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BRAZIL CONFERENCE 
Principal Kenneth McRoberts 
Glendon College, York University 
PREFACE 
As many of you know, Glendon College's founding Principal was Escott Reid. Rhodes 
Scholar, former high commissioner to India and ambassador to Western Germany, Reid 
was one of the artisans of Canada's post World War II foreign policy. Within Reid's vision, 
Glendon was to be devoted to preparing Canadians for public service. It was for this reason 
that Glendon was made to be bilingual: all graduates were to be competent in Canada's 
second official language. And, reflecting Reid's own experience and preoccupations, the 
notion of public affairs involved international as well as domestic matters. 
Au fil des ans, l'enseignement bilingue en sciences sociales et lettres de Glendon a 
mene ban nombre d'etudiants ii jouer un role de premier plan au niveau des relations 
internationales. On compte parmi nos anciens et anciennes trois ambassadeurs du Canada, 
un Secretaire-General-adjoint (Amnistie internationale), des economistes de reputation 
internationale, ainsi que beaucoup d'autres personnes de haut qualibre occupant ou ayant 
occupe des pastes d'importance ii l'echelle mondiale. 
Notre programme d'etudes internationales exerce une influence preponderante dans 
la preparation des etudiants de Glendon ii la vie publique internationale. Pluridisciplinaire, 
ce programme s'appui sur /'ensemble des ressources du College pour offrir une formation 
unique dans les deux langues officielles du Canada et ce, dans le domaine des etudes 
internationales. 
One of the program's most remarkable achievements is the organization by its students 
of annual conferences. This is the seventh such conference. The topics of previous 
conferences were, in chronological order: Cuba, China, South Africa, the European Union, 
the Middle East, and South East Asia. In most instances, the conferences have been 
followed by visits to the region in question. The students have already chosen the theme for 
next year's conference: Russia. 
So, as Principal of Glendon, I am delighted to declare open the conference on "Brazil: 
The Emergence of a World Power': 
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RESEARCH AT YORK UNIVERSITY 
Stan M. Shapson, PhD 
Vice-President Research & Innovation 
York University 
York University has a rich history of student-led initiatives and has always 
challenged students to take an active role in research and innovation. This year's · 
international conference, entitled Brazil: The Emergence of a World Power was a 
wonderful example of how Glendon students are contributing to public policy and 
research. This initiative is contributing to the exchange of ideas and transfer of 
knowledge. The student-initiated conference at Glendon played an important 
research and policy role in Canada, contributing to a greater understanding of the 
impact of globalization on Brazil and providing an important platform to examine 
the possibilities of strengthening Brazil-Canada relations. 
York University is firmly committed to connecting knowledge internationally. 
We are working hard to make international connections in our research and we 
have identified the expansion of international research as a strategic priority. The 
international connections that we have made to date are powerful and provide us 
with important understandings and mutual benefits. We can and will, however, do 
more. 
My office, for example, is working with faculty members at four universities 
across Canada to establish Canada's first and only national research chair in Brazil 
Studies. This research chair will bring together a number of universities across 
Canada to strengthen the Brazil-Canada dialogue. It will be a truly interdisciplinary 
and international research chair with outreach to the business community and 
policy makers across the country, and beyond. Having our university as one of the 
main participants in the Brazil research chair will provide our students with the 
opportunity to interact on a regular basis with key scholars from Brazil. 
Our research focuses the attention of local, national, and international 
communities to York and we are increasingly viewed as a distinctive institution 
that increases understanding, addresses complex scientific and societal problems, 
and develops the frontiers of knowledge. In fact, with its wealth of international 
collaborations York is perfectly suited to take a leadership role in the new borderless 
information world in which we are living. 
The innovative international programs undertaken at Glendon and the focus of 
its students on connecting studies to policies and practices in other countries 
is to be commended. 
I would like to congratulate the students who organized this exciting and important 
international conference. 
I wish to extend my thanks to His Excellency, Henrique R. Valle, Ambassador 
of Brazil to Canada who delivered the conference's keynote address. 
Thank you also to each of the individuals and organizations that generously 
contributed to this year's international conference, the field trip to Brazil, the 
individual research essays, and this publication. 
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CONTRIBUTORS 
Prof. Bernard Andres 
Presentation du Centre d'etudes et de recherches sur le Bresil de l'UQAM 
Professeur de lettres a l'Universite du Quebec a Montreal (UQAM), Bernard Andres 
est aussi membre de la Societe Royale du Canada. Il s'occupe depuis seize ans des 
echanges litteraires entre le Quebec et le Bresil. Il sejourne regulierement comme 
professeur invite et conferencier. Il s'interesse aux etudes comparees Quebec- Bresil 
et a publie divers travaux dans des revues bresiliennes de l'Etat de Rio Grande do 
Sul. Il dirige a l'UQAM un nouveau Centre d'etudes et de recherches sur le Bresil, 
inaugure en septembre 2001. 
Dr. Albert Berry 
Recent economic trends in Brazil 
Albert Berry is Professor of Economics at the University of Toronto and Research 
Director of the Programme on Latin America and the Caribbean at the University's 
Centre for International Studies. His main research areas, with focus on Latin 
America, are labour markets and income distribution (with attention to the impacts 
of the recent economic reforms in Latin America), the economics of small and 
medium enterprise, the economics of education, and agrarian structure and policy. 
He has worked with the Ford Foundation, the Colombian Planning Commission, 
and the World Bank, and acted as consultant for a number of international and 
other agencies. He recently directed an analysis of economic policy for Pakistan 
over the next 15 years. 
Ms. Annette Hester 
Politics, Presidential Elections amd the energy Crisis in Brazil 
Annette was born and educated in Rio de Janeiro. Her primary activities have 
included developing market strategies and acting as liaison between leading oil, gas 
and energy companies in North America and Latin America. She has also 
provided consulting services to governmental agencies in several countries of the 
Americas, especially in Brazil and Canada. In 2001, she was appointed director 
(interim) of the new Latin American Research Centre of the University of Calgary. 
With her unique expertise, Annette has frequently been an invited participant in 
round table discussion on hemispheric integration and trade negotiations. 
Dr. Charles Gastle 
The Aircraft from Brazil/Canada dispute 
Dr. Charles Gastle has a Doctorate in International Trade and Competition Law and 
is a partner at Shibley Righton LLP, Toronto. He was called to the Bar in 1987 and 
practices commercial litigation, international arbitration and trade law. He has 
published more than 30 articles in a variety of publications. 
Prof. Ted Hewitt 
Urbanization: Brazilian Innovations in Response to Social Problems in Brazil 
W. E. (Ted) Hewitt is Associate Vice-President (Research) and Professor of Sociology 
at the University of Western Ontario in London, Canada. He is Managing Editor of 
the Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, and director of the 
Brazilian Studies Working Group, and association of university-based Brazilianists in 
Ontario and Quebec. He has published extensively on issues related to social move-
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ments, local government, and international cooperation for urban development in 
Brazil and elsewhere in Latin America. 
Ms. Sherry Nelligan 
Dreams and Disparities - Gender Equality in Brazil 
Sherry Nelligan is the Executive Director of Gender Equality Incorporated in 
Toronto, Ontario. As the promotion of equality and success is her passion, Sherry 
has been working in this area for over 15 years from various analytical perspectives 
including: grass roots community work, counseling and advocacy, gender analyses, 
gender training and teaching, project management and publications. Over the 
years, Sherry has contributed to international development projects for various 
sectors and countries. The majority of her work has been in Brazil where she lived 
and worked for over 6 years. Sherry is the recipient of a Canadian International 
Development Award for Canadians. · 
Dr. Rosana Barbosa Nunes 
Immigration to Brazil and the formation of the Brazilian people 
Dr. Rosana Barbosa Nunes is Assistant Professor at Brock University and Course 
Director at Glendon College. She completed her undergraduate studies in Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil and her M.A. and Ph.D at the University of Toronto. She has published 
articles on aspects of the history of immigration to Brazil and on Portuguese 
immigration during the 19th century. She has taught courses on Brazilian history 
and culture as well as on Latin America history at the University of Toronto, York 
University, Guelph University and Brock University. 
Dr. Cecilia Rocha 
Urban Food Security Policy: the Case of Belo Horizante, Brazil 
Dr. Rocha's recent research projects focus on issues related to food security in 
Canada and other countries. She has written a paper on food security policies in 
Belo Horizante, Brazil, and is now working on an evaluation of the costs and 
benefits of school nutrition programs in Toronto. She was one the planners and 
coordinators of the Workshop on Food Security (Food Jam) held during the first 
World Social Forum in Porto Algre, Brazil, in January 2001. Since 1998, Dr. Rocha 
has been the Toronto coordinator for the International Training for Environmental 
Leadership (ITEL), developed by NIEGA, based in Sao Paulo. In the teaching area, 
Dr. Rocha has been involved in developing an international field experience course 
on community development. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Janice Leung 
The Brazil Independent Study Committee is pleased to present this publication, 
which is the culmination of our project entitled: "Brazil: the Emergence of a World 
Power': The project included a semester course and the organization of an inter-
national conference on Brazil, as well as a field research trip to the country. We 
hope that this collection of essays, which encompass the conference and field trip 
portions of this project, will not only result in a better understanding of Brazil, but 
will also promote the strengthening of Canada-Brazil relations. 
The student Annual Conference Project has become a tradition at Glendon 
since the 1995-96 academic year. Each year, a group of seven or eight students 
decide to study a country, a region or an international institution. This very 
demanding Project has four main components: a series of seminars on the selected 
country, region or institution (Fall Term); the organization of an international 
colloquium on the subject (Winter term); a field research trip (after the final exams); 
and the submission of a research essay on aspects of the country/region or 
institution concerned (usually on security, trade, investments, and human rights 
issues). Until the year 2000-2001, the project has covered the following countries 
and regions: Cuba (1995-96), mainland China (1996-97), South Africa (1997-98), 
the European Union (1998-99), the Middle East (1999-2000), and South East Asia 
(2000-2001). 
In continuing this tradition, this year we focused on Brazil as our subject of 
study. Brazil is a vibrant, culturally diverse society that evokes images of the mad 
passion of Carnival along with the mythic nooks of the Amazon. As the largest and 
most populous Latin American country, the Federative Republic of Brazil has long 
ignited the imagination of explorers and scholars alike. This regional powerhouse 
has experienced a vast amount of changes over the last thirty years, including over-
coming military governance of the country, and stands now as the third largest 
democracy in the world. As well, tremendous industrial and agricultural development 
has led Brazil to become South America's leading economic power and the country 
with the eighth largest GDP worldwide. At the dawn of the 21st century, the future 
of Brazil as both a regional and global leader looks bright. 
The first two parts of this publication are a collection of the major papers 
presented at our very successful conference on Brazil, held at Glendon on February 23, 
2002, in which experts from the public and private sectors were brought together 
to produce stimulating discussions on the domestic and foreign policy of this South 
American giant. Part I deals with selected social, economic and political issues. Part 
11 covers aspects of Canada-Brazil commercial and academic relations. 
Part Ill includes some of our experiences and impressions gathered during our 
field trip to Brazil, in April 2002. The objective of the field trip was to immerse the 
committee members into Brazilian culture and society, allowing them to gain a 
first-hand perspective of the country. As well, three weeks of field research in Brazil 
greatly enhanced the quality and depth of our knowledge of this great country. The 
field research portion of the project gave us a real taste of the diversity and vitality 
of this country. Having spent time in six cities (Sao Paulo, Salvador, Manaus, Brasilia, 
Porto Alegre, Rio de Janeiro) located in different regions of the country, the most 
striking initial impression of Brazil was its diversity of cultures, which gave the idea 
of having many different countries in one. However, the commonality that we found 
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in each region that we visited, was the vibrancy and dynamic nature of Brazilian 
society. During our field research trip we had the chance to visit universities, NGOs, 
government agencies and cultural centres. Though our visit was relatively short, we 
had the benefit of experiencing many aspects of Brazilian society during that 
period of time. 
Finally, we have many people to thank for helping us make this project a 
success. In addition to the supporters mentioned in Annex, there are many more 
people who deserve our gratitude. In particular, we would like to extend our 
warmest thanks and appreciation to those who attended the conference and to the 
many individuals and organizations that showed us such hospitality during our field 
research trip in Brazil. We would like to express our deep gratitude for such kindness 
and support. For without such support, our project would not have been possible. 
The Brazil Independent Study Committee, 2001-2002 
Edith da Costa 
Guillaume Landry 
Jessica Dionne 
Marie-Claire Lemay 
Vanessa Lishingman 
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Maria Faija 
Janice Leung 
BRAZIL: PRESENT DOMESTIC REALITIES AND FOREIGN POLICY GOALS 
Remarks by His Excellency Henrique Valle, 
Ambassador of Brazil to Canada 
Thank you very much, Ms. McDougall, for your introduction. I am very 
honored to be here at Glendon College and extend my appreciation to the Principal, 
Professor Kenneth McRoberts, and the Brazil Independent Study Committee for this 
invitation. 
This is perhaps the most important academic event about Brazil that has taken 
place during my almost three years in Canada. A great number of relevant persons 
in the field of Brazilian studies in Canada have been brought together for this 
conference. Along with my appreciation, I convey my warmest congratulations for 
this most welcome initiative. 
Fostering academic contacts between Brazil and Canada is necessarily a top 
priority. I am convinced that this field offers ample opportunities for improving 
bilateral relations. Yesterday I had the pleasure to meet with the President of York 
University, Professor Lorna Marsden, and other senior members of this institution. 
We discussed the possibility of having a chair on Brazilian Studies in Canada. Both 
countries have much to gain from increased mutual awareness. I am very much 
determined to follow up on this issue. Therefore, for a number of reasons, 
it is a great pleasure to be here today. 
As a Brazilian citizen, I must confess to a certain degree of pride when I first 
read the title of this conference "Brazil: the emergence of a world power" . However, 
as a diplomat, objectivity and discretion recommend a more cautious approach to 
my presentation. Brazil has certainly a long way to go before it could be considered 
a "world power" . 
Having in mind this basic concept, I will divide my presentation in three main 
blocks. I will initially comment on Brazil's potential to become an increasingly 
relevant actor in the world, but I will also focus on domestic shortcomings which 
remind us that Brazil is still a developing country. I will also speak about our 
foreign policy priorities and, as Ambassador to Canada, I will take this opportunity 
to make some brief comments on the prospects for bilateral relations. 
I would like, however, to make a clarification for what you may come to regard 
as a lack of academic rigor in my presentation. More than attempting to deliver a 
coherent and well-structured speech, I will try to highlight some specific facts and 
trends which I consider to be important for any appraisal of Brazil, a country whose 
huge diversity and complex realities challenge quick and easy assessments. 
I. 
Brazil is a country with great assets and an extraordinary potential. Throughout 
our history, we have shared with Canada one common national characteristic: 
optimism and faith in the future. When I came to Canada, I was struck by the 
famous speech by Prime Minister Laurier in 1904, in which he said that the 20th 
century would be the century of Canada. Nothing could be more similar to the state 
of mind that has historically marked the view of Brazilians about our own future. 
Even in the face of adversity, widespread belief that Brazil has a great future is 
undoubtedly a national trait. And, in many aspects, that future has already been 
conquered. 
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I begin my presentation with a clear note of optimism regarding the strength 
of democracy in Brazil. Political institutions are solid. Congress is vibrant, an effective 
counterweight to the Executive branch in Brazil's presidential system. The Judiciary 
is absolutely independent. Civil society has become increasingly active. Freedom of 
the press is second to none in the world. Trade unions are free. These realities are a 
guarantee for long-term political stability. 
Brazil's demographic characteristics are testimony of a great country. The 
Portuguese, Native Indians and Africans who formed the original core of the new 
nation were joined by immigrants from all corners, resulting in a society that is 
unique in terms of diversity. Brazil hosts the largest communities of Italian and 
Japanese descent in the world. The number of Brazilians of Arab and German 
origin is also impressive. 
In that sense, Brazil is not different from other immigration countries. However, 
what stands out in Brazil's diversity is that people from such distinct origins have 
indeed molded themselves into a new common identity. Second and third generations 
seldom speak the language of their ancestors. Brazil is definitely not made up of 
different peoples and cultures living side-by-side and keeping their own 
separate identities, but rather the product of an unprecedented raeial, ethnical and 
cultural mix. It might be difficult to grasp the essence of this new identity, but it is 
quite evident to any foreigner that Brazilians feel they belong together. It is as 
simple as that, but stating the obvious can be useful, since the average Brazilian is 
often not aware of this extraordinary achievement, especially in a world marked in 
so many ways by ethnic conflict. 
I am not arguing that Brazil, according to the well-known theory which was so 
popular in the past, is a "racial democracy". That would be naive, at best. Many difficult 
challenges remain, especially with regard to the social condition of Brazilians of 
African ascendancy. In a historical step, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso has 
been taking the lead to address this issue. There can be no doubt, however, that 
Brazil, gradually overcoming obstacles, is a unique and successful example for racial 
and ethnic tolerance. In our era of globalization, Brazil is therefore particularly 
well-positioned to be a voice for understanding between countries and cultures. Our 
society is in itself a product of globalization, before this statement became vogue. 
Brazil's demographic evolution is also impressive with regard to the pace of 
population growth. Our football fans will remember that the 1970 world cup 
victory in Mexico was celebrated with a song that mentioned a nation of 90 million 
people. One generation later, the country's population stands at 170 million, 
practically doubling in the last 30 years. These numbers are overwhelming, still 
more so when we consider that population growth came hand in hand with an 
acceleration of migration to the cities. Back in the seventies, almost 50% of the 
population still lived in rural areas, compared to less than 20% now. In rough numbers, 
Brazilian cities had some 52 million inhabitants in 1970, but more than 136 
million now - an astonishing growth of almost three times in one generation. One 
can hardly imagine the resulting pressure on public services in areas such as urban 
infrastructure, health or education - let alone adequately respond to them. 
And yet, all in all, Brazil's society has been able to rise to the challenge, in spite 
of shortcomings which I will mention ahead. Today, demographic pressures are 
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abating. Population growth is down to a much more manageable pace of 1.3% a 
year. In the years and decades ahead, there will be more room for increasingly 
successful social policies in Brazil. 
Beyond its demographic and territorial scale, Brazil's potential is also under-
scored by the size of its economy, one of the most important among developing 
countries. 
Having reached a value of more than US$ 800 billion in 1997, Brazil's GDP fell 
sharply in nominal dollar terms after the devaluation of the Real in 1999. However, 
it must be noted that this does not reflect an actual decline in the production of 
goods and services - it is, rather, a consequence of devaluation. Therefore, in order 
to have a more accurate perception about Brazil's economic size, it is appropriate to 
consider it in purchasing power terms. 
According to the World Bank, Brazil's purchasing power parity- or PPP - gross 
national income in 1999 reached US$ 1.15 trillion, placing Brazil as the ninth 
economy in the world after the USA, China, Japan, India, Germany, France, the UK, 
and Italy, in this order. Again: I do not want to sound naive. It is quite clear that 
size does not translate into well-being of average citizens. While Brazil's per capita 
income in that same year in PPP terms was US$ 6,840.00, Canada's, in comparison, 
was US$ 25,440.00. 
Brazil's economic potential has been reinvigorated by successful stabilization 
policies since the launching of the so-called Real Plan in 1994. Despite the shock of 
the 1999 devaluation, in the wake of an unprecedented credit crunch in 
international markets, Brazil was able to maintain the course of stability, thanks to 
structural reforms and sound ·macroeconomic policies that have been in place since 
1994. Brazil's new commitment to responsible fiscal and monetary policies is an 
achievement of historical proportions. 
After experiencing economic growth of 4.5% in 2000, Brazilians were confident 
that we had entered a new era of sustainable long-term expansion. However, a very 
unfortunate combination of events came to prevail last year: an unexpected domestic 
energy crisis; fears of a possible contagion effect from other emerging economies; 
the economic slowdown in the United States and its effects on the world economy; 
and, last but not the least, the aftermath of the tragic events of September 11th. 
Under these difficult circumstances, Brazil's economy has proven once more its 
resilience and capacity to react to new challenges, having grown by some 
2% last year, according to initial estimates. Although this figure is frustratingly low 
for a country with huge social problems such as Brazil, it is nevertheless acceptable 
given current international conditions. 
I do not intend to deal at length with macroeconomic figures. But I would like 
to suggest, to those of you who might want to have a closer look at Brazil's recent 
economic performance, that you glance through the remarks I made here in 
Toronto, last November, at the Annual Luncheon of the Brazil-Canada Chamber of 
Commerce and the Canadian Council for the Americas. The text is available at the 
Embassy's web page. For updated figures, you might also visit the web sites of the 
Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance, which you can reach through the 
Embassy's home page. 
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In any case, the message I would like to stress today is that Brazil's economic 
potential is becoming more and more a reality. I am confident that this positive 
trend has solid roots. 
As you know, Presidential elections will be held next October. At this stage, we 
should refrain from early conclusions or forecasts. Some eight months before the 
vote, there are still too many uncertainties. But it seems clear that President 
Cardoso's legacy of stabilization, responsible economic policies and structural 
reforms will remain in place. 
Stability is a conquest of Brazilian society as a whole, beyond questioning by 
any political platform. It has meant a lot for millions of lower income Brazilians 
who were able to overcome poverty thanks to its benefits. According to official 
figures, 44% of the population were considered to be poor in 1993, in comparison 
with 32% in 1999. 
Although this trend is positive, the fact remains, however, that 53 million 
Brazilians, approximately 1/3 of the population, were still living in poverty in 1999. 
This situation that can be described, without indulging in any overstatement, as 
Brazil's major historical shortcoming, even more so because - as President Cardoso 
remarks -Brazil is not a poor country in terms of the size of its economy, but rather 
an unjust one. 
There are a number of programs in place in order to address this challenge, but 
undoubtedly Brazil is still very much affected by an extremely unfair income 
distribution pattern. For decades, overcoming poverty has proved to be an elusive 
goal. The difficulties in fighting poverty more effectively affect the country's image 
abroad - but, more than that, it represents a blow to our self-confidence. 
It is true that Brazil's social indicators have consistently improved over the last 
decades, even during the so-called "lost decade" of the eighties. While the average 
life expectancy barely reached 52 in 1970, it is now approaching the 70-year mark. 
Infant mortality in the first year of life has decreased from 88 per thousand in 1970 
to 48 in 1991 and is now down to 33. In 1992, o"nly 86% of Brazilians in the 7-14 
age group were enrolled in school -but now we are not far from the goal of having 
all Brazilians in that age group regularly attending school. 
Overall, there is a clear trend towards better social indicators. Again, however, 
results are far from satisfactory, specially taking into account Brazil's resources 
and potential. The country's economic achievements ought to warrant better living 
conditions for the average Brazilian. Social indicators in Brazil still compare 
unfavorably with those of most other Latin American countries. 
Brazil remains very much a country of contrasts, a characteristic which 
recommends a cautious approach when assessing its realities. The concept of 
"dualism" is present in every major interpretation about Brazil's history. A country 
of remarkable achievements and potential, but still plagued by significant levels of 
poverty. A country committed to democracy and the rule of law, but still marred by 
human rights violations. A country committed to environment protection, with a 
leading role in international endeavors in this field, but still coping with a serious 
challenge in the Amazon region and in other ecosystems. 
Having returned to democracy in the eighties, and conquered economic 
stability in the nineties, fighting poverty and improving the living standards of our 
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people is certainly going to be the central issue of Brazilian political life in 
the years to come. Foreign policy must keep that in mind, in order to preserve its 
legitimacy and support among the Brazilian society. 
11. 
As Foreign Minister Celso Later points out, Brazil's foreign policy tries to match 
domestic demands with external windows of opportunity. That is why the challenge 
of national development is at the core of foreign policy priorities. 
Brazilians take a very realistic approach to our capacity to play an active role in 
international affairs. We are certainly very much aware of our scale - territorial, 
demographic or economic - and our assets, but at the same time we are no less 
aware of our shortcomings. 
It is clear that in Brazil there is no room for strategic and military ambitions an 
a regional or global scale. Pressing domestic needs prevent the mobilization which 
would be necessary for the fulfillment of such ambitions. In other words: Brazil 
cherishes no dreams of grandeur. The Brazilian society would never lend its support 
to such visions. 
Throughout our history, Brazil's most important diplomatic achievement has 
been the fact that we have been living in peace with all our neighbors in South 
America since 1870. National borders were all settled by peaceful means at the turn 
of the 19th and 20th centuries. Relations with our neighbors have been marked by 
understanding and cooperation, especially after democracy became the rule in the 
continent in the eighties. 
Taking into account this framework of peace and stability in the region, it is 
only normal that diplomacy in Brazil be very much centered on the contributions 
it must give to national development. This is certainly very important, since 
policy in Brazil devotes so much attention to economic and trade issues, such as the 
consolidation of MERCOSUL, a free trade agreement between MERCOSUL 
and the Andean Community, the FTAA process, a free trade agreement between 
MERCOSUL and the European Union or trade negotiations at the WTO. 
On the other hand, these comments certainly do not mean that Brazil does not 
seek an active voice on international issues which have an impact on national 
. development. On the contrary: however subjective this appraisal might be, I dare to 
say that on issues such as the FTAA process, the WTO discussions or environment 
protection, among others, Brazilian diplomacy has a degree of influence which goes 
beyond the "scale" of the country. 
In a speech last November at the opening of the United Nations General 
Assembly, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso set out some major issues facing 
world leaders today: defeating terrorism; reforming the UN Security Council; 
expanding the G-7; launching a new trade round at the WTO in order to redress 
inequalities that are detrimental to developing countries; firmly establishing the 
International Criminal Court; implementing the Kyoto Protocol; and strengthening 
the non-proliferation regime. This is an ambitious agenda, which reflects Brazil's 
desire to contribute to a more balanced international order, to the benefit of all. 
After September 11th - while recognizing that the challenge posed by terrorism 
requires a much greater emphasis on security and defense issues in the international 
agenda - Brazil has been saying that this should not steer us away from other 
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cooperative endeavors. The imperatives of fighting poverty in the world, promoting 
human rights and greater social justice, protecting the environment and building a 
more equitable world remain as daunting as ever, and certainly even more pressing. 
They are a priority for Brazil, and our diplomacy does not spare any effort in order 
to promote those goals. 
Ill 
As Ambassador of Brazil to Canada, I would like to conclude my presentation 
with some remarks on our bilateral relations. Objectivity forces us to admit that 
these remain a story of unrealized potential. 
Brazil and Canada share a number of common interests in the hemisphere and 
in the world. This stems from the fact that both countries - one developed, one an 
emerging economy - constitute plural, multi-ethnic societies espousing the values 
of freedom and democracy, human rights and social justice. We do have, therefore, 
the basis to build upon. However, the substance of our overall relationship remains 
somewhat elusive. The fabric of our relations still lacks the necessary density. 
As you know very well, bilateral relations have for the past several years been 
suffering the prolonged effects of the aircraft dispute involving Bombardier and 
Embraer. Although technically it is now a trade dispute at the WTO, this issue 
has become a pervasive element of our relations, with consequences that extend 
beyond the aerospace field. 
As much as we may wish to contain the effects of the dispute, it is undeniable 
that its negative impact on Canada-Brazil relations has been significant. It has 
affected political dialogue and our trade and investment relationship. 
The conclusion of the most recent panels at the WTO - one confirming that 
PROEX III conforms to international trade rules and the other asking Canada to 
withdraw several recent loan operations - may help to create favorable conditions 
for the bilateral dialogue on the aircraft dispute. Recently, our negotiators met in 
Sao Paulo, last November, and in New York, two weeks ago. They agreed to continue 
consultations next April. Both sides expressed their willingness to end this dispute, 
but at this point it is not yet possible to foresee how things are going to evolve. In 
any case, as long as it remains, it will affect the normal flow of bilateral relations. 
Brazilian exports of beef compounded the difficulties caused by the aircraft 
dispute. The damage to Canada's image in Brazil was significant, as the move was 
perceived by the Brazilian public to have constituted an unfair measure, adopted 
hastily and in the absence of justifiable grounds. 
We have since overcome the more turbulent period in the immediate aftermath 
of the embargo, which brought constructive bilateral contacts to a virtual halt. 
Gradually, we are moving toward a more normal pattern of relations, including the 
resumption of high-level bilateral meetings. I am very pleased with the fact that 
tonight I am travelling to Brazil in order to participate in consultations to be held 
between our two Vice Foreign Ministers, a high level dialogue which is now 
auspiciously inaugurated. 
The resumption of high level contacts is in the interest of both sides. We have 
a tradition of cooperation in the multilateral arena in areas such as democracy, 
14 
human rights, the environment, disarmament and non-proliferation. We have 
shown joint leadership in pushing ahead the issue of democracy and human rights 
in the Summit of the Americas process. We have a sound basis on which to build 
upon. A better bilateral relation is a contribution to the promotion of common 
interests in the Hemisphere and in the world. 
Dear and distinguished friends, 
Once again, I would like to reaffirm my profound satisfaction for the opportunity 
to have shared with you some ideas about Brazil. 
Thank you very much. 
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IMMIGRATION AND THE FORMATION OF THE BRAZILIAN PEOPLE 
Rosana Barbosa Nunes 
Introduction 
Thank you very much for the opportunity to be here today. Since I'm the first 
speaker of this panel, I would like to give you a broad introduction to the major 
historical issues and trends affecting the formation of the Brazilian people. In this 
presentation I'll avoid undertaking a strictly academic analysis and instead give you 
a more personal perspective based on my experience as a Brazilian immigrant in 
Canada. 
When I came to Canada, I thought it was interesting that many people here 
frequently asked me the question: "What are you?" At first I didn't know what they 
meant but slowly, I began to understand that people here had the need to under-
stand what was my racial or ethnic background. So I began answering them that I 
was Brazilian. Yet, to my amazement, my answer was still not enough to appease· 
the curiosity of my new Canadian acquaintances. Then, I began understanding that 
they wanted me to hyphenate my Brazilian nationality. Probably, they wanted me 
to say that I was "Portuguese-Brazilian" or "Italian-Brazilian," "native-Brazilian" or 
something similar. However, this question didn't make much sense to me, since 
most Brazilians do not keep track of their ancestry, at least not in the same way as 
Canadians do. 
An event involving Brazilians here in Toronto also got me thinking how Brazil's 
experience with immigration and immigrant adaptation was different from that of 
Canada. It took place on the subway, where a group of Brazilians from a variety of 
racial backgrounds- European, Korean, African, and African-European- were talking 
very lively and loudly (as Brazilians usually do) when a Canadian man approached 
them and said that he was dying of curiosity to know where they were from. He said 
that he had never seen a group who looked so different from each other but who 
acted so much alike. One of the Brazilians said they were from Brazil after which 
the man left since his stop had arrived. I can only imagine that after he left, the 
Canadian man was probably as confused as before or even more as most North 
Americans have no idea of Brazil's racial and cultural diversity or the high level of 
interaction between the races. 
So today, I want to give you a general idea of the different peoples who 
immigrated to Brazil and I'll attempt to illustrate that Brazil achieved a true 
"melting pot"society in the 20th century, mainly as a result of a rational decision 
to "brazilianize" Brazil. 
Immigration to Brazil 
In regards to the different groups that immigrated to Brazil, let me say briefly 
that Brazil received a large number of forced and free immigrants throughout most 
of its history. For instance, Brazil received the largest number of African slaves of 
any nation in the world. As table 1 shows, Brazil received an average of 3 and a half 
million slaves. The descendants of those who survived slavery comprise today the 
largest African community outside Africa. 
Brazil also received large numbers of free immigrants, throughout its history (as 
Tables 2, 3, and 4 show). From the colonial period to the mid-20th century, Brazil 
received a large and constant influx of Portuguese immigrants. The influx of 
Portuguese immigrants has been a constant in the history of European contact with 
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Brazil. This South American country constituted the main destination for · 
Portuguese immigrants from the middle of the sixteenth century to the 1790s. 
From the nineteenth until the middle of the twentieth centuries "over four fifths of 
all registered Portuguese migrants went to Brazil." In absolute terms, there were at 
least 1,055,154 registered Portuguese migrants entering Brazil from 1820 to 1920. 
Other Europeans also arrived in Brazil on different occasions. For instance, in 
the 1820s and 1830s, German and Irish families were brought to Brazil and given a 
plot of land on the condition that the adult males serve in the Brazilian army for 
a period of about eight years. Germans were also brought to Brazil on different 
occasions and granted plots of land in empty or border areas of the empire, as a way 
to assert and guarantee sovereignty over regions under dispute with neighbouring 
countries, mostly in southern Brazil. · 
After the abolition of the slave trade in 1850, Italians and Spanish immigrants 
among others, began to be subsidized to work on the coffee plantations of Brazil. 
These new immigrants were mostly directed to Sao Paulo. The economic dominance 
which Rio de Janeiro enjoyed in the first half of the nineteenth century shifted to 
Sao Paulo in the second half of the century. Because of this, Sao Paulo was the state 
irt Brazil which sponsored the most immigrants after 1850. 
These were later joined by the Japanese, who began arriving in the early twentieth 
century. This group constituted the first Asians to arrive in Brazil. Up until the mid 
1920's, Japanese immigration was relatively insignificant. However, during the period 
between 1924 and 1933, it became the second largest migratory current. 
Most Japanese immigrants went to Sao Paulo and, by the 1930s, they comprised 
more than half of all immigrants arriving in this State. Until 1925 most of the 
Japanese came to Brazil to work in the coffee plantations. However, after WWI large 
numbers of Japanese were subsidized by the Japanese government to emigrate to 
Brazil. These immigrants were able to establish themselves as small farmers in 
different regions of this country but most settled in Sao Paulo. The descendants of 
these Japanese immigrants comprise today the largest Japanese community outside 
Japan. 
Yet, I should argue that, despite the importance of all of these, to the development 
of Brazil, none of these groups have contributed to the growth of this nation to the 
same extent as the Portuguese and the Africans. The large number of Africans who 
arrived in Brazil from the mid 1500s to the mid 1800s and the constant 
historical flow of Portuguese immigration have shaped this nation in a fashion 
unlike that of any other group. 
The Whitening of the Brazilian Population 
One interesting aspect of Brazilian immigration history was the desire of the 
Brazilian elite throughout the 19th century to whiten the Brazilian population 
through European immigration. The independence of Brazil in 1822 was brought 
about by a small group of whites whose intentions were to free Brazil from the 
colonial limitations in terms of trade and administration, but who wanted to keep 
the social structure of the country intact. This group firmly opposed social change. 
The Africans in Brazil were seen as a necessity for the empire but were not regarded 
as a group who should be granted political, social, or civil rights. 
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Even the few people who called for the end of the slave trade did so not 
through humanitarian concerns but by pointing to the negative influence that 
blacks had on the country. For instance, the Aurora Fluminense published an article 
in November 1831 criticizing the slave traders for barbarising the country through 
their importation of enslaved Africans. According to the editor of the newspaper, 
his fellow countrymen " ... continued in the vicious circle of working on one hand 
to civilise the nation and on another to barbarise it with the frequent dealings with 
these men, born and reared without civilisation and promptly transported to the 
most intimate places of our abodes, and put into close contact with our children, 
from their tender infancy ... " 
The level of racism towards Africans is apparent in many statements of the 
period. In 1823 the Minister of the empire, Jose de Bonifc'icio e Silva, was probably" 
the only member of the government who defended the end of the slave trade with 
conviction. During a dialogue with Charles Chamberlain, the British representative 
in Brazil, he stated that the Africans in Brazil "are the gangrene of our prosperity." 
In 1837, a Brazilian intellectual, Frederico Leopold Cezar Burlamaque wrote a 
book on the slave trade and on the negative aspects of domestic slavery. In it he 
supported the end of slavery in Brazil, the buying of a colony by Brazil in Africa so 
that all blacks in the country could be sent to Africa after the abolition of slavery, 
and an increase in European immigration. 
He defended the arrival of Europeans on the grounds that, in his opinion, the 
slaves were unfit for any work demanding intelligence. 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the preference for white 
immigrants began to take a more organized form. The "Sociedade Central da 
Imigra~ao", created in the early 1880s, had the specific objective of bringing 
Europeans to Brazil. It, believed that even though Africans and Orientals were 
superior to the European as an agricultural labour force, Europeans were more 
intelligent than the Orientals who in turn were more intelligent than the African. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the preference for white settlers was also 
clearly acknowledged by the government. A decree in 1890 declared that the country 
welcomed all healthy and able-bodied immigrants who were not subject to any 
criminal persecution in their own countries. However, it accepted "natives of Asia 
or Africa, who .can be admitted only by authorisation of the National Congress and 
in accordance with the stipulated conditions". 
The Brazilian elite credited Brazil's backwardness in relation to the United 
States and Europe as a racial problem and, in their minds, in order to progress, Brazil 
needed to create a nation which resembled Europe as much as possible. The belief 
was that it was necessary to improve the Brazilian "blood" through European 
immigration. Generally speaking, it was believed that an increase in the white 
"blood" would improve Brazil's national character. 
Yet, before we jump to conclusions about racism in Brazil, let me say that these 
ideas were widespread in Europe and in North America and were the result of 
European "theories" of racial superiority which were founded on Darwinism. These 
ideas were widespread in Europe and in the Americas. Therefore, the Brazilian racist 
approach to its black population and its desire to create a more European population 
was not unique in the Americas. 
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The "Brazilianization" of Brazil 
However, what was unique, was that even though the Brazilian elite was 
openly racist toward Brazil's blacks, Brazil never established any legalized system of 
segregation in the country as did the United States and South Africa. In addition, 
by the early 20th century, some segments of the Brazilian elite began openly 
defending the idea that the Brazilian people derived from a mixture of different 
races, such as the European, the African and the Indian and claiming that Brazil was 
indeed, not a European nation. This idea was later modified in order to add the 
Japanese contribution to the formation of the Brazilian people. 
By the anniversary of Brazilian independence in 1922, intellectuals were crying 
out for the "Brazilianization of Brazil". During an event organized in Sao Paulo in 
this same year, the "Modern Art Week", a group of intellectuals gave rise to a 
modernist movement within Brazilian arts. Intellectuals taking part in this event 
instigated the idea that Brazil should stop importing European values and culture 
and should promote Brazilian folklore and history. They stated, "We are the sons of 
the hills and the forests. Stop thinking about Europe. Think of America." As a 
consequence, around this time significant elite and middle class groups began valuing 
the presence and the contributions of non-white Brazilians and slowly abandoned 
the ideology of the supremacy of the white race that dominated Brazil in the 19th 
century. 
This does not mean, however, that Brazil became a country free of racism in the 
20th century. Brazil does not have a "racial democracy" as some scholars have 
argued. You need only to see the large number of blacks and mulattos who comprise 
the population of the favelas and who comprise most of the lower working class in 
the country. 
However, what Brazil created, was a society which tried to assert its own nation-
alism by accepting, at least at the level of popular culture, the contributions of all 
of its immigrant groups and by developing the notion that Brazil was indeed not an 
European nation but a rich and diverse society. This idea which was first defended 
by intellectuals was further promoted by politicians such as Getulio Vargas and it 
gained general acceptance during the mid-20th century. It was, for instance, during 
the first government of Getulio Vargas in the 1930s that carnaval became to be 
promoted as the expression of an authentic national Brazilian heritage. 
This new nationalistic approach to Brazil affected mostly the way the elite 
approached Brazil's blacks and it reflected the manner in which the descendants of 
Africans slowly came to be accepted as part of Brazil. However, this approach also 
influenced Brazilians to value the contributions of all immigrant groups Brazil has 
received. Perhaps, with the exception of some Germans from Southern Brazil, we 
can say that most immigrant groups have become acculturated to Brazil and have 
contributed in different ways to the creation of a Brazilian identity. 
The Japanese would probably be the group which would have a more difficult 
time to adapt due to the fact that they came to Brazil much later than all other 
groups and due to the fact that they were the only Asians that came to Brazil in 
significant numbers. However, in a recent visit to Japan, I could see how different 
the Japanese-Brazilians who have immigrated to Japan are from the Japanese from 
Japan. I witness how shocked Japanese people are to see people who look so much 
20 
like them acting in such a different manner. The Japanese don't understand why 
Japanese-Brazilians are always hugging and kissing each other and talking loudly on 
the streets. These are aspects of Brazilian culture and not of Japanese culture. 
Social Impact of Immigration: 
Now I would like to talk about the social impact which immigration has had in 
Brazil. First I should say that the arrival of European immigrants affected the social 
position of Brazilian blacks. The immigration of large numbers of whites meant that 
the blacks now faced increased and unfair competition for jobs. The European 
newcomers had the advantage of being white and of having an easier route to social 
improvement. 
I should also say that the constant flow of European immigrants had a 
profound impact on the racial structure of Brazil's population. For instance today, 
the city of Salvador, in Bahia, is considered the "African" city of Brazil. Yet, in the 
early 1800s, Rio housed the largest black population in the Americas. However, Rio 
today is not considered the "black city" of Brazil. This is in large part because of the 
large number of white immigrants that Rio received throughout_ the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. 
Another impact of immigration in Brazil is that miscegenation between 
European immigrants and blacks served to diminish the black presence in the country. 
The racial system of Brazil in which appearance rather than ancestry determined 
racial classification, corroborated and was, probably, a consequence of the elite's 
policy towards the "whitening" of Brazil's population. "Lighter" mulattos had a 
·tendency to identify themselves with their white predecessors and to deny their 
African ancestry. 
This does not mean, however, that the African influence in Brazil was lost. The 
country still has a significant number of residents of African descent, and African 
culture is evident, even today, especially in music, food and religion. In fact, African 
culture, in many ways, has survived better in Brazil than the culture which was 
brought by the Portuguese. For instance, Portuguese music is not particularly 
popular in Brazil. Even the Portuguese language, in the way that it is spoken and 
written in Portugal, is not well accepted. 
Therefore, to conclude, I should say that immigration has been a very real 
aspect of Brazil's history and it had a profound impact on the country. Moreover, 
I could also say that despite its diverse population Brazil has been able to create a 
society which, although is not free of racial prejudice, has accepted the contribution 
of all of its peoples and together these created the rich Brazilian culture of today. 
Table 1: Most Important Slave Importers in the Americas (1451-1870) 
Brazil 3,646 800 
British Caribbean 
French Caribbean 
Spanish Caribbean 
Dutch Caribbean 
British North America 
1,665 000 
1,600 200 
1,552 000 
500 000 
399 000 
Source: P. Curtin. Atlantic Slave Trade. (Madison, 1970), p.268 
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Table 2: Number of Foreigners Registered in the Police Department of Rio de 
Janeiro, April/1831 and May/1842 
Portuguese 18,427 
French 1,346 
Spanish 869 
English 406 
Germans 
Swiss 
Genoese 
Italians 
Prussians 
Sardinians 
Hanoverians* 
Uruguayans 
Americans 
Argentines 
Danes 
Austrians 
Belgians 
Africans 
Others 
Total 
268 
185 
159 
155 
151 
145 
122 
78 
77 
59 
54 
41 
36 
21 
434 
23,025 
Source: Arquivo Nacional do Rio. de Janeiro. Apresenta~ao de Passaportes de Estrangeiros na Policia. 
C6dice 381, volumes 1-16 
* Includes people from Hamburg 
Table 3: Immigrants Entering Brazil, 1851-75 
Portuguese 151 845 
German 
Italian 
Others 
Total 
36 915 
9 528 
wo 508 
300 632 
Source: Richard Graham. "1850-1870." In: Leslie Bethell. Brazil: Empire and Republic,1822-1930. 
(Cambridge, 1989), p. 137. 
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Table 4: Most Numerous I . G 
. mmigrant roups Entering Brazil, 1890-1929 
Italian 1 156 472 
Portuguese 1 030 666 
Spanish 551 385 
German 112 593 
Russian 108 475 
Japanese 86 577 
Austrians 79 052 
Source: Maria Tereza Schorer Petrone. "Imi ra ao " I . . , . . . 
vol. 2 (Sao Paulo: 1978), pp. 100-10l. g <;: · n. Histona Geral da Civi!izac;:ao Brasileira. Tomo 3, 
Due to a printing error, none of the endnotes from the article 
"Immigration and the Formation of the Brazilian People" by 
Rosana Barbosa Nunes, were included in the printed version. 
Please go to "http://www.glendon.yorku.ca/rosananunes" for the 
complete version of the article. 
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PAST ECONOMIC TRENDS IN BRAZIL: 
THE PRELUDE TO CURRENT ECONOMIC ISSUES 
Albert Berry 
Brazil made major economic gains over the 20th century. One indicator of low 
productivity of an economy and the correspondingly low - income levels is life 
expectancy. Around 1930 the average life expectancy of people born in Brazil was 
about 29 years. Now it is about 67 years. The dramatically low 1930 figure reflected 
extremely high infant mortality rates, widespread malnutrition, and poor sanitary 
conditions. Today's Brazil, while still having a high share of all the poor people in 
Latin America, especially concentrated in the Northeast, is a very different country 
from what it was in 1930. 
The extent of the differences reflect the fact that Brazil over the 35 year period 
(1945-1980) achieved the highest average growth rate of GDP in the world, at nearly 
6% per year. Although population was also growing fast- at its peak in the 1950s at 
around 3% per year, the economy was able to outrun this population growth and 
leave a considerable increase in per capita income (at over 3% per year), which 
amounted to something over a tripling for the period. During this fast growth phase 
there was a rapid and massive shift of people from rural areas to urban ones as the 
relative importance of agriculture gradually fell and that of industry and services 
rose - the standard pattern of structural change in a growing economy. 
Like virtually all developing countries, the early phases of Brazil's growth were 
built on a base of primary sector output and exports; in this case coffee was the first 
dominant export product and Brazil has long been the world's largest producer of 
that item. Beginning to some extent in the years of the Great Depression (1930s), 
Brazil followed an import substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy of development, 
consistent with the teachings of Raul Prebisch and the Economic Commission for 
Latin America, which he headed for many years beginning around 1950. Brazil's 
industrial sector developed rapidly behind high protectionist walls, facilitated by 
the coffee and other exports which permitted the import of machinery and raw 
material for manufacturing which could not be efficiently produced in the country. 
As noted, growth was fast over the 1945-1980 period as a whole, though it did have 
its ups and downs; the high point was the period from the late 1960s through the 
early 1970s (the so-called "Brazilian Miracle") when growth was in the range 8-9% per 
year. Growth slowed when OPEC raised oil prices in the mid-1970s, since Brazil was 
and is an oil importer so a rise in the price of that product was deleterious to growth. 
At that time Brazil made a difficult decision--to borrow on the international 
capital market in order to keep growth moving rapidly. This looked like a reasonable 
decision at the time since real interest rates on such lending were very low. As its 
international debt was being built up by this borrowing, Brazil was also pursuing a 
rational plan of investment in industries (primary and secondary), which would 
raise the country's export capacity by the early to mid-1980s. Had the events which 
precipitated the international debt crisis of the 1980s not transpired, it is reasonably 
probable that Brazil's plan would have worked out nicely, the exports would have 
risen to allow the country to gradually pay off the debt acquired in the 1970s, and 
we would all be applauding the wisdom of the policy choice made at that time to 
borrow in order to keep on growing fast . (Without borrowing, Brazil would have 
had to suffer a recession since it would not have been able to import enough raw 
materials and intermediate goods to keep its industrial establishment operating at 
full capacity; this would have lowered GDP and caused the layoff of many workers). 
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But bad luck came now in the form of the decision by the recently elected 
Reagan in the U.S.A. and Thatcher in the U.K. to rein in the inflation in their countries 
by tight monetary policy and the accompanying recessions. Their lead was followed 
by many other countries. The impact on Brazil was twofold. First, as the inflation 
in key countries like the U.S.A. and the U.K. fell the real interest rate on inter-
national debt rose and the burden of a given amount of debt for a country like 
Brazil therefore jumped up sharply. Secondly, the recession in the industrial world 
made it harder to sell in those countries and, thereby, raise the money needed to 
service the international debt. This scissors effect - the real interest payments 
required on the debt rose but earning the foreign exchange with which to pay that 
debt service became more difficult. This combination made it impossible to escape 
the looming crisis. As the debt crisis deepened, the sources of international credit 
dried up, so even if a country like Brazil had a good plan to work its way out of the. 
debt gradually, no one was willing to advance the credit needed to implement that 
plan. So Brazil, along with many others, was plunged into the debt crisis-induced 
economic crash which ultimately meant that there was almost no growth over the 
1980s as a whole, and pet capita incomes were lower at the end of the decade than 
at the beginning. Worse than this, Brazil's growth dynamic had been broken. When 
a country is growing fast, it is relatively easy to keep growing; there· is a lot of 
positive inertia. When a country is economically stagnant, it is hard to climb out of 
that rut - inertia works against it. So, sadly, Brazil's positive inertia was replaced by 
a negative one and the country has not yet been able to recover strong and stable 
growth. There have been bursts of a couple of good years in a row since then but 
nothing like the success of'the pre-1980 period. 
The Achilles heel of Brazil's overall economic performance has always been the 
extreme levels of income inequality. In this regard Brazil and South Africa are usually 
regarded to be at the top of the dubious hierarchy. The average income of the top 
10% of the population is usually about 80 times that of the bottom 10%. There is a 
great regional concentration of poverty in the Northeast, and a continuous 
. exodus from that region via migration toward the South or the West. Education is 
very unequally distributed in Brazil; quite a few people have higher (university) 
education while many (now more the older people) have none. These aspects of 
inequality date back to a very unequal distribution of land and to a history of 
slavery, which kept equilibrium wages low, together with an immigration policy 
designed to achieve the same effect. Inequality tends to get passed down from 
generation to generation, and this has happened strikingly in Brazil. The relative 
income gaps between rich and poor have not changed greatly since measurement 
started nearly SO years ago. The upshot of the extreme inequality is that the high 
level of poverty suffered in Brazil is unnecessary in the technical sense that there is 
enough income to go around, were it better distributed, something one cannot say 
about the really poor countries of the world like Ethiopia. 
Since the early 1980s, when Brazil was plunged into crisis, there has been a 
complicated and thus far unsuccessful attempt to recover a solid growth path by 
adjusting to the changing international conditions. The last two decades have 
witnessed a dramatic policy shift in Latin America and, in varying degree, around 
the developing world towards liberalization of markets and towards outward 
orientation. This has been strongly encouraged (through conditionalities imposed 
on borrowers) by the IFis - the international financial institutions (International 
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Monetary Fund and World Bank). The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) 
currently under discussion is one manifestation of this shift towards market-friendly 
policies and openness. 
Brazil has been, on average, a reluctant participant in this policy shift. The 
reasons are not too hard to see. First, Brazil did very well, indeed, under the old ISI 
model and has not come close to replicating the growth performance of that model 
since it went into abeyance in 1980. Other Latin American nations did not do so 
well under that model; it was the two largest countries - Brazil and Mexico, whose 
growth was fastest during those decades, suggesting (as does economic theory) that 
such inward-looking policies are likely to work best in relatively large countries with 
big internal markets. During that ISI period, although income distribution 
remained quite unequal, there was a lot of "trickle-down" to the poor and the 
incidence of poverty fell considerably from its initially extremely high level. The ISI 
policy allowed Brazil to nurture a number of industries behind protectionist walls 
before subjecting them to international competition, a general strategy similar to 
those of the East Asian tigers like Korea. Giving up this opportunity to prated 
"infant industries" is one of the costs of the free trade option favoured by the IFis. 
Another fear that Brazil may have is that under an FTAA the United States will 
have excessive control over events in the hemisphere- they might be looking at our 
softwood lumber dispute with the Americans as an example of what happens to 
countries in free trade pacts with the U .S.A. - trade is not fully free and the 
Americans have the political clout to mainly determinate the rules of the game. 
The current Embraer-Bombardier conflict must be seen in the context of the 
history of Brazil's industrial policy. That policy has for decades been geared towards 
pushing the country up the ladder of technological sophistication - something 
which all of the successful countries of East Asia have done, beginning with Japan. 
The airline industry is . symbolic of that success in Brazil. One can argue about 
whether this is the optimal strategy for a country like Brazil, but in any case it has 
been their choice. Before the freer trade world in which we now live, the subsidization 
of exports was much more widespread and accepted than it is now; though industrial 
countries continue to give themselves the luxury of subsidizing agricultural exports. 
Brazil is clearly trying to maintain some degrees of freedom in the face of the new 
rules of the game, with which it does not fully agree. 
One of the big questions for Latin America's future is whether and when its 
largest country, Brazil, can regain a growth dynamic which would put an end to the 
legacy of the lost eighties and the sputtering nineties. I am hopeful that this will 
transpire fairly soon. I believe that the country's strong performance earlier in the 
last century is indicative of a real growth potential, a dynamism there to be tapped 
under favourable conditions. The conditions have not been favourable for some 
time now, but I am hopeful that they will become so in the foreseeable future. 
When this happens it will be a great boon to Argentina, now significantly linked to 
Brazil through the MERCOSUR and to other countries of the region. And Brazil will 
only be able to exercise the leadership within Latin America, which only it can 
exercise, when it is growing strongly. Whether this will come about in the next five 
years, or the next ten years, or a longer period is, however, the big unknown at this time. 
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POLITICS, PRESIDENTIAL ElECTIONS AND THE ENERGY CRISIS IN BRAZIL 
Annette Hester 
First, I would like to congratulate the students and professors for organizing 
such a high caliber event. You are setting the bar for area studies in this case Brazil, 
and we, at the University of Calgary, look at it as a new standard. Thank you for the 
invitation to be here with you today to share what I hold most dear: all things 
Brazilian! And, it gives me the pleasure of spending time with good friends and 
colleagues. 
I was asked to speak to you about Brazilian politics. I imagine one would say, 
well that is simple enough: Brazil is a federation, has a presidential system, a 
congress and a judiciary, states and territories, a return to democracy since 1984, 
and direct presidential elections since 1989. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, our 
president, is completing his second and last mandate. And, in the mist of what is 
shaping up to be a turbulent year for South America with troubles in Argentina, . 
Colombia, and Venezuela -, the forecast for Brazil is fairly stable in spite the fact 
that we will have presidential and gubernatorial elections in October. 
Yes, this is election year in Brazil. And this reality, you will see, makes this year 
unique. Just think about this: according to statistics published by the Electoral 
Tribunal, mentioned by Dr. Edmilson Moutinho dos Santos in his latest publication 
"The Brazil and Gas Sector - Outlook and Working Opportunities," in the last 
municipal elections of 2000, there were over 5500 mayors elected, the great majority 
of them from 12 different parties, yet 261 of the 5500 elected mayors belonged to 
other parties. At the federal level the story is much the same. There is so much 
fragmentation, party switching, and overall weakness in the political party system 
that governing Brazil isn't about executing a well organized plan, it is about the art 
of making deals in congress sometimes by friendly (way too friendly) means and 
other times by blackmailing. However, the reality is that Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso has been governing by what we call "medida provisoria" - provisory 
instruments that allow the executive to override congress and the judiciary to 
impose its will. This is far from a democratic way to run a country. The consequence 
is a weakening of the institutions, a legal system that is beyond the comprehension 
of even the best legal minds, and an inefficient and clogged up court system. On 
the other hand, without ·this tool how do you deal with the ridiculous and 
unmanageable proliferation of parties? 
To give you a flavour of the complexity of the scenario in Brazil let us look at 
the upcoming presidential race. The three party coalition that led Cardoso to 
victory, PSDB, PFL, and PMDB is breaking up and it looks like each will have its own 
candidate. The problem is that Cardoso has been plagued by low approval ratings-
a result of the voters' perceptions of problems with unemployment, hunger, health, 
violence, energy crisis, and corruption - which is translating into the inability to 
help his party presidential candidate Jose Serra. Serra is having a very hard time 
getting his campaign going. For the moment, and as you know, eight months are a 
lifetime when it comes to political campaigns, according to opinion polls, the 
leading candidate is the Partido Trabalhista's (Worker's Party) Luiz Inacio Lula da 
Silva, or as he is known to Brazilians, Lula. This is Lula's fourth attempt to become 
Brazil's president and not the first time he has led the opinion polls early in the 
campaign. Up ·to now, Brazilians have been reluctant to elect someone who sees 
Venezuela's Chavez, and Cuba's Fidel Castro as role models. The second placed 
contender is Roseana Sarney, the photogenic governor of the State of Maranhao, 
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daughter of senator and former president Jose Sarney, and sister of the current 
environment minister Jose Sarney Filho. As you can imagine, she is not a lightweight 
when it comes to politics in Brazil. For now, the remaining candidates remain 
bunched together at quite a distance. Who is going to win I don't know but it 
almost doesn't matter because governing with a super-fractured congress is going to 
be impossible for anyone. 
David Fleicher, a talented political scientist from Universidade de Brasllia, 
wrote a few weeks ago in his weekly newsletter "Brazil Focus," " ... the scenario is 
further complicated by the fact that out of Brazil's 27 governors, 13 can't be reelected 
as governors but can as a senator, deputy or president. Of the remaining 14, three 
may run for president or vice." Note that if you are going to run for another post 
you must resign your position by April 16th. That means that for most of this year 
the country is going t9 be run by Vice governors. Will anyone get anything ·done 
this year in Brazil? I have a difficult time answering this question if I try to think of 
the overall picture. But let's take a look at the reality in the energy sector. 
I am not sure if you are aware but Brazil has been living an energy crisis 
California-style - that seems to be easing up thanks to a successful rationing 
program, a slowdown in the economy and a lot of help from Sao Pedro, the saint 
responsible for rain. The crisis was a result of overuse of reservoirs and lack of rain, 
causing extremely low water levels (hydroelectric power accounts for over 90% of 
the country's electricity production). To make matters worse, lack of transmission 
lines meant that even though some regions did have higher reservoir levels, 
electricity couldn't be delivered where it was needed. The situation became so 
drastic that in the middle of May the government announced a mandatory 
rationing program for everyone. Residential, commercial, and industrial users were 
required to decrease their electricity consumption by a whopping 20%. The crisis 
happened in spite of the fact that experts had warned the Government since at least 
1996 that investment in that sector was insufficient. New hydroelectric projects 
were not approved, investment in transmission lines did not take place, and the gas 
transport, pricing, and electrical pricing regulations were so flawed that investment 
in alternative sources was not forthcoming. 
While the worst seems to be over, the reasons for this reversal of fortunes seems 
more circumstantial than planned. The December newsletter from Brazil's Central 
Bank suggests that the stringent cutbacks will be relaxed after February, bringing 
permitted power usage back to approximately 95% of 2000 rates. Critics are quick 
to point out that the changes needed in the regulatory environment to create 
stability and lower risk factors have not been forthcoming, rendering the predicted 
reduction in rationing merely an election campaign tool. However, if it is true that, 
although he had been warned, Cardoso failed to act in order to avoid the electricity 
rationing, other leaders in more developed countries with a great deal more 
experience in regulatory matters suffered the same fate. That speaks to a problem 
that faces all countries, developed or not: getting the regulatory regime right. 
In this area, especially taking into consideration the far-reaching changes 
introduced by Cardoso in Brazil's oil and gas environment during his eight-year 
tenure, perhaps history will judge him with a lot more candour than his countrymen. 
After all, he presided over the 1995 constitutional change that loosened up 
regulations in the sector to allow foreign investments in the exploration and 
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production of oil and gas in the country. In 1997, he enacted legislation that created 
a regulatory agency the Agencia Nacional do Petr6leo (ANP) charged with regulating 
all activities related to oil and gas, from exploration to the gasoline pump. He kept 
his 1996 promise of not privatizing Petrobras, the Brazilian energy company 
controlled by the government and still managed to replace and change the legal 
composition of the Board of Directors to allow the company to function as a 
competitive agency while keeping its control in government's hands. These are 
considerable accomplishments. 
The transformation of the hydrocarbon sector in Brazil offers a great case-study 
on the challenges a government faces when trying to find the right formula to go 
from a monopoly system to an open, free competition, economic model. Setting 
the rules and finding the delicate balance between maintaining the strength of 
Petrobras the national petroleum company and a reason for much national pride - . 
and stimulating fair competition requires skilled leadership and a lot of political 
wallop. That seemed to be the case with the team Cardoso had in place in early 
1999. Rodolpho Tourinho, Minister of Mines and Energy, made a series of 
controversial decisions from the moment he accepted his position in January 1999. 
Although some will argue that much of the electricity debacle was exacerbated by 
his dealings with the electric sectoi: regulatory agency (ANEEL), it is widely 
accepted that the choice of economist and financier Henri Philippe Reichstul as the 
new president for Petrobras certainly paid off in unexpected ways. When his name 
was first announced, the market reception was less than warm. After all, what do 
you make of a president of one of the largest oil companies in the world who has 
never seen a rig in his life? Reichtul proved to be a fast learner. Undaunted by 
anyone's perception, he went about asking as many questions as possible and 
applying his vast experience in the financial markets to move the company into a 
new era. Without a doubt, the Petrobras of today is a completely different company 
than the one Reichstul took over. It is an integrated energy company with a clear 
strategic vision and accountable to shareholders. There were also some very low 
points: the sinking of ocean oil platform P36 and the oil leak in Guanabara Bay. 
Nonetheless, under Reichstul's leadership, the government was not able to use 
the company for every political whim as it had in the past, in spite of its majority 
shareholder position. 
Sparring with Reichstul was an equal heavyweight at the ANP. David 
Zylbersztajn, the Director General of the agency, was clearly qualified for the job. 
An engineer by training with a Ph.D. in energy economics, he spent his career as an 
academic until he was invited by the State of Sao Paulo to head the energy 
portfolio. There he was responsible for designing the electric and gas distribution 
privatization strategy. It didn't hurt that Zylbersztajn was married to Cardoso's 
daughter. So the stage was set: Tourinho maneuvered in the larger political sphere, 
Reichstul kept the government out (as much as possible) of Petrobras' internal 
affairs, and Zylbersztajn made sure that Petrobras did not run the energy sector for 
the government. 
But political power has a fleeting quality. It can turn on you at the drop of a 
hat, and that is what happened to both Tourinho and Zylbersztajn. The Minister of 
Mines and Energy was caught in a fight between Cardoso and the legendary 
politician from Bahia, Antonio Carlos Magalhaes, his political "godfather." 
Magalhaes lost, and Cardoso wasted no time in eradicating Tourinho's presence 
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from the government's political structure. Tainted by the dispute, Tourinho was 
asked to resign in February 2001. Zylbersztajn's predicament was far more delicate. 
After almost a year of rumours, he announced that his marriage was over, and that 
he would be separating from his wife (Cardoso's daughter). To no one's surprise, 
Brazilian politics being as personal as it is, Zylbersztajn resigned his position in 
November. Instead, Reichstul's resignation in December (which took effect in 
January 2002) came as a complete surprise for both the market and Petrobras' staff. 
There was a lot of speculation that he was not getting along with the new minister 
of Mines and Energy, Jose Jorge, and with the ANP, with whom he had been 
battling over the rights to an exploration bloc (BCAM 40). However, Reichstul 
insists that this reasoning is completely false. He claims he had finished a work 
cycle, and his family, who remained in Sao Paulo (Petrobras' headquarters is in Rio), 
demanded his presence. 
So, in an election year, Brazil is faced with a completely new team at the helm 
of every energy-related portfolio. The odds are that it will be hard to get a lot of 
movement and resolution of outstanding issues ·when everyone has a steep 
learning curve. The new minister of Mines and Energy, Jose Jorge, has been at his 
post the longest. He was appointed in March 2001. Although he has been hard at 
work, he had to face the electricity crisis straight off the bat, and since then the 
continuous difficulties of managing a complex portfolio. According to his CV, Jorge, 
a career politician, worked mostly in education and culture portfolios, and has had 
virtually no experience in the energy sector. The new Director General of the ANP, 
Ambassador Sebastiao do Rego Barros Netto, a distinguished career diplomat, is also 
new to the energy portfolio. Also, after spending the last decade in international 
postings, it is not clear how well-connected he is inside the political system in 
Brazil. However, that might be a plus instead of a minus. The possibility of having 
the head of a regulatory agency not connected to any special group makes for good 
regulation. Also, Rego Barros' extensive negotiating skills should come in handy 
when dealing with the problem of departmental jurisdiction over the environmental 
licenses. Petrobras' new president Francisco Gros is the only one of the three that 
come to the job with experience in the sector. In his capacity as President of the 
Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico (BNDES) - Brazil's development 
bank and one of Petrobras' major stockholders - he had a seat on the company's 
board. Consequently, he is well equiped to continue the work Reichstul set in 
motion. As he mentioned in his inaugural speech "in the last year of a government 
there is not much to invent." So, it looks that, in this presidential election year, 
Brazil will be like a stay the course kind of place! 
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URBANIZATION IN BRAZIL: CHALLENGES AND INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS1 
W. E. (Ted) Hewitt 
Introduction 
To Canadians, Brazil is perhaps best known for its q)ffee, World Cup winning 
soccer teams, famous landmarks (such as Rio's Corcovado), sandy ocean beaches, 
and of course, the world's largest and most spectacular pre-Lenten party, Carnaval. 
It is also largely seen as firmly situated within the ranks of the world's developing 
nations. Yet, in many respects, Brazil is clearly an emerging world power. With a 
population of 171 million spread over an 8.5 million square kilometre territory, 
the value of goods and services produced in the country exceeds US$750 billion, 
making Brazil the world's eighth largest economy. 
With well over three-quarters of its inhabitants living in cities, Brazil is also one 
of the world's most urbanized countries. Further, much of the urban population is 
resident in a handful of the country's largest cities, as is shown in Table 1. Of these, 
both Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro are among the Latin American region's (and the 
world's) largest. Even some of the "smaller" cities on the list are, however, still 
larger than Canada's major metropolis, Toronto. 
Table 1. Population of Brazil and Brazil's Major Cities 
· Brazil 171,000,000 
Bel em 1,619,243 
Fortaleza 2,650,431 
Recife 3,130,430 
Salvador 2,758,392 
Belo Horizonte 3,889,700 
Rio de Janeiro 10,287,078 
Sao Paulo 16,859,712 
Curitiba 2,504,484 
Porto Alegre 3,301,285 
Source: EMPLASA, Sumario de Dados da Grande Sao Paulo (Sao Paulo: Empresa Metropolitana de 
Planejamento, S.A., 1997) 
Brazil's Urban Challenges 
Most of these cities have experienced extremely dramatic expansion since the 
1960's, with annual growth rates approaching 10 percent in some centres. Given 
generally restricted public financing, most municipalities have been ill-equipped to 
provide the vital services and infrastructure required to deal with their burgeoning 
populations. By the end of the 20th century, most cities in Brazil were facing a 
number of critical challenges, among them: growing urban poverty, inadequate 
educational facilities, lack of public services such as sewerage, inadequate 
transportation and communication infrastructure, and air and water pollution. We 
examine each of these challenges in turn below. 
31 
Table 2. Percentage of the Population Resident in Families Earning Less Than 
$10,000 per Year 
Brazil 55 
Bel em 45 
Fortaleza 62 
Recite 61 
Salvador 59 
Belo Horizonte 47 
Rio de Janeiro 44 
Sao Paulo 29 
Curitiba 36 
Porto Alegre 41 
Source: EMPLASA, Sumario de Dados da Grande Siio Paulo (Sao Paulo: Empresa Metropolitana de 
Planejamento, S.A., 1997) 
As Table 2 reveals, urban poverty in most Brazilian cities is endemic. Even in 
some of the more "affluent" areas of the south, such as Sao Paulo, Curitiba, and 
Porto Alegre, the percentage of individuals belonging to families earning the 
equivalent of Can$10,000 per year (providing for standards of living barely above 
the subsistence level) ranges from about 30 to 40 percent - far higher than that 
posted for developed countries such as Canada. In Brazil's poor northeast region, 
the incidence of urban poverty is alarming, with upwards of 60 percent of the 
population resident in families earning less than $10,000. 
Table 3. Illiterates as a Percentage of the Population 
Brazil 19 
Bel em 9 
Fortaleza 20 
Recite 18 
Salvador 13 
Belo Horizonte 10 
Rio de Janeiro 8 
Sao Paulo 9 
Curitiba 9 
Porto Alegre 9 
Source: EMPLASA, Sumario de Dados da Grande Siio Paulo (Sao Paulo: Empresa Metropolitana de 
Planejamento, S.A., 1997) 
Literacy rates vary in a similar fashion (see Table 3). In Brazil's north and north-
east, the number of Brazilians who can neither read nor write reaches 20 percent of 
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the population. And while rates are less than half this in the rest of the country, 
rates of illiteracy are still many times higher than in Canada (1 %) or other developed 
countries. As Table 4 reveals, part of the problem is related to participation in 
education. At least two-thirds of urban residents throughout the country have 
received only 8 years of formal schooling or less. 
Table 4. Percentage of the Population with 8 Years of Schooling or Less 
Brazil 80 
Bel em 66 
Fortaleza 77 
Recife 75 
Salvador 71 
Belo Horizonte 75 
Rio de Janeiro 68 
Sao Paulo 72 
Curitiba 71 
Porto Alegre 71 
Source: EMPLASA, Sumario de Dados da Grande Silo Paulo (Sao Paulo: Empresa Metro'politana de 
Planejamento, S.A., 1997) 
As can be seen from Tables 5 and 6, some basic services which Canadians take 
much for granted are frequently lacking in many Brazilian cities. For example, by 
the late 1990s, only about a third of Brazilian homes had telephone service. Most 
residents in cities such as Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Belo Horizonte have access 
to adequate sewerage; yet this is clearly not the case in cities such as Porto Alegre, 
Fortaleza, or Belem, where a minority of residents have such access. 
Table 5. Percentage of Homes with Telephone Service 
Brazil 22 
Bel em 33 
Fortaleza 22 
Recife 16 
Salvador 30 
Belo Horizonte 31 
Rio de Janeiro 29 
Sao Paulo 35 
Curitiba 36 
Porto Alegre 22 
Source: EMPLASA, Sumario de Dados da Grande Silo Paulo (Sao Paulo: Empresa Metropolitana de 
Planejamento, S.A., 1997) 
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Table 6. Percentage of Homes Connected to Municipal Sewer System 
Brazil 39 
Bel em 7 
Fortaleza 13 
Recife 27 
Salvador 35 
Belo Horizonte 71 
Rio de Janeiro 56 
Sao Paulo 78 
Curitiba 37 
Porto Alegre 22 
Source: EMPLASA, Sumario de Dados da Grande Siio Paulo (Sao Paulo: Empresa Metropolitana de 
Planejamento, S.A., 1997) 
Of course, poverty, lack of education, and inadequate sewerage are all factors 
contributing to poor health, as is the lack of adequate hospital and medical care 
facilities. Evidence of the state of health care in most cities is provided by 
continuing high rates of infant mortality, as Table 7 shows. Infant mortality rates 
range from a high of 59 per 1000 live births in Belem, to a low of 22 in Porto 
Alegre - still 4 times higher than the Canadian rate. 
Table 7. Infant Mortality Rate (Deaths per 1000 Live Births) 
Brazil 35 
Bel em 59 
Fortaleza 38 
Recife 51 
Salvador 23 
Belo Horizonte 33 
Rio de Janeiro 35 
Sao Paulo 26 
Curitiba 29 
Porto Alegre 22 
Source: EMPLASA, Sumario de Dados da Grande Siio Paulo (Sao Paulo: Empres.a Metropolitana de 
Planejamento, S.A., 1997) 
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Brazil's Innovative Solutions 
Such challenges are not, of course, insurmountable, providing that sufficient 
resources can be brought to effect their resolution. As mentioned previously, 
however, most Brazilian cities operate on extremely limited budgets. For example, 
with over 5 times the population, the municipal budget of the city of Sao Paulo is 
almost equal to that of the city of Toronto at about $5 to 6 billion. Given these 
financial constraints, politicians and administrators in Brazil's cities have had to 
devise frequently novel solutions to the problems facing them. Here we review four 
types of innovations in the areas of planning, governance, infrastructure and 
services, and poverty relief, respectively. 
With respect to planning, first of all, we are now seeing in Brazil the establishment 
of "planning secretariats" in an increasing number of Brazilian cities. Such bodies 
were all but absent in most centres throughout much of the last century, but 
perform a vital function in helping decision-makers to allocate resources to areas of 
critical need- especially when such resources are in short supply. Also emerging are 
regional planning bodies with responsibility for the coordination of planning 
among constellations of municipalities. These organizations provide a vital service 
in bringing together groups of highly trained municipal experts who are able to 
,advise municipal government on zoning, space planning, urban renewal, land 
taxation, and other issues. A good example of the latter is the Metropolitan 
Planning Company in Sao Paulo (EMPLASA), which is responsible for the collection 
and analysis of data used in the broader planning process in the Greater Sao Paulo 
region. Such practice builds upon the experience gained in Brazil's existing 
"planned cities." The best known of these are Brasilia and Belo Horizonte, both of 
which continue to provide living models of practices which are available for 
emulation by other Brazilian cities. 
The strengthening of local governance - through the adoption of participatory 
democratic and sound administrative practices - has also been prioritized in many 
regions of the country. A few organizations, such as Brazil's Institute of Municipal 
Administration (IBAM), are working to facilitate this process by providing 
information on best practices and organizational restructuring to municipal 
governments throughout Brazil. Many municipal governments have also embarked 
upon ambitious "democratization" programs. One of the best known of these is the 
"participative budgeting" process now in place in many Brazilian cities, which 
allows ordinary citizens the opportunity of deciding how scant resources are to be 
applied to the resolution of municipal problems. 
On another front, service delivery in a number of areas in Brazil has been 
strengthened as a result of municipal cooperation programs (both national and 
international) which allow cities to share information and "know-how" with respect 
to program delivery. For example, a partnership exchange program involving the 
cities of Sao Paulo and Toronto allowed the former to improve its municipal 
ambulance system through better training and equipment acquisition, and to find 
ways to encourage developers to contribute financially to the financing of public 
housing schemes. Some cities have developed solutions which they have then 
shared with others, both in Brazil and elsewhere. In the transportation services area, 
the city of Curitiba has developed a home-grown solution to increasing the 
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capacity of public transit and reducing traffic congestion through the development 
of an "above-ground" subway involving the use of dedicated bus lanes combined 
with limited access stations. 
New programs to help reduce urban poverty are in place in a number of 
Brazilian cities. One innovative program is the "sacolao", an initiative involv~ng the · 
resale of "second grade" fruits and vegetables at municipal markets at standard 
"per kilo" rates. With federal funding, many cities have implemented "pay for 
school" programs, which transfer cash directly into the hands of poor families as 
replacement funding for earnings children would otherwise acquire working 
illegally. "Food for trash" programs have also been undertaken in selected 
municipalities, whereby residents are offered free food in exchange for trash and 
other litter which they collect and deposit at central collection sites. 
Conclusion 
Even taken together, programs such as these will not resolve the pressing 1 
problems facing Brazil's cities overnight. They do represent extremely important 
steps forward, however, in allowing cash strapped municipalities to deal with some 
of the more pressing issues facing urbanites, especially those with limited incomes. 
As such, they provide real models for urban centres in other parts of the developing 
world, and perhaps even for developed world cities which are increasingly subject 
to budgetary restrictions imposed by cutbacks in funding from higher levels of 
government or legal restrictions on municipal fundraising. 
1 Summary of a talk given at the Brazil Conference, Glendon College, 23 February 
2002. Not to be cited without permission of the author. 
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Introduction 
Researchers at the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) have 
recently presented data and analyses confirming that the locus of poverty and 
malnutrition has been changing worldwide from mostly rural to mostly urban 
(Haddad et al., 1999). The "absolute number of poor and undernourished in urban 
areas is increasing and is accounting for an increasing share of overall poverty and · 
malnutrition" (ibid., p.1891), they argue. Such trend has tremendous implications 
on how researchers and policy makers should approach issues of food insecurity 
and undernutrition. IFPRI's researchers suggest, for example, that it is time to give 
up the notion (held by many governments throughout the world) that urban food 
insecurity is primarily a problem of adequate supply of food. For most cases, it is 
not. Rather, urban food insecurity is primarily due to the inability of poor 
households in urban areas to access safe, quality food in sufficient quantities. They 
also suggest that more research is needed on urban poverty and undernutrition 
(ibid., p. 1898). In particular, there seems to be a dearth of models for policy and 
programs in this area, suggesting the need for documentation of best practices in 
local and national programs (Ruel, et al., 1999). 
The case of an urban, local government program that introduces some innovative 
bases for food security policy is the subject of the present paper. The objectives are 
1) to describe the main projects under this program, making this case more widely 
known; and 2) to suggest some of the factors leading to, or accounting for, the 
program's apparent success. Reflections on the possible lessons to be learned from 
the BH case for the development of effective urban food security policies elsewhere 
are offered in the conclusion. 
I. THE FOOD SECURITY PROGRAM IN BELO HORIZONTE, BRAZIL 
Belo Horizonte, capital of Minas Gerais state, is the fourth largest city in Brazil 
with a metropolitan population of over 2.4 million. In the early 1990s it was 
estimated that 38% of families in the region lived below the poverty line (Lopes and 
Telles, 1996), and 44% of all children lived in poverty (CMCA, 1994). In 1995, close 
to 20% of children aged 0 to 3 years old showed some degree of malnutrition 
(SMAB, 1995). 
In 1993, the newly elected municipal government of Belo Horizonte (BH) 
initiated a program to develop initiatives to reduce food insecurity in the city. From 
local public opinion polls, to expert observations and academic studies, the 
consensus seems to be that the BH program is addressing some of the most significant 
challenges associated with hunger and malnutrition, and that it could serve as a 
model for other municipalities in Brazil, in other developing countries, and even in 
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developed countries. The BH program was the recipient in 1999 of the prize "Public 
Administration and Citizenship" promoted by the Getulio Vargas and . Ford 
Foundations. 
The key to the BH program is the Municipal Secretariat of Supplies (Secretaria 
Municipal de Abastecimento- SMAB) created by the City Government to develop and 
carry out an integrated policy addressing malnutrition and hunger in the area. All 
the projects designed by the staff at SMAB are guided by the notion of food 
security, interpreted as a principle: that all citizens have the right to adequate 
quantity and quality of food throughout their lives, and that it is the duty of 
governments to guarantee this right (SMAB, n.d.). 
The program implemented by SMAB is divided into three main lines of action. 
The first encompasses policies geared to assist poor families and individuals at .risk 
to supplement their food consumption needs. These are not simply emergency 
programs, but permanent initiatives whose progress is monitored by civil society 
groups. 
The secon~ line of action in the SMAB program is directed at the private sector 
in the food trade. Through partnerships with private food suppliers, the SMAB has 
been able to bring food to areas of the city previously neglected by commercial 
outlets. It has also adopted policies to regulate prices and control quality of basic 
staples, fruit and vegetables supplied under its program. The results obtained under 
these initiatives are being monitored by researchers at the Minas Gerais Federal 
University. 
Attempts to increase food production and supply form the third line of action 
in the SMAB program. Initiatives here include technical and financial incentives to 
small producers, creation of direct links between rural producers and urban consumers, 
and promotion of community gardens and other forms of "urban agriculture". 
The creation of the SMAB - a separate administrative structure, with its own 
budget - was necessary to centralize the planning, coordination, and execution of 
all municipal food security policies. This centralization has allowed for a funda-
mental review of how nutrition and food-related programs are perceived: from 
emergency (read "temporary") and "assistance" (read "marginal") initiatives to 
regular policies deserving of the same status as other (more traditional) public 
policies in areas such as health and education. This, according to its founders and 
professional staff, has been SMAB's greatest accomplishment to date: to mainstream 
food security into municipal public policy (Pessoa and Machado, 1999). 
SMAB's organization 
SMAB is organized in three departments, each responsible for the development 
and administration of the projects and initiatives under the three lines of action of 
its program: 
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Figure 1: SMAB's Organization 
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Department for Promotion of Food Consumption and Nutrition. The main 
functions of this department are to prevent and reduce malnutrition, specially 
among high-risk groups (children, pregnant and nursing women, and the elderly), 
and to promote healthy eating habits throughout the BH metropolitan region. 
Department for Administration of Food Distribution. The main function of 
this department is to develop and administer market-intervention mechanisms for 
price control and quality check of food products made available in the region. It 
also aims at increasing the accessibility to quality food items in marginalized areas 
of the city. 
Department for Incentives to Basic Food Production. The projects under this 
department have two main objectives: 1) to facilitate greater and more direct links 
between producers and consumers of basic food items, and 2) to promote urban 
agriculture. Through these projects, SMAB promotes higher incomes for small rural 
producers and greater access to quality food items for urban consumers. 
COMASA (Conselho Municipal de Abastecimento e Seguran~a Alimentar) is the 
associated 20-member council created to advise SMAB on its projects and general 
program directions. It has representatives from other government sectors (municipal, 
state, and federal), labour unions (agricultural and industrial workers), food 
producers and distributors, consumer groups, and different non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). 
In 1995 SMAB had a permanent staff of 122 or 0.6% of all municipal 
employees. It also hired another 105 contract workers employed in its many 
different projects (Coelho, et al., 1996). By 1998 its permanent staff had increased 
to 135 people; another 126 people were working under contract (Pessoa and 
Machado, 1999, p.4). Among its technical staff, SMAB employs nutritionists, social 
workers, food technicians, and economists. 
SMAB's total budget for 1995 was US$17.8 million. Out of that, 46% (US$8.2 
million) were transfers from the federal government (most of which were for the 
School Meals program), 45% (US$8 million) came from municipal funds, and 9% 
(US$1.6 million) were generated from its programs (Popular Restaurant, Popular 
Food Basket, and permit fees in the Abastecer and Worker's Convoy programs). The 
US$8 million coming from the city represented 1.65% of the total municipal 
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budget for that year (Coelho, et al., 1996). By 1998, municipal expenditures 
associated with SMAB's programs represented only 0.95% of the city's budget, and 
11 o/o of its total budget were covered by funds generated from its programs (Pessoa 
and Machado, 1999, p. 3). 
11. DESCRIPTION OF MAIN PROJECTS 
A brief description of SMAB's main projects (Coelho, et al., 1996; Cunha and 
Lemos, 1996; SMAB, n.d.; SMAB, 1995; SMAB, 1997; SMAB, 1999; SMAB 2000) 
follows below. 
Under the Department for Promotion of Food Consumption and Nutrition: 
Preventing and Fighting Malnutrition: Free distribution of "enriched flour", 
a mix of wheat flour, corn flour, wheat bran, ground egg-shells and maniac 'leaf 
powder, rich in vitamins and minerals. 
The distribution is done mostly through public health clinics to mothers of 
young children, pregnant and nursing women. Each woman receives 2 kg of flour 
per month, together with instructions on how to incorporate the mixture into 
common, everyday recipes. In the case of children suffering malnutrition, mothers 
receive 3 kg of a "special" enriched flour with powdered milk added to the mixture. 
In 1999, 19,658 children aged 0 - 5 years old were registered in the program - a 
significant increase from the 9,702 registered in 1994. Among pregnant and nursing 
women, 3,000 received the enriched flour packages through public health clinics in 
1999 (Secretaria Municipal de Saude, 1999). 
The advantage of having the distribution of the enriched flour through public 
health clinics is twofold. First, it guarantees that the program reaches children at 
risk. Given the two-tiered health care system in Brazil, only low-income people 
receive care from public clinics with any frequency. The other advantage of this 
distribution method is that women and children under the program suffering from 
malnutrition can receive continuous medical attention. A study by the Municipal 
Health Department shows that, in 1998 75% of children diagnosed with severe 
malnutrition showed an improvement under the program. Only 5% of the children 
in the program presented some deterioration in their nutritional status (Secretaria 
Municipal de Saude, 1999). 
The enriched flour is also distributed to municipal public schools (as part of the 
School Meals program), and to day-care centres, nursing homes and hospitals 
which are run by charitable organizations and are registered into the program 
through the municipal Department of Social Work. 
Federal government grants cover the cost of flour going to the School Meals 
program and the cost of milk added in the "special" enriched flour mix. But the 
bulk of the cost in the production and distribution of enriched flour is borne by the 
municipal government. In 1995, the regular mix cost R$2.78/person/month, while 
the special mix cost R$6.78/person/month. This was considered by SMAB's personnel 
to be a very cost-effective way of combating malnutrition among the people most 
at risk. 
School Meals: Provision of nutritious meals to children (ages 6 to 14) enrolled 
in public municipal schools. 
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A federally funded school meals program has been in place in Brazil since 1954 
under the Ministry of Education. The decentralization of the administration of the 
program was allowed only in the early 1990s when federal funds were transferred 
to municipal governments. In 1994 SMAB took over the administration of the 
school meals program in BH. 
The program provides a meal per day to all students enrolled in the public 
school system. As in the case of the Preventing and Fighting Malnutrition program, 
the School Meals program presents a strong "self-targeting" feature given that 
public schools' pupils come mostly from low-income households. In areas of greater 
need (very poor neighbourhoods), the "all-year-long" school meals program is 
extended to serve children at municipal schools during vacation time. In 1999, 175 
schools were in the program, benefiting on average 152,937 children per day. 
Under the SMAB, the school meals program in BH has significantly improved 
its cost-effectiveness. After the decentralization of the program, the federal govern-
ment maintained its funding formula, transferring R$0.13/day per child enrolled in 
the public school system. The caloric content of school meals in BH, however, 
increased from a daily average of 199.63 in 1993 (before SMAB's administration) to 
376.61 in 1995 (an improvement over 88%). 
A number of changes adopted in the program under SMAB can explain the 
improvements achieved after decentralization of the school meals program. SMAB 
increased the number of its potential suppliers (and, hence, competition among 
them) in order to get lower prices on its purchases. As much as possible, suppliers 
were recruited among local producers and businesses, significantly reducing 
transportation and distribution costs (with an added bonus of providing greater 
incentives to the local economy). 
The increased nutritional value of meals came from a combination of factors 
which include the reduced use of industrialized products and the increased 
purchases of fresh fruit, vegetables, cereal, eggs and meat. A different menu is 
offered for each day of the week. Meals are centrally planned by a group of 
professional nutritionists, and prepared by each school cooking staff trained by 
SMAB. Enriched flour is added to many of the recipes followed in the school meals 
program. In 2000, the challenge to nutritionists at SMAB was to continue planning 
meals with caloric content of 300 or more within the same budget of R$0.13/day 
per child that had not changed since the early 1990s. 
Nourishment Support to Daycare Centres: Provision of enriched flour and 
other 26 food items to government-subsidized and charity-run community daycare 
centres. 
Under this program, qualifying day-care centres (those serving low-income 
communities) can be registered with the SMAB to receive assistance. In 1999, 242 
daycare centres participated in the program, guaranteeing 100% of the nutritional 
needs of children under their care. An average of over 34,000 children a day 
benefited from this program. 
SMAB has also provided assistance to organizations working with street 
children. Altogether ("Preventing and Fighting Malnutrition", "School Meals", 
"Day Care" and other programs), it is estimated that SMAB's programs aimed at 
children 0 to 14 years old reach 33% of all children in the metropolitan area. 
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Popular Restaurant: A government-run restaurant providing nutritious meals 
at affordable prices. 
This modern, well-equipped, cafeteria-style restaurant functions in a government-
owned building measuring over 1,100 square metres. It is located in a busy, central 
area of the city, close to bus and subway terminals. Its location is · 
convenient to a number of low-income workers which commute from the periphery 
areas of the city to work. By 1999 the restaurant was operating close to capacity, 
serving an average of 3,433 meals a day, corresponding to 40 tons of food per 
month. Its success suggests the need for a second popular restaurant in the 
downtown area of Belo Horizonte. 
The restaurant is open from 11 a.m. to 2 p.m. for lunch, and 5 p.m. to 8 p.m. 
for dinner five days a week (Mondays through Fridays). Its meals are planned by 
SMAB's nutritionists and prepared by trained staff. At lunch it offers a meal ofrice, 
beans, vegetables, salads, meat, juice and fruit at R$1.00. At dinnertime it offers 
soup (beans, vegetable, maniac, chicken, or meat) at R$0.50. The subsidies required 
to maintain this operation have been increasing steadily from a low of R$0.13 per 
meal in 1995 to R$0.53 per meal in 1999. SMAB, nevertheless, is committed to 
maintaining its R$1.00/meal price despite the budgetary challenge it presents. 
Although the restaurant is open to anybody, a survey conducted in 1995 
confirmed that 60% of its customers received monthly incomes corresponding to 
three minimum-wage salaries or lower. Thirteen percent of the customers reported 
salaries above five minimum-wage pay. The restaurant, however, has a clientele that 
includes individual retirees and whole families, bank clerks and street vendors, 
university students and street kids. They all receive the same treatment, pay the 
same price, and eat the same nutritious meal. They can also join the Association of 
the Popular Restaurant's Customers which provides suggestions on improvements 
for the menu and the restaurant's services through regular meetings with the 
restaurant's manager. 
Under the Department for Administration of Food Distribution: 
Abastecer (To Supply) and The Worker's Convoy: These are private-run, 
commercial outlets, licensed for operation and supervised by SMAB. 
The objective of these programs is to increase the access of all consumers in the 
City to basic items such as fresh vegetables and fruit, cereal, coffee, meats and fish . 
Increased accessibility is achieved in two ways: by offering basic food items at prices 
lower than in other commercial stores; and by locating the outlets under the 
programs in low-income, periphery neighborhoods. 
Under the Abastecer program, private operators were chosen (through a public, 
transparent, selection process) to run 15 fixed outlets located in poor regions of the 
city. Under the Worker's Convoy, outlets are mobile. In exchange for being allowed 
to operate in more profitable, central locations, sellers are required to serve 
periphery neighborhoods on weekends. 
The programs were designed as innovative partnerships between the 
government (through SMAB) and private agents. Prices of 21 items are set by 
SMAB in periodic consultation with the operators, allowing for a negotiated profit 
margin which is typically lower .than profit margins achieved in regular, commercial 
outlets. Prices of other, non-basic items sold in these outlets are not regulated. 
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Besides prices, SMAB also monitors the quality of the products sold under the 
programs, and provides technical assistance and general information on how to 
display the products, safe storage and handling. 
In 1999 the Abastecer program served an estimated 70.5 thousand families, 
while close to 33.5 thousand families used the Worker's Convoy. Prices under these 
programs are, on average, 23% lower than those in other commercial stores. For 
many basic food items, prices are often SO% lower than in unregulated outlets, 
contributing significantly in reducing food expenditures for low-income families. 
Popular Food Basket: In this program, a monthly basket of 22 basic 
consumption items (food, toiletry and household cleaners) are sold directly to 
low-income families at subsidized prices through a bus visiting low-income 
neighbourhoods on a weekly or bi-weekly basis. Families participating in this 
program must earn up to two minimum-wages salary, live in poor neighbourhoods, 
and must be registered into the program through community associations or 
charity organizations. After the initial expenditures required to set up the program 
in 1995 (about R$18,500), it is estimated that municipal subsidies are needed 
to cover only 2% of the overall cost in running it. In 1999, 4,200 families were 
registered in the program. 
Through the Municipal Social Work Department, SMAB also distributes the 
popular food baskets to needy families for a maximum period of three months. In 
1998, 13,560 baskets were distributed free of charge. 
SMAB's Basic Monthly Ration: Twice a week, SMAB publishes the prices of 45 
basic household consumption items (36 food items, S personal hygiene products, 
and 4 household cleaners) found in 40 commercial establishments (supermarkets) 
in the city. The lists (compiled by researchers at the Federal University of Minas 
Gerais) are distributed to newspapers and posted in bus-stops throughout the 
metropolitan area. The information can also be accessed by phone or via internet. 
The interit of this project is to inform consumers and guide them on where to find 
basic products at lowest prices, thus increasing competition among commercial 
establishments. 
Under the Department for Incentives to Basic Food Production: 
Straight from the Country and the "Harvest Campaign: These programs aim 
at facilitating direct interaction between small rural producers and urban 
consumers. By eliminating the private and often oligopolistic intermediaries that 
normally operate in bringing the products of small rural producers to urban 
markets, SMAB hopes to increase the income of small farmers and still offer high 
quality products to consumers at lower prices. 
Rural producers selected through a public process are assigned fixed sale points 
throughout the city (many times, in conjunction with the Worker's Convoy). As it 
happens in all other sale outlets under SMAB's programs, sellers in Straight from the 
Country and Harvest Campaign programs have their prices and the quality of their 
products closely regulated. 
In 1999, 36 rural producers from 10 different municipalities around BH participated 
in these programs. They offered a variety of fresh leaf vegetables, roots, and fruits at 
lower prices than in other outlets. 
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The City Supplies Centre (CAM): This is a "Fixed Fair", covering an area of 
10,000 square meters, where farm producers trade 40,000 tons of horticultural 
commodities per year, through both retail and wholesale transactions. Recently, 
SMAB has also initiated the Green Basket program under which it serves as an 
intermediary between hospitals, restaurants and other institutional customers will-
ing to buy vegetables and fruit directly from small rural producers. 
School and Community Vegetable Gardens: SMAB promotes the creation of 
school and community gardens throughout the city, providing seeds and seedlings, 
as well as technical/educational support. In 1999 the project supported 40 school 
gardens and 37 community gardens. The gardens supplement school and community 
meals, and serve as "live labs" for science and environmental studies. 
Pro-Orchard: Promotes and supports the planting of fruit trees in low-income 
neighbourhoods in partnership with community centres. In 1996 this project 
distributed 18,197 seedlings of nine different tree species. 
Agroecological Experience Centres: In partnership with the Municipal ; 
Secretariat for the Environment and the Network for Exchange in Alternative 
Technologies (an NGO), four centres were created primarily to supply seedlings and 
seeds for other SMAB projects. They are, however, developing into "agroecological" 
education centres, disseminating "agricultural techniques that preserve the 
environment and that use available resources rationally" (SMAB, n.d., p.6). 
Ill. FACTORS IN SMAB'S APPARENT SUCCESS 
Not all SMAB's initiatives have been equally successful. The City Supplies 
Centre (CAM), for example, remains under-utilized as food traders refuse to move 
from the old and qowded (but central) "Mercado Central" to the more modern and 
spacious (but less central) CAM. Another "failure" might be the COMASA, designed 
to advise SMAB on its projects and program directions. Politics and personality 
conflicts intervened in preventing it to function as an effective advisory body. 
Overall, however, SMAB's programs have been quite successful, reaching close 
to 35% of Belo Horizonte's population (Pessoa e Machado, 1999), mostly low-
income families and individuals. And although further scrutiny and more thorough 
evaluations of its projects are warranted, a few salient factors may be suggested to 
explain SMAB's apparent success. 
Food security as a human right. One of the most important factors in shaping 
SMAB's policies has been adopting the principle of food security as a human right. 
The relevant quotation here, appearing in many of its documents is: that all 
citizens have the right to adequate quantity and quality of food throughout 
their lives, and that it is the duty of governments to guarantee this right. 
The consequences of this for policy are quite profound. First, it stresses the 
responsibility of governments in upholding this right for all citizens. Government 
resources must be allocated to guarantee this right. Second, as far as access to 
adequate food is concerned, people are first and foremost citizens rather than 
consumers. This fundamentally undermines the role of markets in food security. As 
stated in one of SMAB's documents, "we must guarantee healthy, sufficient, and 
constant nourishment to those who are consumers and to those who, lacking 
buying power, cannot even be included in this category" (SMAB, n.d., p. 1). 
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Food insecurity as "market failure". SMAB has justified mainstreaming food 
security into public policy by having the identification of food insecurity as 
"market failure" - a traditional argument used for the necessity of public policies in 
the areas of health, education, public safety and national defense. Market failure 
happens when free markets are socially inefficient (Mankiw, 1998). It is the failure 
of free markets to bring about results that best satisfy the wants of society 
(McConnell et al., 1999). In the case of market failure, the "market clearing forces 
do not maximize social net benefits" (Kahn, 1998, p. 14). 
One important reason for market failure deals with the provision of "public 
goods". Free markets fail to provide an efficient quantity of public goods because 
these goods tend to create very high beneficial "externalities" that cannot be 
captured by private markets. Once a public good is made available, it can be 
simultaneously enjoyed by many people, even those that have not paid for it. 
Markets do not do a good job in producing public goods because producers cannot 
prevent non-payers from enjoying it. There is, in general, no profit motivation to 
lead private firms to supply a socially efficient quantity of such goods. Public goods 
generate tremendous benefits to society, but free markets, governed by private, 
individual self-interest, will not provide them. Hence, the existence of a public good 
"presumes a legitimation of governmental activity" (Ver Eecke, 1999, p. 140). 
Food itself is not a public good. It is a private good and, as such, private 
producers do have an incentive to produce it as they can prevent non-payers from 
accessing it. Food security, however, is a public good. Individuals living in a society 
where all people are basically well-nourished and healthy benefit from that condition, 
even if some were not contributing (paying) for its provision. In other words, food 
security can be simultaneously enjoyed by many people (a public good), in contrast 
to private goods (e.g., food), "which are marked by rivalries in consumption ... (and 
for which) property right enforcements prevent consumption if one does not pay" 
(Ver Eecke, 1999, p. 141). 
Another consequence of the view of food security as a public good is that free 
markets may still not provide a socially efficient quantity of it even if enough 
income were distributed to low-income groups. Food security incorporates the 
notion of accessibility to food (which could be increased by providing enough 
income to all), but it goes beyond that to include food safety, quality, and diversity 
according to social/cultural norms. That is to say, as far as food security is concerned, 
market failure may not be overcome simply by turning people into consumers. 
Much of SMAB's strategy in dealing with market failure seems to use the 
market mechanism itself as much as possible. It is attempting to correct market 
failure by improving market functioning. Without losing sight of the objective 
(food security), rather than substituting it, many of SMAB's projects tend to make 
use of the market. 
This is most clear in the projects under the Department for Administration of 
Food Distribution. Recognizing that much market failure is the result of "imperfect 
competition" and "imperfect information", part of the intended objective of the 
projects is to increase competition (decreasing prices) and inform consumers. 
Reducing oligopolistic features in food production and distribution is also an open 
objective of initiatives under the Department for Incentives to Basic Food 
Production (Pessoa and Machado, 1999). 
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In the case of projects under the Department for Promotion of Food 
Consumption and Nutrition, the utilization of market mechanisms is much more 
limited. Here, efficient targeting (reaching the population most at risk) is essential 
for cost-effectiveness (Pinstrup-Andersen, 1988). SMAB targets low-income house-
holds by working through public health clinics, public schools, charity-run daycare 
centres, and through registration (by family income) in some of its projects. 
Political feasibility. Realistically, right to food security, as many other human 
rights, are not always upheld. In the case of some poor countries, lack of appropriate 
resources may limit the capability of governments to guarantee basic rights. But lack 
of resources is not the limiting factor in Brazil (as it is not in many cases throughout 
the world). As the third largest agricultural exporter in the world, general 
availability of food, for example, is not a threat to the country's food security. 
Guaranteeing food security as a human right becomes then a question of 
political feasibility (Pinstrup-Andersen, et al., 1995). At the national level, three 
factors came together in the first years of the 1990s to create a favourable environ-
ment for food security policies in Brazil: 
1) Decentralization and The Workers' Party (PT) Platform: The PT, as a~ national 
party, had pushed food security to the foreground, as a priority policy (Bittar, 1992; 
Coelho, 1996). It is, thus, not surprising that the municipal government which 
created the SMAB was that of the Workers' Party. Resource decentralization 
established under the new constitution of 1988 has permitted municipal PT 
governments to promote many locally defined, socially progressive programs. 
Decentralization has also benefited some social programs previously administered 
at the federal level. This is specially evident in the school meals program, financed 
by the federal government but administered locally by the SMAB. Such decentral-
ization allowed for significant savings (in transportation costs, for example), as well 
as for having this project supporting local suppliers. 
2) The Citizens' Action Campaign Against Hunger and for Life: In 1993 this 
campaign was created to mobilize people to assume their citizenship and fight 
malnutrition and poverty in the country. It was a huge success. At its peak in 1995 
one of its creators and most visible campaigner, Herbet de Souza (Betinho), was 
voted the most admired Brazilian in a national survey (ahead of Pele, the soccer 
player) . After many years under authoritarian regimes, and much evidence of 
corruption among the political elite, people seemed eager to push for policies with 
high ethical values. The citizenship campaign provided that opportunity, mobilizing 
people from all classes towards a common cause (Souza, 1996; Sposati, 1996). The 
support of Brazil's powerful middle classes for food security issues gave an extra 
incentive for political action in that direction. 
3) The Federal Government's Response: The federal government had to respond 
both to the popular mobilization under the Citizens' Campaign and the political 
pressures coming from the Workers' Party (and other parties on the centre-left). In 
1993 the federal government launched the Plan Against Hunger and created the 
National Council for Food Security (CONSEA), following some of the PT's proposals. 
Three principles in the federal government's program were solidarity, partnership, 
and decentralization (Coelho, 1996). These same principles were incorporated in 
the municipal government's proposal for food security in Belo Horizonte. 
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At the local level, political feasibility was facilitated by the very creation of 
SMAB, centralizing all decisions concerning food security. In the past, many aspects 
of municipal food security were spread over different agencies (health, education, 
environment, etc.) that did not have food security as a priority. As a consequence, 
many projects addressing food security lacked the political commitment needed for 
successful implementation. 
Partnerships and Participation. Another major factor shaping the success of 
SMAB is its commitment to develop and implement projects through partnerships 
and the participation of civil society groups. ·u is interesting to note that the 
initiative for partnership development came from the government itself. It sought 
out tbe participation of NGOs and civil society groups in the implementation of its 
projects. 
Among SMAB's main partners are other government departments (specially 
Public Health, Education, and Environment), the private sector (small farmers, food 
manufacturers and store operators), NGOs (the Citizens' Action Campaign, the 
Network for Exchange in Alternative Technologies, and others), philanthropic 
groups (running day-care centres, community centres and nursing homes), 
community associations, and the University of Minas Gerais (which collects the 
data for SMAB's Basic Monthly Ration). 
Such widespread and strong partnership network may be pointed out as the key 
factor in guaranteeing the continuity of the SMAB's program. It has survived two 
government transitions and it is now thriving under a new municipal administration 
(and a different political party). Its projects are not seen as "pet projects" of a given 
political party or local personalities. Although their administration is under SMAB's 
responsibility, they are "owned" by many different local groups and institutions. 
It is this widespread "ownership" that may guarantee their sustainability in the 
long run. 
Education. Education may be the other main factor guaranteeing the continuity 
of the program. It is indeed a theme running through all SMAB's projects. It 
incorporates not only education on nutrition and good eating habits, but it extends 
to education on food safety, handling and presentation, environmental sustain-
ability, and food security as a human right. 
Local Commitment and Leadership. Finally, one must not undermine the 
importance of local political commitment to the idea of food security as a human 
right, and the importance of competence among the people developing and 
implementing the projects, specially during their initial stages. With a relatively 
small, but very dedicated group of people, and under the knowledgeable leadership 
of its first director, SMAB seems to have been able to achieve in a few years tremendous 
gains towards food security in Belo Horizonte. 
CONCLUSION 
The main objective of this paper was to describe, in general terms, the 
food-security policy being developed since 1993 in Belo Horizonte, Brazil. The 
paper also highlighted some factors which could explain the apparent success of the 
SMAB program. In general, the BH case suggests that a successful policy in food 
security should be carried out in a comprehensive, integrated approach, involving 
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aspects of consumption, distribution and production of food; use the market, as 
much as possible, in addressing market failure; make full and effective use of 
partnerships; and include education as an integral component in all projects. 
A distinctive feature of the SMAB program has been its success in mainstreaming 
food security issues into public policy. This is possible, the paper has argued, by 
interpreting the right to food security as a "public good", and food insecurity as 
"market failure". Food security projects are then less "marginalized", less "charity-
driven". They are justified in taking back some degree of control of food production 
and distribution from the dominant market system - a feature which some experts 
in this field have pointed out as essential in establishing "best practices" (Welsh and 
MacRae, 1998). 
It is, at this point, premature to identify the BH case as a model. Each of its 
projects, for example, are deserving of a more thorough scrutiny. Furthermore, too 
many questions are still to be answered. For example, given that much of the 
factors responsible for the apparent success of the SMAB program were nation-wide , 
(food security as a human right, decentralization), why haven't successful food 
security policies been implemented in other cities under the Workers' Party? How 
much of the success is due to local leadership and competence? One may also 
speculate that, if such policies were being considered in more cases, stronger 
opposition from established powers (agro-industrial, food manufacturers and 
retailers) could effectively prevent their implementation. While as an isolated case 
BH is not a serious threat to the political-economic norm in the country, one 
wonders how much of a revolution it would unleash if it were to be copied 
throughout Brazil. 
Despite all the questions (which indicate how much more is to be known of 
this case), BH can be seen as a model in one sense. It has established a standard 
against which other initiatives in municipal food security policy can be measured. 
It is also against that standard that we may now evaluate the future conditions of 
food security in Belo Horizonte itself. 
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"DREAMS AND DISPARITIES - GENDER EQUALITY IN BRAZIL" 
Sherry Nelligan 
Illustrated in this document is a sketch of some 'big picture' data and statistics 
about gender equality in Brazil. Colour and life are added to the sketch with true 
stories about people in Brazil. The document also outlines an analysis of some 
gender equality indicators and describes hopes and challenges for the future. The 
author's background includes 6.5 years living in Brazil, for the most part in the 
Northeast. The realities of this particular region have largely shaped the author's 
perspective regarding the situation in Brazil. Northeastern Brazil is a vast and 
beautiful area of the country, and also the largest pocket of poverty in the Americas. 
Gender Equality 
Contrary to general opinion, gender and gender equality do not refer to 
biological differences between men and women. Sex relates to biological differences, 
whereas gender refers to roles that men and women play in society, in the family, 
in the workplace, in the community, and at the state level. Gender also concerns 
relations between the sexes. Gender relations vary from culture to culture, and even 
from family to family within the same culture. In addition, a number of factor~ 
affect gender relations, such as education and socio-economic status. The main 
point to highlight for the purpose of this document, is that gender relations are 
socially constructed as opposed to biologically determined. There are various 
positions about equality of gender roles between men and women. One viewpoint 
is that women's and men's roles do not need to be equal in terms of 'sameness'. 
Rather, equality is measured in terms of levels of participation, access to and 
ownership of resources, voice and decision-making power in the family, community 
or group. When applying this perspective, foci of gender equality are status and the 
valuing of women's participation equally with men's. 
Gender Equality in Brazil 
In many ways gender equality has advanced considerably in Brazil in recent 
years. Dr. Ruth Cardoso made a presentation to the 23rd United Nations General 
Assembly in New York city about gender equality in Brazil. Dr. Cardoso is the First 
Lady in Brazil and has also been a prominent feminist activist for many years. In 
her address she gave examples of recent advances in gender equality and also cited 
some of the continuing difficulties. The following points, adapted from Dr. Cardoso's 
presentation and other sources, are organized into the categories of education, 
health, domestic violence, politics and the labour force. 
Education: Evidence of advancement towards gender equality is most prominent 
in the field of education, in which there are indicators that females are actually 
surpassing males in some areas. For example, increases in girl's levels of schooling 
in the last decade have altered the overall educational picture to the point that girls 
now have a higher overall literacy rate than boys in Brazil. Also, there is evidence 
that females now have increased access and availability to schools, and that 
percentages have grown for female participation in school, in the completion of 
primary level schooling and in enrolment in secondary and·post-secondary educa-
tional institutions. These increases have impacted on sex ratios to the point that, 
on average, women now have more schooling than men do. 
Health: There have been various advances in women's health care in Brazil. 
The year 2001 saw the enactment of the 'Women's General Health Program'. The 
objective of this program is to improve health service quality in prenatal care and 
so 
to reduce the rates of caesarian sections, cervical and breast cancer. There are also 
new health facilities to deal with the growing number of adolescent pregnancies, 
and to combat sexually transmitted diseases and AIDS. However, despite these 
increased efforts to improve health services for women, the mortality rate of women 
has actually increased by 5.5%. 
Domestic Violence: An area of considerable concern related to gender equality 
is domestic violence. In Brazil, there are Women's Defense Police Stations which 
were instituted to combat the problem of violence against women. Women's 
Defense Police Stations are the same as regular police stations except that they 
exclusively register crimes against women. The need for such services in Brazil is 
great. For example, in Salvador, Brazil, there were over 10,000 incidents of domestic 
violence registered in the singleWomen's Defense Police Station in the city in 1993. 
This number was higher than the statistics for any other police station in the city .. 
To put this in context, there are many wars in which fewer people are hurt. Statistics 
such as this one for the Women's Defense Police Station in Salvador become more 
ominous still when one considers the extensive body of research about violence 
against women. Findings regarding police involvement and domestic violence 
indicate that the majority of women who register complaints have suffered repeated 
beatings before going to the police. Therefore, the likelihood is high that many 
more women have suffered abuse than is registered in the statistics. 
Politics: In 1984, Brazil ratified the United Nations Convention on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). From then on, all states 
were technically mandated to protect women's right to equality. However, like 
many of Brazil's constitutional policies, which are exemplary in terms of justice and 
human rights issues, there is a wide gap between the provisions within the policy 
and their implementation within society. In 1985, the National Council for 
Women's Rights (CNDM) was created by congressional law as part of the Ministry 
of Justice with wide ranging authority to administer changes for women. New public 
policies were developed and educational programs and campaigns to advance 
gender equality were enacted. However, by 1990 when new politicians were in 
power voicing different priorities, the CNDM lost its autonomy and presence in the 
national political scene. At present the focus of CNDM is limited to the area of 
women's health. Another example, which demonstrates both advances and 
continuing obstacles towards gender equality, occurred during the October, 2000 
municipal elections in Brazil. Election quotas have been put into place since the last 
elections. As a result of these quotas there was an increase of 82% of women 
elected as mayors in Brazil. One of the women who was elected is Marta Suplicy, in 
the city of Sao Paulo, which is the largest city in Brazil. However, during the 
election campaign Ms. Suplicy's main rival, Paulo Maluf, a long-time politician, was 
asked about his crime policy. During Mr. Maluf's response he said "It is fine to rape, 
as long as you don't kill". It should be noted that Mr. Maluf was not elected mayor 
and that his views on gender could not be considered representative of those of 
other well established politicians in the country. However, the public expression of 
this kind of viewpoint by such a prominent politician highlights the continuing 
problems in gender equality in Brazil. 
Labour Force: There have been significant advances towards gender equality in 
the labour force in Brazil. The percentage of women within some professions has 
actually exceeded men's participation. For example, 59% of lawyers in Brazil are 
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female, and 54% of doctors are women. Also, for the first time in Brazilian history, 
a woman, Ellen Gracie Northfleet was appointed to the Supreme Court in 
November, 2000. Professions such as the judiciary, dentists, university lecturers, 
architects and journalists all have fairly equal participation between men and 
women. However, these percentages are significantly more skewed in 'traditionally 
male' professions such as: engineers, farmers, chemists and airplane pilots. Overall, 
women represent 51% of the workforce. On the negative side, women's salaries are 
still on average only 66% of men's salaries. Equality in terms of race is another 
significant factor in this equation. Euro Brazilians earn up to 75% more than their 
Afro-Brazilian counterparts. Notwithstanding these continuing challenges, 
indisputable advances towards gender equality are occurring within the Brazilian 
labour market. 
Gender Equality and Machismo 
The unmistakable advances that women have made in education and in career 
development in the face of evidence of continuing serious problems such as the 
large numbers of Brazilian women experiencing violence, is perplexing. One could 
surmise that women's advances are partially due to an increased openness to 
gender equality by men and a greater number of men participating in domestic 
chores and chifdcare. Though this might be occurring to some degree, machismo 
and masculinity remain very strong social constructs in Brazil, as suggested by the 
following stories. I mentioned in the introduction that my experience was mostly 
confined to the Northeast of Brazil. These stories may not reflect the situation 
prevailing in the country as a whole, but they certainly testify to the persistence of 
serious problems of gender relations in at least part of the country. An example to 
highlight Brazilian machismo occurred during a discussion about gender roles with 
a kind, gentle Presbyterian minister named Pastor Antonio. In talking with Pastor 
Antonio and his wife Maria at their kitchen table, the Pastor said that in Brazil it 
would be viewed very negatively if he were to pick up his teacup and put it in his 
kitchen sink, and that his manhood would be in question. Another example is a 
young man named Marcelo who is in medical school studying to be a doctor. 
Marcelo is a tall, handsome young man and, when talking with him he appears 
quite charming and amiable. However, when he sits down to a meal in his house, 
he does not cut up his own meat. Instead, he expects the family's teenage maid to 
cut it up for him. 
Faced with these kinds of obstacles, and lack of assistance from male members 
of the family with domestic tasks, one wonders how it is that women have 
advanced so far in recent years. A clue to the puzzle is that most households that 
might be classified as lower middle class in Canada and upwards in terms of 
socio-economic class, have at least one maid. Normally it is t.he maids who cook, 
clean and care for the children, while the man and woman of the house are free to 
pursue higher education and advance their careers. Therefore, one of the reasons 
that some women have made marked advances towards gender equality in Brazil, is 
due to the aid of other women. Unfortunately, the treatment of maids in Brazil 
often falls far short in terms of justice and human rights when compared with 
Canadian labour standards and, in fact, with Brazil's own constitution. The following 
story of an encounter between the author and one maid provides an example. 
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One day there was a knock at the door. A frantic teenage girl stood outside 
wringing her hands in despair. The girl's name was Ju, short for Jucineide. 
Ju explained that she worked as a maid in the same building, 2 floors up. 
This was surprising as, though we had occupied the building which only 
had four apartments for several months, Ju was unfamiliar. It was later 
discovered that Ju was rarely allowed to go out. 
The reason for Ju's panic was that she had washed the Nike shoes of one of 
the boys in the family. She had put the insoles out to dry on the balcony 
and the wind had blown them off. She wondered if they had fallen on to our 
balcony. Ju said that, if she was unable to find the insoles, the price of a 
new pair of shoes would be deducted from her salary. 
At the time that this meeting occurred, the monthly minimum salary was 
slightly over $100. Therefore, deducting the cost of a new pair of Nike shoes would 
constitute the confiscation of the majority of Ju's monthly salary by her tmployers. 
Unfortunately Ju's situation does not necessarily represent an exception in Brazil. It 
is more concerning still to note that Ju lived with an educated, church going family. 
The husband worked as a Sociology Professor at a University and had served as 
Alderman in the city. 
Many of Brazil's advances have been made possible off the backs of young 
women like Ju. The treatment of some maids in Brazil is little removed from slavery. 
Maids are not always permitted to attend even night school because it would 
conflict with their duties. Wages are sometimes so low that the young women are 
unable to save enough to take the bus home to visit family in the country, even 
once a year. Also, stories of physical and sexual abuse are far from uncommon, but 
usually go unreported because the women are often young teenagers who feel 
powerless to do anything about their situation. Slavery in Brazil was not abolished 
completely until 1888. Could this fact partially account for the continuing 
injustices suffered by maids today? In any case, it is interesting to note that slavery 
was finally abolished in Brazil by a woman, Princess Isabel, during her brief period 
in power. It is also worth recalling that the abolition of slavery in Brazil was a 
relatively peaceful qnd gradual process. 
Gender Equality and the future of Brazil 
In terms of Brazil's future, there is a clear link between development, poverty 
reduction and gender equality. Through numerous analyses over time, the World 
Bank has determined the following, 
"Countries that enact specific measures to protect women's rights and 
increase their access to resources and education have less corruption and 
achieve faster economic growth than countries that _do not." 
There is a huge gap between the rich and the poor in Brazil. Brazil now has the 
second largest gap in income distribution in the world, after Bangladesh. This 
inequality and discrimination against some sectors of Brazilian society, presents a 
serious obstacle to the development of the nation as a whole. Narrowing the gap 
between the rich and the poor is one of the biggest challenges for Brazil in becoming 
a World Power. Some poverty alleviation policies have recently been put into place 
in Brazil, such as the minimum income program, which complements the personal 
income of senior citizens as well as that of families with children up to the age of 14. 
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There is also a new program that pays parents a small sum in exchange for sending 
their children to school regularly, in order to promote education and reduce child 
labour. Programs such as these provide hope that the income distribution gap will 
be eventually narrowed and that greater social equality will be achieved. Along with 
the importance of poverty alleviation, research on the implementation of gender 
equality measures indicates the value of both of the sexes participating in increased 
equality and benefits for all as opposed to continued struggling against one another. 
The process towards gender equality is far more peaceful and effective if women and 
men work together on the issues. 
Historically, gender equality work, previously referred to as 'Women in 
Development', has often excluded men's participation. Often men have shown 
little interest in the subject, but sometimes men have demonstrated openness to 
discussing inequities and to sharing in the process towards inevitable change. 
When we find common ground and work together as a family, community, or 
nation we are stronger and better. There are many stories that demonstrate both the 
struggles and advances towards gender equality in Brazil as well as innovative 
initiatives in responses to challenges such as the Women's Defense Police Stations. 
Brazilians are known for their interest in lear:Qing opportunities and for their 
openness to testing out new ideas. Canadians have a great deal to learn from the 
Brazilian people in this and other areas. 
The last story, depicting one woman's success in achieving elements of gender 
equality in her life, is one of poignant beauty. It is a story that portrays the work of 
Marcia Dangremon and Ceci Prestrello through the Woman Life Collective in 
Recife, Brazil. Marcia has recently passed away, but Ceci and the other staff of the 
Collective continue their work towards the prevention of violence against women. 
One day I visited Marcia and Ceci. We went to the restaurant of an acquaintance of 
theirs, named Dona Alda. Dona Alda's "restaurant" consisted of several steel tables 
in front of a simple home, underneath some beautiful palm trees. Marcia had told 
me about her last visit to the restaurant during which Dona Alda had described her 
difficult life with an adulterous, abusive husband. A life filled with much work and 
suffering. Marcia had asked her what she did each morning. Dona Alda replied that 
she gets up at 5:00a.m. every morning and goes straight to her sewing machine to 
do some sewing before she begins cooking for the restaurant. Marcia had asked her 
what she likes to do most and Dona Alda replied that she loves to dance, but that 
her husband says: "it is ugly for an old woman to dance." After hearing this, Marcia 
had taken the other woman's hand and said: "Dona Alda, from now on when you 
get up in the morning, don't go straight to your sewing machine. Go and sit under 
your palm trees, and take some time just for you." When I met Dona Alda that day, 
about two weeks after Marcia's last visit, she was calm and serene. She told us that 
she had taken Marcia's advice and was feeling so much happier, and less bitter about 
her life. We enjoyed a very pleasant time that day, talking with Dona Alda underneath 
her palm trees ... The next day we received the news: Dona Alda had died the night 
before ... dancing with her grandchildren. 
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PRESENTATION DU (ENTRE D'ETUDES ET DE RECHERCHES 
SUR LE BRESIL (CERB) DE L'UQAM 
Prof. Bernard Andres, directeur du CERB 
Abstract 
The Center for Studies and Research on Brazil (CERE) encompasses all of UQAM's 
academic programs on Brazil. UQAM has cooperated for many years with 22 Brazilian 
universities, institutes and research centers through pairing between institutions, 
departments and research centers. This cooperation concerns all of UQAM's faculties and 
sectors including Arts and Literature, Education, Health, Environment, Urban Studies and 
Strategic and Diplomatic studies. With an interdisciplinary approach, the Center for Studies 
and Research on Brazil brings together, promotes and supports all the programs on Brazil. 
Depuis plus d'un siecle, le Quebec et le Canada entretiennent des liens· . 
privilegies avec le Bresil. Il en est ainsi au plan industriel, avec la corporation 
BRASCAN' (on pense aux premiers reseaux d'hydro-electricite dans de grandes villes 
du Sud, aux premiers tramways et a la premiere entreprise telephonique de Sao 
Paulo). C'est aussi le cas au plan religieux avec l'envoi de missionnaires, ou au plan 
diplomatique2, dont nous parlera bient6t M. Rejean Tessier. Le domaine culture! 
n'est pas en reste si l'on songe, des les annees 1940, aux personnalites quebecoises 
qui sejournerent alors au Bresil: le medecin et romancier Philippe Panneton 
(Ringuet), le peintre de Tonnancour, l'historien Gustave Lanct6t et le musicien 
Claude Champagne. De son cote, le compositeur bresilien Villa Lobos est venu 
diriger a Montreal en 1953. On trouvera l'historique de cette cooperation dans le 
livre de Zila Bernd et de Michel Peterson paru en 1992: Bresil-Quebec: les bases d'une 
comparaison. 3 
D'autres presentations, aujourd'hui meme, evalueront I' evolution de ces echanges 
culturels, economiques et politiques. Je m' en tiendrai pour ma part a la cooperation 
universitaire et aux echanges academiques, a partir de !'experience que nous avons 
eu a mon universite, experience qui a conduit a la creation recente du Centre 
d'etudes et de recherches sur le Bresil (CERB). Comme on le verra, bien que loge a 
l'Universite du Quebec a Montreal, ce centre a une vocation interuniversitaire et · 
vise a s'ouvrir sur !'ensemble des programmes academiques touchant au Bresil dans 
!'ensemble du Canada. 
Apres un bref survol de nos activites consacrees au Bresil, j'evoquerai le mandat 
que nous nous sommes donne et les projets qui nous animent a court et a long 
terme. Ce faisant, j'essaierai de repondre a trois questions: 
• Pourquoi un Centre d'etudes et de recherches sur le Bresil? 
• Pourquoi un Centre d'etudes et de recherches sur le Bresil a l'UQAM? 
• Pour qui, ce Centre? 
1. Brascan (1899): http: //www.brascanbrasil.corn.br/grupo brascan/organograma.htm 
2. La premiere legation canadienne au Bresil date de 1941. 
3. Sur les relations entre le Canada et le Brfsil, voir Anctre Patry, 11 Panorama des relatio ns entre le Canada et I' Amfrique 
latine", in Zila Bernd et Michel Peterson fd., Confluences litt€raires. Bres il-Quebec: les bases d'une comparaison., Candiac, 
Editions Balzac, Col. "L'Univers des discours", 1992, p. 315-316. 
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1) Pourquoi un Centre d'etudes et de recherches sur le Bresil? 
La creation de notre centre< repose sur un constat. Tout rapprochement avec le 
Bresil ne pourra donner sa pleine mesure et etre veritablement fructueux a long 
terme sans une meilleure comprehension de nos specificites economiques, sociales 
et culturelles respectives. Sans echanges reguliers intenses et approfondis de la part 
des acteurs de la societe civile, se perdent de belles opportunites de collaborations 
et d'innovations sociales si caracteristiques du metissage croissant de nos deux 
societes. A cet egard, les universites peuvent et doivent jouer un role determinant 
dans ces rapprochements et cette meilleure comprehension reciproque. 
Or, force est de constater qu'un net desequilibre existe entre le Bresil et le 
Canada puisque plusieurs Centres d'etudes canadiens (Nucleos de Estudos 
canadenses) sont fort actifs dans les universites bresiliennes depuis plusieurs annees, 
contribuant directement a favoriser une connaissance et une comprehens£on du 
Canada si importante pour les relations a long terme. L'inverse n 'est pas vrai et le 
Bresil apparait un pays meconnu meme si sa musique s'entend sur toutes les radios! 
En fait, la connaissance du Bresil au Quebec, et plus encore au Canada, reste 
marquee par une image parfois folklorique ne correspondant en rien au Bresil 
moderne, celui des grandes villes, celui du developpement scientifique, celui d'un 
pays qui entend devenir tant dans les Ameriques que dans le monde un acteur de 
premier plan (la derniere crise entre le Bresil et le Canada a eu au moins la vertu de 
nous reveler que ce pays pouvait nous concurrencer dans la haute technologie, mais 
aussi, tenir sa place dans le concert des nations americaines). 
Le constat que nous avons fait, c'est qu'il nous manquait un lieu de rassemblement 
des expertises canadiennes en matiere bresilienne. La presente rencontre temoigne 
assez de la multiplicite des competences sur le Bresil au plan national (et je salue ici 
!'initiative du Brazilian Independent Committee de Glendon College). Mais il n'en 
reste pas moins que nos forces sont encore assez dispersees et qu'un lieu de 
reference sur le Bresil s'impose desormais . Loin de pretendre jouer seul ce role au 
Canada, notre centre entend seulement contribuer a rassembler les expertises et a 
diffuser aussi largement que possible ce qui se fait dans !'ensemble du pays sur le 
Bresil. Mais alors, surgit la deuxieme question. 
2. Pourquoi un Centre d'etudes et de recherches sur le Bresil a l'UQAM? 
]e repondrai en dressant un bilan partiel de nos collaborations avec le Bresil 
depuis une vingtaine d'anne~s. Celles-ci touchent a !'ensemble des secteurs de 
l'UQAM et temoignent d'une reelle masse critique dans les domaines suivants: 
etudes litteraires et theatrales, langue et culture bresiliennes, semiotique, arts, 
environnement, education relative a l'environnement, sante et environnement, 
etudes urbaines, sciences politiques, etudes strategiques et diplomatiques, 
geographie, etc. 
4. Le CERB a He inaugure le 6 septembre 2001. Actuellement, notre centre beneficie d'une subvention de ctemarrage 
provenant du Ministere des relations internationales du Quebec et du Bureau de la Cooperation internationale de l'UQAM. 
ll s'agit la d'un budget de fonctionnement permettant !'engagement d'une seule personne a temps partiel. Des stagiaires 
brfsiliens no us aident pour la permanence et le classement du Centre de documentation. D'autres sources de financement 
sont a Ff tude. Ajoutons que le consulat et l'ambassade du Brfsil nous appu ient activement par I' envoi de documentation 
et par la diffusion de nos activitfs. 
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2-1- Commenr;:ons par les activites de nature culturelle 
2-1-1- Les activites litteraires 
Depuis bient6t vingt ans (1984), le departement d'etudes litteraires de l'UQAM 
entretient une cooperation suivie avec ses homologues des universites federales de 
Niteroi RJ (Universite Fecterale Fluminense), et de Porto Alegre (UFRGS: Universite 
Fecterale de Rio Grande do Sul). Pas moins de trente professeurs et etudiants des 
deux pays ont collabore a cette cooperation. En termes de publication, il faut 
particulierement mentionner, au-dela de nombreux articles et textes de creation, 
Confluences litteraires Bresil-Quebec: les bases d'une comparaison, Zila Bernd et Michel 
Peterson ect. (Editions Balzac, 1992), le numero special de la revue Liberte 
"Brasilitteraire" (1994), ou se retrouvent des textes inedits d'auteurs contemporains 
bresiliens et une publication conjointe en franr;:ais et en portugais, sous la 
responsabilite de Nubia Hanciau5, Sylvie Dion et Alain Belanger, L'Amerique 
fram;:aise : introduction a la culture quebecoise (FURG, 1998), A America francesa : 
introdur;:ao a cultura quebecensa (FURG, 1999). En 1999, Zilci Bernd et moi-meme 
avons fait paraitre au Quebec L'identitaire et le litteraire dans les Ameriques (Editions 
Nuit Blanche). La meme annee, je publiai aussi au Bresil Coerr;:ao e subversao : 
o Quebec e a America latina (Editora da UFRGS). Ajoutons que le departement 
d'etudes litteraires est actuellement implique dans un projet d'extension de son 
doctorat en semiologie a l'Universite nationale de l'Etat de Bahia (UNEB). 
Enfin, en 2001, Zila Bernd, alors presidente de !'Association bresilienne 
d'etudes canadiennes (ABECAN) a rer;:u la distinction honorifique de l'Ordre national 
du Quebec pour son implication dans ces projets de cooperation. Zila Bernd 
eo-organise en decembre prochain un Symposium Canada-Bresil a Montreal; j'y 
reviendrai. 
2.1.2 Les activites linguistiques 
L'Ecole de langues de l'UQAM- qui compte plus de 8000 inscriptions par annee-
offre des cours de portugais depuis l'automne 1998 a 70 etudiants. Nous avons done 
la l'outil qui nous manquait pour creer un veritable Centre d'etudes bresiliennes, 
compte tenu de l'interet croissant des etudiants pour l'apprentissage des langues. 
Mais il est capital de mentionner que, suite a !'excellence de notre formation en 
portugais bresilien et a !'engagement de l'Ecole de langues, le gouvernement 
bresilien a attribue a l'UQAM un Lectorat d'etudes bresiliennes qui nous permet 
deja d'accroitre nos activites d'enseignement des langues et nous offre I' occasion de 
lancer un cours sur la culture bresilienne. Nous ouvrirons aussi en septembre 
prochain une mineure et un certificat en langue et culture du Bresil, afin d'initier 
les etudiants aux grands courants culturels du Bresil contemporain. L'appui de 
l'ambassade et du consulat du Bresil (qui prennent en charge le lectorat de portugais 
et nous dotent d'un important fonds documentaire) est fortement apprecie. ]'en 
profite pour remercier ici publiquement son Excellence, Monsieur Henrique Valle, 
tout comme a Montreal, Monsieur le consul Fernando Jacques De Magalhaes 
Pimenta. 
5. Nubia Hanciau, ancienne stagiaire brfsilienne a 1'UQAM, a fondf un Nucleo de Estudos canadenses 3 Rio Grande au Brf sil. 
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2.1.3 Les autres activites culturelles 
Toujours du point de vue culture!, rappelons l'importante exposition de la 
Fondation Lina Bo Bardi du Bresil presentee par le Centre de design de l'UQAM a 
l'automne 1998 et inauguree par le Consul general du Bresil, lors de la fete nationale 
du Bresil. Le doctorat en pratique des arts accueille aussi des etudiants bresiliens, 
comme Luciano Vinhosa, artiste et enseignant de l'Universite fecterale Fluminense 
(UFF), qui a expose a la Galerie Skol de Montreal cet hiver. 
Enfin, directement rattachee aux dimensions culturelles tout en les depassant, 
il faut mentionner la relation extremement etroite que nous entretenons avec 
!'Association Bresilienne d'Etudes Canadiennes (ABECAN), au sein de laquelle nos 
partenaires d'etudes litteraires sont fortement impliques. L'ABECAN6 a aussi ete a 
l'origine de !'invitation au Bresil de plusieurs professeurs d'autres facultes de 
l'UQAM, notamment en Design et en Linguistique et en Sciences de !'education. 
Notons aussi qu'en sciences de !'education l'UQAM a offert sa maitrise a Salvador 
de Bahia a une vingtaine d'etudiants durant les annees 1980. Une des etudiantes 
d'alors et desormais rectrice de l'UNEB est a l'origine de l'accroissement des 
collaborations (projet en cours d'extension du doctorat en semiologie a Salvador). 
2.2 La cooperation scientifique 
Cette cooperation touche essentiellement differents domaines relies aux 
sciences de l'environnement. Elle est extremement diversifiee et dure depuis 
plusieurs annees. Elle est principalement animee par l'Institut des Sciences de 
l'Environnement (IS£7), qu'il s'agisse des cours en Amazonie, des activites organisees 
avec le SENAC8 et meme des projets de recherche du CRDI9, qui regroupe des 
centres de recherche, membres de l'Institut. 
2.2.1 Les sciences de la Terre 
Le GEOTOP10 et le Departement des Sciences de la Terre et de 1' Atmosphere sont 
impliques depuis 1989, a travers le professeurs Nufio Machado, dans des activites de 
recherche et d'enseignement avec l'Universidade de Sao Paulo (USP) et l'Universite 
de Campinas (UNICAMP) de l'Etat de Sao Paulo, de l'Universite de l'Etat de Rio de 
Janeiro (UERJ), de l'Universidade Federal de Ouro Preto (UFOP) et de l'Universidade 
Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG). Des professeurs-chercheurs et des etudiants 
gradues ont fait des sejours au GEOTOP variant de six mois a un an pendant lesquels 
ils acquierent une solide formation en geochimie isotopique et en geochronologie. 
Les resultats obtenus pendant ces sejours constituent la base d'articles conjoints 
publies dans des revues internationales. La maitrise des techniques a permis aux 
chercheurs bresiliens (des UFOP et UERJ) d'installer des laboratoires specialises de 
preparation d'echantillons pour les analyses isotopiques de precision. Ces 
chercheurs, soutenus par leurs institutions11, visent !'installation de laboratoires 
complets pour les analyses isotopiques et comptent sur le support technique des 
chercheurs de l'UQAM. 
6. ABECAN: < http://www.abecan.corn.br/> 
7. lSE: lnstitut des Sciences de l'Environnement < http://www.ise.uqam.ca/> 
8. SENAC : Service national d'apprentissage commercial, Sa.o Paulo. 
9. CRDI: Centre de recherches pour le developpement international <http://www.unites.uqam.ca/ise/chaire.htm> 
10. GEOTOP: Centre de recherche en geochimie isotopique et en geochronologie. <http://www.geotop.uqam.ca/> 
11. Les chercheurs bresiliens ont IM finances par la BID (Banco lnteramericano de Desenvolvimento), la CAPES (Funda~ao 
Coordena~ao de Aperfei~oamento de Pessoal de Nivel Superior) et le CNPq (Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento 
Cientifico e Tecnol6gico). 
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Toujours au departement des sciences de la Terre, le professeur Michel Jebrak 
s'est implique dans un projet de cooperation avec le professeur Alfonso Schrank de 
l'universite Campinas a Sao Paulo. 11 s'est rendu au Bresil en 1999 pour y donner un 
cours intensif en Geologie economique. Le professeur Michel Gauthier, pour sa part, 
a ete invite a l'Institut des Geosciences de l'Universite de Brasilia en 1988-1989. 
Puis, de 1991 a 1995, il a dirige le doctorat d'une etudiante bresilienne sur les 
gisements d'or palladifere d'Itabira (Minas Gerais) 12 • 
2.2.2 Les sciences naturelles et de l'environnement 
Sous la responsabilite de Domingos de Oliveira, professeur en environnement 
de l'UQAM, un projet a ete entrepris en 1992 grace a un financement de l'Agence 
canadienne de developpement international (ACDI) de pres de 1 000 000 $. Le 
projet UQAM-Amazonie a ete developpe en partenariat avec l'Universite federale du 
Para (UFPa), porte d'entree de l'Amazonie bresilienne, dans le domaine des sciences 
biologiques liees a l'environnement. Dans le cadre du projet, sept etudiants 
bresiliens ont fait des etudes a l'UQAM en mai:trise et un etudiant bresilien a 
recemment obtenu son doctorat. Treize professeurs/chercheurs bresiliens ont realise 
differentes activites a l'UQAM. Certains etaient co-directeurs de recherche pour des 
etudiants bresiliens a la mai:trise et au doctorat de l'UQAM. Quoique la majorite 
faisait partie de l'effectif de l'UFPa, uncertain nombre provenait du Museu Paraense 
Emilio Goeldi (MPEG) et de la Faculdade de Ciencias Agrarias du Para. Mentionnons 
la participation d'un chercheur du MPEG dans la formation des guides quebecois du 
Musee de la Civilisation a Quebec pour !'exposition "Secrets d'Amazonie". Neuf de 
nos professeurs ont enseigne, presente des conferences et fait des recherches en 
Amazonie. Certains ont participe a des emissions televisees et radiophoniques a 
l'etat du Para sur les sujets etudies. 
De nombreuses publications et productions ont decoule de cette cooperation 
dont aussi une exposition sur les fruits et fleurs d'Amazonie presentee tant a Belem 
(Centre des Arts) qu'a Montreal (UQAM). Deux videos realises par "Academia 
Amazonia" de l'UFPa sur !'importance de la biodiversite des pollinisateurs ont ete 
utilises par le Canal Educac;:ao du Bresil. Ce projet a rec;:u le Prix d'excellence de 
l' Association des universites et colleges canadiens (AUCC) pour sa contribution a 
!'internationalisation de l'UQAM 13 • 
Dans ce cadre de la cooperation UQAM-UFPa, il faut aussi mentionner la mise 
en reuvre de deux contrats (pour plus de 1 million de dollars) avec le Centre de 
recherches pour le developpement international (CRDI). Les activites, co-diriges par 
les professeurs Donna Mergler, neuropsychologue, et Marc Lucotte, directeur de 
notre Institut des sciences de l'Environnement, portent sur !'impact du mercure sur 
la sante humaine et la recherche de solutions viables avec les communautes locales. 
Les resultats des recherches sont desormais connus mondialement et un film 
vulgarisant les travaux de cette equipe (sur les ri; es du Tapajos) a ete presente a 
!'emission Zone libre de Radio-Canada le 2 fevrier 2001. On notera que plusieurs 
etudiants bresiliens font leur doctorat a l'UQAM en ecotoxicologie. Du cc>te de 
l'UQAM, !'initiative denommee UQAMAZONE permet a des etudiants de suivre un 
cours sur la diversite biologique des ecosystemes amazoniens tout en facilitant 
l'apprentissage du portugais bresilien. 
12. Mme Gema Olivo Ribeiro, est devenue professeure de geologie economique a l'Universite Queens a Kingston (Ontario). 
13. Prix d'excellence pour UQAM-Amazonie. 
<http://www. unites. uqam .ca/medias/J 0 URNAL/9899/J OURNAL/11/ 11A.htm> 
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2.2.3 L'ectucation relative a l'environnement 
L'UQAM est egalement partenaire de l'Universite Fecterale de Mato Grosso dans 
le cadre d'un projet d'appui institutionnel finance par l'ACDI (750 000 $), projet qui 
porte sur la formation de formateurs en education relative a l'environnement. Ce 
projet (1996-2000) etait dirige par la professeure Lucie Sauve, chercheure associee au 
Centre interdisciplinaire de recherches sur l'apprentissage et le developpement en 
education (CIRADE) et membre de l'Institut des sciences de l'environnement de 
l'UQAM. Ce projet a lui aussi re~u la reconnaissance de l'AUCC, en 2000, comme le 
meilleur projet canadien ayant favorise !'internationalisation du Campus par 
!'action communautaire. 
2.2.4 La sante et l'environnement 
L'UQAM apporte aussi sa contribution a un organisme bresilien de la tres 
importante region industrielle de Sao Paulo, le Service national d'apprentissage 
commercial (SENAC), pour que ce dernier cree un centre en sante environnementale: 
il s'agit d'une maitrise en sciences de l'environnement ainsi qu'un diplome en 
sante securite au travail. Dans le meme domaine, la professeure Celine Chatigny 
coordonne un projet de diplome en ergonomie, avec le centre CINBIOSE14 de 
l'UQAM (Centre d'etude des interactions biologiques entre la sante et l'environ-
nement). Une des caracteristiques interessantes des projets pilotes par l'UQAM au 
Bresil est leur interdisciplinarite et leur dimension sociale, comme on l'a vu dans les 
travaux sur !'impact du mercure sur la sante humaine et la recherche de solutions 
viables avec les communautes locales. Cette recherche de solutions realistes a des 
problemes concrets et ce souci d'ectucation populaire, on les retrouve egalement 
dans les projets de collaboration entre l'Institut des Sciences de l'environnement et 
l'Universite fecterale de Santa Catarina (UFCI). Le professeur Normand Brunet 
recevait en janvier 2002 a l'UQAM Dr Paulo Freire Vieira, president de 1' APED 
(Association bresilienne d'enseignement et de recherche en ecologie et developpement). 
Paulo Freire Vieira est un disciple de Pierre Dansereau qui travaille 
actuellement a un "Projet pilote d'ecocteveloppement pour les ecosystemes littoraux 
du sud de l'Etat de Santa Catarina". 
2.2.5 La geographie 
Un protocole de collaboration a ete signe entre l'Institut des Sciences 
Geographiques de l'Universite Federale du Minas Gerais (UFMG) a Belo Horizonte 
et le Departement de Geographie de l'UQAM. L'echange de professeurs et d'etudiants 
des cycles superieurs et des partenariats en recherche ont ete amorces dans ce 
domaine, notamment avec le concours de notre Laboratoire de Cartographie. 11 faut 
aussi signaler le cours sur les systemes d'information geographique donne en 
novembre 2000, a Sao Paulo par le professeur Benoit St-Onge, dans le cadre d'une 
entente liant l'Institut des Sciences de l'Environnement de l'UQAM, et le SENAC 
(institut de formation pan-bresilien). Des projets sont en cours avec cet etat sur la 
gestion des bassins versants et sur des questions touchant a !'education de la 
citoyennete et de la conscience territoriale. 
Des discussions de collaboration sont aussi amorcees avec l'Universite de l'Etat 
de Sao Patilo (UNESP), l'une des grandes universites bresiliennes, sur le theme de la 
14. CINBIOSE: Centre d'etude des interactions biologiques entre la sante et l'environnement 
<http:/ /www.unites.uqam.ca/cinbiose/> 
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gestion des bassins versants. Le professeur Serge Occhietti est responsable de ce 
dossier pour lequel un protocole d'entente de cooperation est en cours de preparation. 
La professeure Suzanne Laurin, quant a elle, oeuvre dans le domaine de la 
didactique de sa discipline, sur des questions touchant a !'education de la 
citoyennete et de la conscience territoriale1s. Du cote de la geographie humaine, le 
professeur-associe Jean Morisset a eu de nombreuses relations avec differentes 
institutions bresiliennes et une longue experience d'enseignement au Bresil. 
2.2.6 La contribution du professeur emerite Pierre Dansereau 
Nous ne pourrions terminer !'evocation des collaborations en sciences 
environnementales sans mentionner le prestigieux nom de Pierre Dansereau qui a 
ete honore en septembre 1998 au Bresil par les dirigeants de la Fondation de 
l'Environnement de l'Etat de Minas Gerais et de !'Association bresilienne de 
l'enseignement et de la recherche en ecologie et developpement. Dans le cadre d'un 
colloque intitule "Ethique ecologique et education pour la viabilite : le message de 
Pierre Dansereau", le professeur emerite de l'UQAM a vu ses anciens etudiants 
(canadiens et bresiliens) temoigner de son apport considerable au developpement 
de l'ecologie et de la science en general durant sa remarquable carriere. 
2.3 Les autres activites 
D'autres activites d'etudes et de cooperation avec le Bresil en sciences 
humaines, economie et etudes strategiques existent aussi a l'UQAM. C'est le cas du 
professeur Andre Corten, en Science politique, qui travaille depuis plus de dix ans 
sur divers aspects de la realite bresilienne (syndicats, mouvements religieux, etc.) 16 • 
Nous avons en outre une cooperation avec le professeur Yves Chaloux de 
l'Universite de Brasilia sur les questions relatives a !'integration economique, de 
meme que sur les echanges d'etudiants de niveau doctorat en sociologie et en 
science politique. Les professeurs Dorval Brunelle (sociologie) et Christian Deblock 
(science politique) sont impliques dans cette cooperation avec l'Universite de 
Brasilia. Le professeur Victor Armony, pour sa part, travaille en sociologie politique 
sur les questions de "democratie et marche en Amerique latine" : il considere le 
Bresil comme un acteur cle dans le continent. Responsable du dossier de collaboration 
avec Brasilia, Victor Armony assure cet axe d'investigation au sein de notre nouvelle 
Chaire de recherche du Canada en Mondialisation, Democratie et Citoyennete 
(titulaire : Jules Duchastel). 
On aura compris de ce tour d'horizon que l'UQAM a developpe des collaborations 
avec le Bresil dans des secteurs fort diversifies, avec des partenaires varies et dans des 
regions differentes ayant ainsi une vision globale d'un Bresil aux multiples facettes. 
Tout ceci pour repondre, je l'espere, a la question: "Pourquoi un Centre 
d'etudes et de recherches sur le Bresil a l'UQAM ?" C'est la, me semble-t-il, un bilan 
eloquent de realisations et de projets en cours. Ceux-ci, loin de s'epuiser, se 
dynamisent en de nouveaux partenariats que notre centre entend stimuler avec 
d'autres universites canadiennes interessees. 
15 . Accreditee au programme de doctorat en education, Suzanne Laurin codirige un f tudiant de l'Universidade estadual de 
Santa Cruz (Bahia) en didactique de la geograph ie. Elle poursuit egalement des echanges avec les professeurs Ferreira et 
Stamatto de l'Universidade Rio Grande do Norte sur !'education a la citoyennete et l'enseignement de l'histoire et de la 
geographie. 
16. On pourra notamment lire: "Emotion du pauvre au Bresil ". Le Monde diplomatique (mars 1996), p . 26, ou encore Corten 
A. Le pentec6tisme au Bresil. Emotion du pauvre et romantisme thi!ologique. Paris: Karthala. 1995; Corten, A. "Bresil : une lutte 
entre les candidats de Dieu et du diable". Revue nouvelle, no 1, t. 99 (octobre 1994), p. 89-96. 
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3) Pour qui, ce centre ? 
Un centre pour tous. Le CERB est bien entendu con~u comme un lieu 
interdisciplinaire ou convergent aussi bien des expertises culturelles que 
scientifiques, sociales, economiques et politiques. Loin d'avoir une approche 
limitative, le Centre se veut ouvert sur tous les milieux interesses par les divers 
enjeux qui interpellent le Bresil d'aujourd'hui. On peut done d'emblee ctecrire le 
mandat du Centre comme un lieu de connaissance et de maillage. 
Dans cet esprit, le mandat du Centre est de : 
1) Promouvoir le rassemblement de professeurs, chercheurs et de toute autre 
personne interessee par les developpements culturels, artistiques, sociaux, 
scientifiques, economiques et technologiques bresiliens et, dans ces perspectives, 
favoriser les relations avec le Canada et le Quebec en particulier. 
2) Stimuler les programmes d'etudes, de recherche et de diffusion d'information 
sur le Bresil. 
3) Etre le centre de references sur le Bresil, tant aupres des communautes 
universitaires quebecoise et canadienne qu'aupres des principaux partenaires 
universitaires de la societe civile (gouvernements, secteur prive ... ). 
4) Un dernier objectif (last, but not least) me tient a ccrur, que j'aimerais 
annoncer solennellement a !'occasion de ce colloque de Glendon: il s'agit de 
la fondation d'une Association canadienne des etudes bresiliennes (sur le 
modele de l'ABECAN : Association bresilienne d'etudes canadiennes). Ce 
projet vise a rassembler !'ensemble des chercheurs et personnes interessees 
par le Bresil au Quebec et au Canada. Je sollicite done votre avis et votre 
appui pour le realiser dans les mois qui suivent. 
Deux occasions nous serons donnees l'automne prochain pour en discuter. 
D'abord, un colloque a l'UQAM, fin octobre, dans le cadre du Congres de 
!'Association canadienne des etudes latino-americaines et des Caraibes (ACELAC, ou 
Canadian Association for Latin American and Caribbean Studies : CALACS). Un 
valet de ce congres portera sur le Bresil. Vous recevrez bientot l'appel de communications. 
Tous les aspects de la realite bresilienne y pourront etre etudies dans les quatre 
langues (anglais, fran~ais, espagnol et portugais) : 
1. Democratie et citoyennete 
2. Mouvements sociaux et societe civile 
3. Environnement et ecologie humaine 
4. Communautes autochtones 
5. Immigration et minorites 
6. Litterature, langue et art 
7. Etudes .culturelles et medias 
8. Genre et sexualite 
9. Histoire 
10. Politique et relations internationales 
11. Economie et commerce 
etc. 
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Davantage centree sur des questions interculturelles, une autre rencontre se 
prepare egalement a l'UQAM, debut decembre 2002, toujours avec la collaboration 
de notre Centre d'etudes bresiliennes. Sous la eo-direction demon collE~gue Simon 
Harel et de la professeure bresilienne Zila Bernd, nous aurons un Symposium 
Canada-Bresil : 
"Penser les transferts culturels: pratiques et discours du pluralisme". Vous recevrez 
egalement les renseignements requis. ]e precise qu'une partie de ce que j'annonce 
ici se trouve dans notre Bulletin du CERB. Le reste sera bientot disponible sur notre 
site web : http://www.unites.uqam.ca/bresil/ 
Pour conclure en deux mats et repondre a la question "Pour qui, ce centre ?", 
il est essentiel de retenir que le Centre est un lieu de partenariat. Nous voulons, au 
Quebec comme au Canada, faire en sorte que les interets et expertises des autres 
institutions universitaires soient mobilises pour faire decouvrir et pour etudier 
toutes les caracteristiques de la societe bresilienne. Le Centre sera done au c<:Fur des 
initiatives en relation avec le Bresil, meme si ce n'est pas toujours lui qui en sera 
l'acteur principal. 11 est tout aussi essentiel de noter que les liens de partenariat avec 
le Bresil concement autant les regions plus developpees du Sud que celles du Nordeste 
ou de l'Amazonie ou les dimensions economiques et culturelles sont tout autres. 
Retenons aussi qu'a Montreal, notre Centre de documentation" est ouvert a 
!'ensemble de la communaute bresilienne de passage, comme a !'ensemble des . 
chercheurs canadiens interessee par le Bresil. Un centre pour taus les chercheurs et 
les partenaires interesses au Bresil. Outil indispensable a la recherche et a 
l'enseignement sur le Bresil, le site web auquel nous travaillons actuellement 
rassemblera !'ensemble des programmes en cours et des liens de recherche. 11 
s'enrichira de vos propres travaux et de vos propres projets si vous voulez bien nous 
en faire part. C'est une invitation, tout comme je vous convie egalement a nous 
rencontrer lors de votre prochain voyage a Montreal. Un excellent cafezinho vous y 
attend a notre centre. 
17. Centre de documentation du CERB : Pavillon }udith-Jasmin, ) . 1916, UQAM (Metro Berri-UQAM), 405, rue Sainte-
Catherine Est, HZL 2C4. Telephone: 514 987 3000, poste 8207; tax: 514 987 8218; courriel: brasil@uqam.ca; 
Web : ww'w.unites.uqam.ca/bresil/. 
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ESTEY CENTRE FOR LAW AND ECONOMICS 
IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
CANADA-BRAZIL TRADE RELATIONS: 
AN EXPEDITED ARBITRAL MECHANISM MAY BE REQUIRED TO RESOLVE THE 
WTO Aircraft from Brazil/Canada dispute 
Professor ]oseph D'Cruz and Dr. Charles M. Gastle 
February 2002 
This study is dedicated to the memory of the late Mr. Justice Willard Z. Estey 
who, in March 2001, recommended that it be written, due in part to the disparate 
regional impact that this dispute may have across Canada, should it not be settled. 
CONTENT 
I. Introduction . 
11. Understanding Brazil 
Ill. The history of the Aireraft from Canada-Brazil Dispute 
IV. The alternatives to Settle or to Continue the Dispute 
V. Conclusion: Forebearance with an Expedited Arbitral Mechanism: the 
Superior Strategy 
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"Se quiserem guerra, guerra e guerra," Fernando Henrique Cardoso18 
J. Introduction 
Canada and Brazil are struggling with the issue of how to resolve the intractable 
series of Aircraft from Brazil/Canada disputes that have bedevilled Brazil-Canada 
trade relationship and can undermine the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas 
initiative ("FTAA") intended to be completed by 2005. Brazil, augmented by the 
Mercosur Customs Union'9, is at best a reluctant participant in the ITAA negotiations, 
and one that is courting the European Union in free trade negotiations as a 
counterweight to the fear of North American dominance in the region20• The recent 
financial crisis within Argentina appears to be strengthening Mercosur, with 
Argentina turning to Brazil as one of its major export market21 • Canada should be 
concerned that the continuance of the Aircraft from Brazil/Canada dispute will 
represent an important trade irritant for an invigorated Mercosur. Canada is placing 
its exports to the region at risk, either by institutional retaliation through the 
imposition of punitive tariffs or by popular revolt, as occurred in January-February 
2001 during the "beef war". This dispute is also tending to undermine an important 
opportunity to promote hemispheric integration. 
Canada and Brazil have announced that they will meet in New York City on 
February 8, 2002 to attempt to settle the dispute. WTO dispute settlement panels 
have ordered that Canada and Brazil remove prohibited export subsidies that have 
been extended in various sales contracts22• This is not practicable as the contracts 
have been signed and any attempt to claw back the subsidies will likely place both 
countries in breach of contract. Not surprisingly, Canada has hinted that it might 
"allow" Brazil to leave the existing subsidies in place, probably in return for a 
similar indulgence. This will not settle the on-going dispute as both parties are reported 
to be more than willing to continue offering strong government support23 • If history 
is any guide, a solution may prove elusive if the parties attempt to negotiate bright 
line rules that will prevent what each party considers to be "cheating" by the other. 
Sadly, the development of new legal rules tends to increase the number of legal 
proceedings and not reduce them. We believe that the creation of an expedited 
arbitral process that can evaluate subsidy offerings while contract competitions are 
still open should be considered as a term in settling this and similar disputes. 
* Professor joseph D'Cruz, DBA (Harvard) is the Professor of Strategic Management , Director of the Global Executive MBA 
Program, Rotman School of Business, University of Toronto. Charles Gastle, LL.M., D.jur, (York) is an Associate with 
the Estey Centre for Law and Economics in International Trade and a partner at Shibley Righton LLP, Toronto. The authors 
wish to acknowledge the research assistance of Crystal Hounsell, Queen's University, and Anne-Laure Dufau, Solenne 
Mercier and Pascal Rapallino, Aix-Marseille University, France. 
18. "If they (Canada) want war, war is war." Femando Henrique Cardoso, President of Brazil. Guerra e Guerra, avisa FHC, 
Econmia, Comercio exterior, 0 Estado de s. Paulo, February, 2001 
19. Founded in 1991, including Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. 
20. Ibid., at 95 
21. Argentina's Crisis, Harsh Realities, The Economist j an 26th-Feb 1st, 2002, at 34. Not all commentators agree that 
Mercosur will be strengthened. Inside U.S. Trade reports in an article, Argentine Crisis Clouds Long-term FTAA Forecast, 
Won 't Delay Start, Oanuary 18th, 2002 www.insidetrade.com): 
But one private-sector source said that the limited success of Mercosur so far cannot be blamed on asymmetrical 
currencies alone, and was also due to the large number of exclusions and underlying problems with that agreement 
itself. This source said the more important export markets for Argentina remain the U.S. and European Union and 
Argentina must continue to focus on agreements that will lead to increased access to those markets. 
22. The WTO panel determination in Canada-Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional A ircraft, WT/DS222/ R, released 
on January 28th, 2002, that Canada must remove the subsidies extended to Air Wisconsin, is still subject to an appeal 
by either Canada or Brazil. 
23. Ottawa puts brave face on WTO Ruling, The Globe and Mail, fan 29th, 2002, B6, Brazil-Export Financing Programme for 
Aircraft, Recourse to Arbitration by Brazil under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, WT/DS46/ ARB 
28, August 28th, 2000, para 5.189 ("Article 22.6 Panel Report''). 
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Bombardier and Embraer compete in the regional aircraft market which 
includes commercial aircraft of fewer than 100 seats. Both are considered key 
national champions in a critical high technological sector. Three-quarters of 
Bombardier's profits are reported to come from the aerospace division24 • The 
importance of Bombardier is underscored by a variety of studies that have 
highlighted the underdeveloped nature of Canada's high technology sector2s. 
Embraer was Brazil's largest exporter in 1999 (representing 3.5% of total exports)26, 
and its importance is underscored by WTO concerns regarding Brazil's ability to 
finance its current account deficit27 • The importance of Embraer is reflected in the 
difficult transition that Brazil is making from an industrial policy based on the 
traditional Latin American model of import-substitution, to a more open economy 
putting its relatively inefficient industrial structure under greater import pressure. 
Both Canada and Brazil view their national champions as important contributots to 
the development of high technology clusters and important sources of national 
competitive advantage. 28 
On August 28, 2000, WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism29 ("WTO DSM") panel 
confirmed Canada's entitlement to impose retaliation on Brazil in the amount of 
$344.2 million per year. Canada refrained from doing so, in an apparent recognition 
that the imposition of punitive tariffs of one hundred percent on imports from 
Brazil would have little if any impact on Brazil's motivation to modify the PROEX 
program. Canada imports from Brazil goods amounting to approximately $1.5 
billion per year, the majority being primary materials or low-technology goods. The 
elasticity of the goods involved indicates that the imposition of retaliatory tariffs 
would depress, if not eliminate, bilateral trade in the goods subject to the tariffs. 
Canada's decision not to retaliate may have been also based on the popular 
revolt that took place in January-February, 2001, when Canada imposed a ban on 
Brazilian beef. Brazilian newspapers at the time reported that purchasing agents 
were cancelling orders of Canadian products and replacing them with alternative 
sources. For example: 
"The first reaction will be in the agricultural sector because everything that 
Canada exports to Brazil can be substituted by other suppliers. The structure of 
bilateral commerce is clear: retaliation will be more negative for Canada than for us. 
There is no doubt that Brazilian enterprises will import from other suppliers. This 
Canadian action is infantile and the cost will be paid by the Canadian consumer 
and by Canadian enterprises that will lose business in Brazil." Pratini de Morais, 
Agricultural Minister of Brazil. 30 
24. "Accentuate the positive", The Toronto Star, February 3rd, 2002, Cl at C3 
25. One of the more recent is Roger L Martin and Michael E. Porter, Canadian Competitiveness: A Decade after the Crossroads, 
C.D. Howe Institute, Working Paper 2001-1 
26. Trade Policy Review, Brazil 2000, World Trade Organization, Geneva, Dec. 2000, at 93, para 67. 
27. Ibid., at 15, para 37 
28. The Canadian aircraft sector is described by the Federal Government as a "vitally important incubator of advanced 
technologies, bringing together a critical mass of Canadian firms that are helping to build a future economy based on 
high-technology, valued-added products." The sector is cited as spending more than S 700 million in 1999 on research 
and development and investment in plants and equipment reaching $850 million in the same year. Canada Ready to 
Match Brazilian Financing Terms to Preserve Aircraft jobs, January lOth, 2001, Department of Industry Press Release. 
29. Article 22.6 Panel Report, op cit. supra, Note 6 
30. "Brasil vai reagir a retalia>oes do Canada", Gazeta Mercantil- Ter>a-Feria jan 23rd, 2001. 
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If the dispute had continued, the reaction to Canadian goods might not have 
been limited solely to Canadian exports to Brazil, as Canadian investments in Brazil 
were also targeted: 
"We will likely encourage the population not to buy lines or utilize the services 
of Vesper, a Canadian enterprise in the Brazilian telephone sector." Edwaldo 
Sarmento, Director and President of the Syndicate of Industries, Telecommunication 
Systems of the State of Sao Paulo 31 
The intensity of the popular reaction in Brazil caught many Canadians by 
surprise. The result was that certain Canadian products were side-swiped by the 
Canadian ban on Brazilian beef, including potash exports. The boycott of Canadian 
potash indicates a particular vulnerability to Brazilian trade action, as the boycott 
was not necessarily due to government action but a rejection of Canadian product 
at the farm gate. This reaction suggests that aggressive trade action by Canada has 
the potential to result in a popular rejection of Canadian goods, should it retaliate 
against Brazilian imports in a manner that effectively shuts off the Canadian 
market. It is notable that beef products, among a number of agricultural products, 
are included in the target list of potential Brazilian imports that might be subjected 
to the punitive tariff that Canada published in the Canada Gazette in May, 2000. 
Instead of imposing punitive tariffs, Canada claims to have matched what it 
perceived to be non-compliant subsidies under the PROEX program. It did so on 
two occasions: the sale of seventy-five aircraft to Air Wisconsin in January, 2001; 
and the sale of up to 150 aircraft to Northwest Airlines in July, 2001. Engaging in a 
"matching" strategy may well prove detrimental to Canada's reputation before the 
multilateral trade community, as it represents the kind of self-help remedy said to 
threaten viability of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. A more tangible 
result is that Brazil may soon be placed in a position to retaliate against Canada by 
imposing tariffs on Canadian imports, including potash and sulphur. In the 
Canada-Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft panel report released 
on January 28, 200232, the WTO Panel determined that Canada extended prohibited 
export subsidies on occasion since 1996, but most notably when it offered the 
"matching" subsidies to Air Wisconsin33 • Subject to an appeal, Canada has been 
given 90 days to remove the subsidies, said to constitute $1.7 billion in financing, 
which will likely prove impossible due to the contractual obligations that Canada 
and Bombardier entered into at the time. Brazil is also in a position to commence a 
new WTO complaint that undoubtedly will find that prohibited export subsidies 
were provided to Northwest Airlines. Canada will then have "lost" two panel 
determinations and the score will be five to two, if keeping score serves any purpose. 
31. "Comercio veta os produtos do CanadA" 
32. Canada - Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft , WT/DS222/R, ] an 28th, 2002, hereinafter "Canada-
Export Credits" 
33. Ibid., Para 8.1 11 ln conclusion we: ... 
(e) uphold Brazil 's claim that he EDC Canada Account finan cing to Air Wisconsin constitutes a prohibited export 
subsidy contrary to Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement; 
(f) uphold Brazils claim that the EDC Canada Account financing to Air Nostrum constitutes a prohibited export 
subsidy contrary to Article 3.1 (a) of the SCM Agreement; 
(g) uphold Brazil 's claim that the EDC Corporate Account fin ancing to Comair in July 1996, August 1997 and February 
1999 constitutes a prohibited export subsidy contrary to Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement." 
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The question arises as to what strategy Canada should adopt in trying to resolve 
this seemingly intractable dispute. In this study, we identify three strategies: 
(a) a policy of forbearance by which Canada and Brazil refrain from retaliation 
and implement an institutional solution that adjudicates allegations of 
improper subsidization on an expedited basis; 
(b) Canada and Brazil enter into an unrestricted bidding war for each new 
contract; or 
(c) Canada and Brazil impose retaliatory, punitive tariffs on one another. 
With respect to the institutional solution, the various WTO panel and appellate 
body determinations that have been issued in this dispute have established that the 
major government support programs of each country (Brazil-PROEX, Canada - the 
Canada Account, Export Development Corporation financing) have been modified 
in a way that they have been found compliant "as such" with the World Trade 
Organization Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, ("SCM Agreement")34 • 
Canada and Brazil must challenge each offer of support on its terms as to whether 
it confers a "benefit" to the customer airline contingent upon export performance. 
It will be difficult if not impossible to develop "bright line" rules of general 
application, beyond those already included in the OECD Arrangement on Guidelines 
for Officially Supported Export Credits ("OECD Arrangement")35 • Both governments 
have demonstrated significant creativity and "flexibility of thought" in crafting 
new offers of support. 
An arbitral mechanism should be able to determine the consistency of a 
specific offer of financing before the contract is awarded. The determination made 
in Canada-Export Credits suggests that Canada learned of the Brazilian offer in 
October, 2000, and "matched" it on May 10, 2001!6 A period of seven-eight months 
should be sufficient for an arbitral panel to determine whether the government 
offer of financial assistance exceeds those ·available on the commercial market. 
Obviously, the arbitral determination should be binding on the parties either directly 
by enjoining the provision of non-compliant support, or enforceable in the 
ordinary course through the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism. This solution 
should also address allegations made recently by Embraer officials that Canada 
cannot be trusted to make full disclosure of its support programs in negotiations to 
resolve the dispute.3' An expedited arbitration process should require disclosure of 
information relating to alleged subsidy programs, failing which an appropriate 
adverse inference might be drawn against the party failing to produce clearly 
relevant information. 
34. World Trade Organization Agreem ent on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, ("SCM Agreement" ), April 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization The Legal Texts - The Results of the Uruguay Round 
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 264 (1994) 
35. Brazil- Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, Second Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 o(the DSU, WT/DS46/ RW/2, 
July 26th, 2001 para 5.67, at pg 23, ("Second Recourse by Canada Panel Report") 
36. Canada-Export Credits, op cit. supra, Note 15., at para 7.137 at 35 
37. It has been alleged that Canadian government officials have not been forthcoming with information relating to vari· 
ous government programs that Brazil has alleged constitute WTO-illegal export subsidies. "Ottawa can't be trusted in jet 
talks: Embraer executive", Financial Post, )an 24th, 2002, at ·FP5 
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A competition of "matching subsidies" or entering into a bidding war is a "tit 
for tat" strategy that takes the form of an iterative prisoner's dilemma. Game 
theory provides support for such a strategy in the context of export subsidies. 
However, there are a number of problems with the application of game theory in 
this context. First, it oversimplifies the nature of the dispute, assuming that each 
government is a single "rational actor" that has complete knowledge of the options 
available and a prescient ability to forecast the utility-maximizing alternative. 
Graham T. Allison explains the manner in which the "rational actor" model underlies 
game theory and neoclassical economic theory.'" He provides two alternative 
models based on the organizational and political aspects of governmental decision 
making in international conflicts or crises. These alternative models highlight the 
importance of institutional and business elites within Canada and Brazil in the 
decision process to provide on-going financial support and in fashioning a respons~ 
to threats of retaliation. 
The imposition of retaliatory, punitive tariffs is the least attractive solution. An 
analysis of the performance of the dispute settlement mechanism since the 
implementation of the WTO Uruguay Round Agreements in 1995, suggest that 
retaliation has played little, if any, role in achieving compliance. A total of eighty-
four panel reports have been adopted, along with thirty appellate reports. Only six 
disputes have reached the stage of an Article 22.6 panel determination authorizing 
a particular level of retaliation to be taken, through the imposition of punitive 
tariffs or the withdrawal of other obligations under the WTO Agreements. Three 
have resulted in the imposition of punitive tariffs and only in one case39 has a 
settlement been reached, but only after the tariffs were in place for two years and it 
is unclear to what degree they contributed to the eventual settlement. In all three 
cases, the punitive tariffs appear to have been seen as a cost of doing business, 
justifying the continuation of the non-complying measure that gave rise to the 
dispute. The factor that appears to have resulted in compliance is not the threat of 
the imposition of tariffs, but the pressure brought by the multilateral community 
through the ongoing scrutiny of measures taken by the responding nation on a 
regular basis, pursuant to the review procedures of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism. 
The importance of pressure from the international community points to an 
important benefit of an expedited arbitral process that takes place before the 
government financing has been extended. It should help each government to 
answer its own constituencies in resisting pressure to take a position that is contrary 
to the rules of international trade. A relatively quick decision that a particular 
subsidy package is "offside", presumably should allow the Canadian and Brazilian 
governments to withdraw, or at least modify, the financing terms. The existing 
provisions of the OECD Arrangement'" will likely provide the legal rules to be applied 
for the expedited arbitral process, as it was reviewed extensively by the WTO 
panels convened in this dispute in defining the limits of the "safe haven" 
recognized by the WTO SCM Agreement. 41 This result should be attractive to Canada 
38. Graham T. Alii son, Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1971, Little, Brown and Company, Boston 
39. E.U.- Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (WT/DS 27), April 9th, 1999 
40. Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircra{f:, Second Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS46/RW/2, 
July 26th, 2001 para 5.67, at pg 23, 
4l .The "safe haven" is foun d in item (k) of the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies set fo rth in Annex 1 of the SCM 
Agreement. Canada - Export Credits, op cit supra, note 15, paras 7.138-9 and 7.159 
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as the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade has stated that 
Brazilian adherence to the OECD Arrangement is its chosen "end game". 
In this study, it is suggested that forbearance is a superior strategy to a policy of 
"matching subsidies", while the application of punitive duties is the least attractive 
option of the three. We start our analysis with a review of the political and 
economic circumstances in Brazil to place the Aircraft from Brazil/Canada dispute in · 
context. The PROEX program is analyzed in the light of Brazilian economic 
circumstances, to demonstrate the importance of Embraer exports in helping to 
finance Brazil's current account deficit through export performance. The current 
status of the dispute is then analyzed along with the three options outlined above. 
The theory underlying the concept of retaliation in trade disputes is presented, 
along with a discussion of the strategic factors that are important in the success of 
the form of retaliation under review. The case for an arbitral mechanism is discussed 
in the context of the "forbearance option" and its structure and design are considered. 
Changes may soon take place through new entrants to the market that may 
highlight the need to settle this dispute. Europe-based Fairchild Dornier is reported 
to be "among two or three aircraft manufacturers with plans to get into the regional 
jet business."42 Boeing had announced a joint venture with the Ilyushin and Sukhoi 
aircraft manufacturers to consider building regional jet models seating up to 100 
passengers, in direct competition with Embraer and Bombardier!3 It is unclear the 
degree to which the events of September 11 '" will delay plans. Canadian and 
Brazilian officials should no longer view the regional jet aircraft market as a 
two-party competition, with new and deeper pockets on the horizon. They have an 
opportunity now to establish a new institutional mechanism that may be used to 
settle the multi-party contract competitions that may be on the horizon. 
11. UNDERSTANDING BRAZIL 
Brazil is a country of extremes in the midst of a political and economic 
experiment. Brazil ranks among the top twenty nations economically with a GDP 
of $800 billion U.S. and a population of 163.9 million,<• one-quarter of which live 
below internationally defined poverty levels, without access to adequate food, 
health, education and employment.<s The United Nations' 1999 report on the 
human development index showed Brazil falling from sixty second to seventy-
ninth overall. 46 It is a nation in a state of transition, emerging from its latest military 
dictatorship in 1985!' 
Throughout the postwar period, Brazil followed the import substitutional 
strategy that was prevalent throughout Latin America. It maintained high tariffs 
and other non-tariff barriers to protect domestic industry from foreign competition!8 
The government played a leading role in organizing marketing cartels in a number 
42. "Accentuate the positive", The Toronto Star, February 3rd, 2002, Cl at C3 
43. "Boeing Wants More Russia Cooperation," August 18, 2001, http://money.iwon.com/jsp/nw/nwdt rt top .jsp?cat 
= TOPBIZ&src=202 &section=news&news_id=reu-1 55964&date=&alias=/ alias/money /cm/nw 
44. http://www.ibge.gov.br/english/estatistica/economia/contasnacionais/voll/tab5.shtm, last visited August 17th, 2001 
45. Thomaz Guedes da Costa Brazil in the New Decade, Searching for a Future, The Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies, September 2000, 
46. Ibid. , at 1. Seventy-seven percent of Brazilian households boast running water while only 40.7 percent have sewers. 
Ibid., at 12 
47. Ibid., at 5 
48. Ibid., at 10 
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of key commodities and created new state enterprises.49 This resulted in the 
development of an inefficient manufacturing sector, with relatively poor access to 
technology. 
After the election of Fernando Collar in March 1990, the first elected president 
since the fall of the military dictatorship,S0 Brazil began a denationalization 
program. 51 This involved a move from its import substitutional model and policy of 
market management to "an outward-oriented, market-driven economy, supported 
by disciplined financial policies."52 Regional integration also became a key ingredient 
of the adoption of a more open trade environment with the formation of Mercosur 
in 1991, comprised of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay.53 It has since been 
augmented by a free trade agreement with Chile in June 1996,'' and Bolivia in 
December 1996.55 The Mercosur nations and Chile represent more than 59 percent 
of Latin America and the Caribbean gross domestic product, with Brazil alone 
accountil}g for 37 percent.56 A corridor runs through Mercosur plus Chile that 
includes twenty large cities, with seventy million urban consumers having a per 
capita income of approximately US $10,000.00.57 
It has been suggested that Mercosur remains the most important trade 
initiative on Brazil's international affairs agenda, having a "huge impact on 
government ministries in mobilizing ideas and resources."58 
The Mercosur initiative is a gamble made by the Brazilian government and 
people, and the political consequences, both internally and externally, are 
significant. 59 
And further, 
For Brazilian policymakers, the images of successful trade integration in the 
European Union and a history of unsuccessful schemes for commercial 
integration in Latin America instilled a sense of urgency to explore the 
possibility of a free trade zone with Argentina. Other forces pushing the 
Brazilian desire for Mercosur included the idea that the new trade area 
49. Ibid. 
50. Ibid. 
5 1. Ibid. at 15. In the first phase, denationalization occurred in such sectors as steel, fertilizer, and petrochemical industries 
through the acceptance of cash and public debt certificates as payment, for revenues of U.S. $4 billion until 1992. The 
program entered a second phase in which restrictions were withdrawn that prohibited foreign investors. By December 
1998, total sales revenue amounted to S68 bill ion with participation of foreign investors up to S28 billion. Canada's 
participation was limited mainly to the telecommunications sector within which Canada invested $640.7 of the total 
$661.7 millions that Canada invested in the program. Ibid. , at 16, Table 3.4 
52. Trade Policy Review, Brazil 2000, op cit., supra, Note 9, at 1, para 1 
53. Sidney Weintraub, Development and Democracy in the Southern Cone, Imperatives for U.S. Policy in South America, the 
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, February 2000, at 1. it follows on two earlier failed attempts at regional 
integration involving Latin American Free Trade Agreement (" LAFTA") reached in 1960 with the goal of reaching free trade 
over a twelve year period. Ibid., at 8. In 1978, the Treaty of Montevideo restructured the agreement into a new organization 
called the Latin American Integration Association (" ALADI"), at 8. The agreement was flawed because it only required the 
parties to follow the rules to the degree possible. 
54. Trade Policy Review, op cit., Supra, Note 9 at 21. The Mercosur - Chile Free Trade Agreement will involve free trade for at 
least three quarters of its tariff lines by January 2006 and free trade for all tariff lines by 2014 . 
55. Robert Bouzas, Mercosur's External Trade Negotiations: Dealing with a congested Agenda, published in Riordan Roett, 
Mercosur, Regional Integration World Markets, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1999, 81-93, at 83 
56. Weintraub, op d t., Supra, Note 36, at 1. 
57. Felix Pena, Broadening and Deepening: Striking the Right Balance, published in Riordan Roett, op cit., supra, Note 38, 1999, 
49-61, at 54. 
58. Da Costa, op cit., Supra, Note 28, at 22. 
59. Ibid. 
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would function as a springboard to improve Brazilian businesses' competi-
tiveness and production scale and that Mercosur would function as a 
negotiating platform to expand Brazil's political presence in global disputes 
on trade and investments, most notably to generate a counterweight on 
issues advanced by the United States. 60 
Mercosur is a large regional market providing a degree of insulation which 
Brazilian industries can use to adapt to international competition. It was established 
with the objective of creating a common market with the free movement of goods, 
services and persons by the end of 1994.01 In 1995, with the introduction of the 
Common External Tariff ("CET"), the parties agreed to create a customs union, 
which should be fully operational by 2006! 2 - Most tariffs between members were 
removed on January 1", 1995, with 85 percent of intra-trade becoming duty freeY 
While it has been suggested that market liberalization was practically the only 
major industrial policy initiative from 1990 through 1994/ 4 the Mexican financial 
crisis of late 1994 marked a period of partial reversion of market lib~ralizing l 
activities.65 The crisis led to the implementation of the "Real Plan" fiscal measures 
in 1995 that stabilized the Brazilian economy, reduced inflation, but increased the 
Brazilian exchange rate. This had the effect of placing Brazil's industrial sector 
under increasing international competition which, in turn, led to a resurgence of 
protectionist pressure. 66 The impact of the crisis on trade strategy was then 
exacerbated by the Russian moratorium on debt repayment and the Asian financial 
crisis that occurred in 1998. These crises generated a large capital flight from emerging 
markets requiring Brazil to further raise short-term interest rates6_7 and undertake a 
tightening of the fiscal regime.68 In mid-January 1999, Brazil was forced to adopt a 
flexible exchange rate regime which led to depreciation in its currency, the Real, by 
thirty percent versus the American dollar. It contributed to a substantial decrease in 
Brazil's trade with its Mercosur partners in 1999.69 The cost of credit remains high 
notwithstanding that Brazil has been able to gradually reduce interest rates since 
the financial shocks of 1997-8.'0 
The result was a worsening of the Brazilian current account and trade balance 
through 1999, when capital flows were negative notwithstanding a substantial 
increase in foreign direct investment. The deterioration in the terms of trade, ' 1 led 
to a dampening of export activity. 
60. Ibid., at 8 
61. Trade Policy Review, op cit., Supra, Note 9,at 20 
62. Lia Valls Pereira, Toward the Common Market of the South: Mercosur's Origins, Evolution, and Challenges, publish ed in Roett, 
op cit., Supra, Note 38, pp 7-23 at 11. 
63. Trade Policy Review, op cit., Supra, Note 9. 
64. Pedro da Motto Veiga, Brazil in Mercosur: Reciprocal Influence, Roett, op cit., Supra, Note 38, pp 25-33, at 27 _ 
65. Ibid., at 28-9 ) 
66. Ibid. 
67. Brazilian Rates 1995 1996 1997 
Savings 39.74 16.34 16.55 
Deposits (90 days to I yr) n.a. 26.18 23.86 
Lending (90 days to 1 yr) 154.51 74.12 61.59 
Trade Policy Review, op cit., supra, Note 9, at Table 1.1, at 3 
68. Trade Policy Review, op crt., supra, Note 9,at 5. 
69. Ibid., para 35, at 12. 
70. Trade Policy Review, op cit. , supra, Note 9, at 2. 
1998 
14.43 
26.21 
64.69 
1999 
12.24 
24.71 
61.36 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Consumer Price Index (ICPA) 66.0 15.8 6.9 3.2 4.9 
71. The decrease in the terms of trade resulted from an increase in international oil prices while the price of commodity 
exports remained depressed. Ibid. , at 7 
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TABLE ONE: 
BRAZILIAN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 1995-1999 (US $millions)72 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Overall balance 13,479 9,016 -7,846 -17,284 -10,739 
Current account balance -17,973 -23,142 -30,909 -33,615 -24,379 
- Trade balance -21,973 -26,042 -33,125 -35,394 -26,419 
- Merchandise Trade bal. -3,352 -5,599 -6,846 -6,593 -1,207 
-Exports f.o.b. 44,506 47,747 52,994 51,140 48,011 
-Imports f.o.b. 49,858 53,346 59,840 57,773 49,218 
- Services -18,595 -20,443 -26,279 -28,801 -25,212 
Capital account balance 29,359 33,958 25,974 20,197 13,805 
Terms of Trade" 95.5 105.8 100.0 98.4 85.6 
The combination of these various shocks to the economy led Brazil to begin to 
modify its market liberalization strategy. In 1995, Brazil began a limited process of 
managing imports, largely thrc,mgh increasing tariffs, to avoid a significant 
depreciation in the balance of trade, which ran a deficit for the first time that year 
after more than a decade of positive balances.74 Brazil also introduced new government 
programs to provide incentives for investment and public financing (including 
subsidies) for export promotion. 75 Brazil increased the CET by three percentage 
points in 1997, which contributed to an increase in the average MFN tariff rate to 
13.7 percent/6 with an applied MFN tariff of 12.6 percent for agricultural goods and 
of 13.9 percent for manufactured goods. 77 
The WTO, in its Trade Policy Review of Brazil published in 2000, noted that a 
concern of Brazilian authorities is Brazil's ability to finance its current account 
deficit. FDI flows have covered the deficit but these flows may decrease as the 
process of privatization that has been underway is completed. As a result, the 
authorities perceive the need to improve export performance, to narrow the trade 
deficit, and perhaps even to move it into surplus. 78 The government had set a target 
of exporting $100 billion by 2002, which is more than twice its 1999level of $48.1 
billion. '9 The target becomes more significant when one considers that of the four 
million businesses in Brazil, less than one half of one percent engage in exports, and 
that 90 percent of exporting income is concentrated in eight hundred businesses. 
72. Ibid. 
73. 1987 = 100, US$ based. 
74. Veiga, op cit., supra, Note 47, at 28 
75. Ibid., at 28 
76. Trade Policy Review, op cit., supra, Note 9,at 26. 
77. Ibid. at 31 The tariff shows a clear escalation, with a higher tariff average on processed items than on semi-processed 
goods and raw materials. This pattern holds for all industries with an average tariff rate of 15.8 percent on finished 
goods, 11.9 percent on semi-processed goods and 8.9 percent on raw materials. 
78. Trade Policy Review, op cit., Supra, Note 9, at 15, para 37 
79. da Costa, op cit., Supra, Note 28, at 21. 
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The balance of payments will be the factor to monitor for signs of a policy 
shift. As payments for the denationalization program approach deadline 
(as there are fewer enterprises to privatize) and the balance of trade 
continues to be negative the balance of payments will be a key indicator of 
Brazil's ability to sustain a favourable environment for foreign direct 
investment and open trade policies. As long as Brazil is able to sustain a 
positive perspective in attracting capital investment and income, internal 
popular demands of consumers and producers regarding the pace of 
opening Brazil's economy can be satisfied by the Central Bank's 
instruments to manage a favourable cash flow and its ability to meet 
foreign payment commitments. If the trends increasing the stock of external 
public and private debt and diminishing liquid foreign reserves persist (at 
the end of the period), pressure will increase to shift the picture of the . 
balance of payments with protectionist measures.80 
Now the importance of Embraer and the aircraft industry becomes evident. In 
the context of Brazil's economic and political environment, Embraer is a powerful 
national symbol, becoming Brazil's largest exporter in 1999, representing 3.5% of 
total Brazilian exports."' It is Brazil's largest aircraft manufacturer having been 
founded as a government company in 1969.82 It helps support a cluster of 500 
companies employing 50,000 people. It holds a 45% market share in the regional 
jet market and 24% of the 20-40 seat market segment."' By June 2000, the company 
held an order book of US$21 billion of which US$8.6 billion were firm orders.•• Its 
exports in 1999 amounted to US$1.7 billion, representing 95% of the company's 
revenue (up from 63.1 o/o in 1994). It provided a net foreign exchange contribution 
(after deducting imports and PROEX payments) of U.S.$647 million. The aircraft 
industry in Brazil is considered to be its most dynamic export sector with its 1995 
to 1999 performance as follows: 
TABLE TWO: 
BRAZILIAN AIRCRAFT SECTOR EXPORTS (US $millions)"5 
1996 1997 1998 1999 
283.8 681.0 1,159.0 1,771.8 
The political and economic importance of EMBRAER to Brazil is reflected in the 
allocation of financial support through PROEX. The program was established in 
1991, with the objective of increasing Brazilian exports by facilitating access to 
export financing especially in respect of goods that require medium- to long-range 
financing. 86 
80. Ibid., at 31. 
81. Trade Policy Review, Brazil 2000, op cit., Supra, Note 9,at 93, para 67. 
82. Ibid. , at 92, para 64-6. The company is now controlled by a Brazilian investment conglomerate, Bozano, Simosen 
Group and its two largest pension funds, Sistel and Previ. In 1999, it formed strategic alliances with the main French 
Aerospace companies (Aerospatiale-Matra, Dassault Aviation, Snecma, and Thomson-CSF). 
83. Ibid., at 92, para 66 
84. Ibid., at 93, para 67 
85. Ibid., at 88, Table IV.4 
86. Ibid., at 60, para 150 
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The importance of the program is reflected in its timing early in the adoption 
of a more open market strategy, both internationally and through the formation of 
Mercosur. Its orientation is reflected in the requirement that Brazilian goods are 
eligible for the maximum financing under the program if they contain 60% 
domestic content!' The program is widely available to Brazilian exporters, with an 
expansion in its coverage at the end of 1998 to include 94% of all lines in Brazil's 
tariff schedule and more than 80% of exports. Brazilian authorities indicate that 
15% of all exports benefit from PROEX support."" While this may be true, EMBRAER 
absorbed 39-45% of total PROEX resources in 1998.89 
Brazil's political and economic stability appear to depend on its ability to 
re-orient its industrial structure from its traditional import substitutional model to 
a more open one that includes international competition. The opening of the 
economy is occurring slowly in key sectors, but with processed and technological 
goods enjoying higher rates of protection. Brazil must increase its exports substan-
tially, to stabilize its current account deficit to avoid the economic instability that 
occurred in 1994 in Mexico and most developing nations in 1997-8 in the midst of 
the Asian financial crisis. It must attract the capital investment needed to increase 
internal development and international competitiveness. This is a significant 
challenge in circull!stances where "Brazilian industrial development has [traditionally] 
-displayed a chronic incapacity to control or reduce public deficits used to invest in 
infrastructure industries and social goods and to increase personal savings. "90 
In these circumstances, EMBRAER must be seen as a national champion and a 
powerful symbol of Brazilian potential in world trade. 91 Brazil can be expected to 
resist a meaningful reduction in PRO EX support, especially when Brazilian officials 
do not appear to clearly accept the findings of the WTO panel, especially when 
exonerating Canadian programs while continuing to find its programs noncompliant. 
Embraer officials "often say WTO rules are designed by rich countries to benefit 
their economies, so Brazil couldn't possibly get a favourable decision."92 
The recent financial crisis within Argentina appears to be improving the 
prospects of Mercosur and further regional integration.93 Argentina had actively 
courted the United States throughout the 1990s, by pegging its currency to the 
United States dollar and by attempting to engage the United States in free trade 
87. Ibid., at 60, para 151. Goods with a 60% domestic content are eligible for interest rate equalization payments on 85% of 
their value. Goods that have a domestic content less than 60% are eligible for an interest rate equalization reduced 
according to the percentage of domestic content. 
88. Ibid., at 60, para 153 
89. Ibid., at 93 para 68 
90. Brazil in the New Decade, op cit., supra, note 27, 
91. "Since its privatisation, Embraer has become a source of pride in Brazil. It is a high-tech export success - foreign sales 
rose 60% last year to $2.7 billion- capable of fighting rich countries' aerospace giants on equal terms. More than equal: 
whereas it is selling regional airlines a full model range from 47 to 108 seats, Bombardier has no model at the bottom 
end and Fairchild Dormier has nothing in the most popular SO-seat range." Regional Jets, Small is Beautiful, The 
Economist, March 17th, 2001, at 65. 
92. InfoBrazil, "From Embraer-Bombardier Dispute to Brazil-Canada Showdown, InfoBrazil interviews Ambassador Jean 
Pierre Juneau, January, 2001." 
http://www.infobrazil.com/Conteudo/Front Page/Twenty Questions/Conteudo.asp?ID Noticias=439&ID Area=2&ID G 
rupo=10, last visited, August 19, 2001 
93. Argentina's Crisis, Harsh Realities, The Economist ]an 26th-Feb 1st, 2002, at 34. Not all commentators agree that 
Mercosur will be strengthened. Inside U .S. Trade reports in an article, Argentine Crisis Clouds Long-term FTAA Forecast, 
Won't Delay Start, Oanuary 18th, 2002 www.insidetrade.com). See footnote 4, infra. 
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negotiations!• Mercosur had struggled since 1999 when Brazil devalued its currency 
in a manner that exacerbated the recession in Argentina that did not have 
similar flexibility in its monetary policy.95 Argentina is now turning to Brazil as one 
of its major export markets, especially at a time when the IMF and the United States 
may be tightening access to the capital markets. In June 2001, Henry Kissinger 
stated that "Argentina is, in a sense, a proxy for the rest of the region."96 If true, 
Canada should be concerned that the continuance of this dispute will represent a 
trade irritant for an invigorated Mercosur that may look increasingly to the E.U. as 
a counterweight to negotiation of a FTAA. The negotiation of an E.U.- Mercosur 
association agreement appears to be an important trade initiative for the E.U.9' 
Ill. THE HISTORY OF THE AIRCRAFT FROM CANADA/BRAZIL DISPUTE 
Canada and Brazil have been embroiled in this dispute since 1996. A significant 
number of panel reports have been issued, with no end yet in sight if the dispute is 
not settled. Canada is defending an important industry within a sensitive ~ 
geographic region. Brazil is defending a crucially important industry, but also 
perceives this dispute as one between a developed and developing nation on the 
basis of rules that favour the former. 
(a). Canadian Challenge of Brazil's PROEX Program 
In 1996,08 Canada requested the establishment of a WTO Panel to rule on the 
legality of PROEX a program established by the Government of Brazil to provide 
export credit to Brazilian exporters.99 With direct financing Brazil lends a portion of 
the funds required for the transaction. When extending interest rate equalization, 
Brazil provides to the financial institution extending the credit (domestic or 
foreign) an equalization payment to cover, at most, the difference between the 
interest charges contracted with the buyer and the borrowing costs to the financier. 100 
The term for equalization payments for aircraft is often extended to fifteen years, by 
waiver of PROEX's guidelines of ten years. The interest rate spread to be 
equalized ranges up to 2.5 percentage points for a term of nine years or more. 101 
94. Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomarcy for the ·21st Century, Jue 2002, Simon &Schuster, at 95 
95. Mercosur Averts Trade Collision, August 2nd, 1999, WTOWATCH.ORG 
96. Kissinger, op cit., supra, note 77, at 108 
97. An E.U. Council Meeting report released on January 28th, 2002, (http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom) stated: 
In the context of the current crisis in Argentina, the Council welcomes the will expressed by the Mercosur Foreign 
Affairs Ministers in their Joint Declaration, made in Buenos Aires on 11 January, 2002, to strengthen the integration 
process amongst their countries. 
The Council believes that a strengthened Mercosur will be the key to the development of the region. 
Finally, the Council reiterates the importance it attaches to the establishment of an Association Agreement between the 
E.U. and Mercosur. It welcomes the progress achieved so far in these negotiations and reiterates the EU commitment to 
continue to make further progress. 
98. Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/R, 1999, para 1.1, at 1 ("lnitial Panel Report") 
99. Brazil-Export Financing Programme for Aircraft- Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS46/RW, May 9th, 
2000, at para 2.1, at 2 ("First Article 21.5 Panel") 
100. Ibid., at para 2.2 
101. Ibid., at para 2.3 PROEX interest rate equalisation payments are established at the time the manufacturer requests a let-
ter of commitment on behalf of the Government of Brazil, if the contract is entered into within ninety days. Ibid., at 
para 2.5. PRO EX payments begin after the aircraft is exported and paid for by the purchaser, with the payments resem-
bling a series of zero-coupon bonds which mature at six-month intervals over the Course of the financing period. Ibid., 
at para 2.6 
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On August 20, 1999, the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") adopted the 
Appellate Body Report recommending that Brazil bring the PROEX program into 
compliance with the WTO SCM Agreement.'02 It was found that the PROEX 
program provided export subsidies prohibited by SCM Article 3.2.103 The Dispute 
Settlement Body recommended that Brazil withdraw export subsidies for regional 
aircraft within 90 days. 104 On May 9, 2000, the WTO panel determined that Brazil's 
changes to the PROEX program did not bring the program into compliance.10s 
Canada provided notification to Brazil that it proposed to undertake retaliation in 
the amount of $700 million (Cdn) 106 through one or more of the following 
measures:107 
(a) Application of a 100 percent surtax on selected imports from Brazil; 
(b) Suspension of Brazil from the list of countries eligible for the General 
Preferential Tariff; 
(c) Suspension of injury inqumes under the Special Import Measures Act, in 
countervailing duty investigations in respect of goods from Brazil that 
benefit from PROEX subsidies; 
(d) Suspension of Canada's obligations to Brazil under the WTO Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing (the Multifibre Agreement); and 
(e) Suspension of Canada's obligations to Brazil under the WTO Agreement 
on Import Licensing, permitting Canada to impose special licensing 
requirements on imports from Brazil. 
The list of goods referred to in the first measure above, is set forth in Appendix 
I, which also indicates the import volume in these goods from Brazil from 1996 to 
2000, as well as those products excluded from the target list. To give a clear picture 
of the pattern of bilateral trade, Appendix 11 also provides an analysis of the exports 
to Brazil from Canada based on the target list. 
On May 22, 2000, Brazil requested the Dispute Settlement Body to re-convene 
the panel for the limited purpose of determining whether the "countermeasures" 
102. World Trade Organization Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, ("SCM Agreemenf'), April 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization The Legal Texts -The Results of the Uruguay Round 
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 264 (1994) 
103. First Article 21.5 Panel Report, op cit Supra, Note 81, para 6.9 at 7. Article 3.2 provides: "A Member shall neither grant 
nor maintain subsidies [contingent, in law or in fact, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon 
export performance, including those illustrated in Annex 1]." 
104. lbid., at para 1.2. 
105. On November 19, 1999, Brazil submitted a status report indicating certain changes to the PRO EX program which, in 
Brazil's view, brought the program into compliance. Ibid., at para 1.3. Canada requested a panel pursuant to WTO 
DSM Article 21.5 to determine whether the measures taken by Brazil did indeed achieve this result. On May 9th, 2000, 
the original panel that heard the dispute determined that the PRO EX program was not brought into compliance. On 
July 21st, 2000, the Appellate Panel confirmed the Article 21.5 panel determination. Brazil - Export Financing 
Programme for Aircraft, Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS46/AB/RW, July 21st, 2000 ("First Article 
21.5 Appellate Report") 
106. Brazil- Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, Recourse to Arbitration by Brazil Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, 
WT/DS46/ARB, August 28th, 2000, ("Brazil Article 22.6 Panel Report"), para 1.1 
107. Notice of Intention to Retaliate in Response to the Government of Brazil's Refusal to Eliminate Illegal Subsidies on Exports of 
Regional Aircraft, Canada Gazette, Part l, May 13, 2000, at 1454-64 
108. Panel Report, op cit. Supra, Note 6, para 1.2 
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requested by Canada were appropriate.108 The panel report was released on August 28, 
2000 and issued the following award: 
[T]he Arbitrators decide that, in the matter Brazil - Export Financing 
Programme for Aircraft, the suspension by Canada of the application to 
Brazil of tariff concessions of other obligations under GATT 1994, the 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing and the Agreement on Import Licensing 
Procedures covering trade in a maximum amount of C$344.2 million per 
year would constitute appropriate countermeasures within the meaning of 
Article 4.10 of the Agreement. 
In this respect, the Arbitrators urge Canada to make sure that, if it decides 
to proceed with the suspension of certain of its obligations vis-a-vis Brazil 
referred to in document WT/DS46/16 other than the 100 per cent surtax, 
this will be done in such a way that the maximum amount of counter- · 
measures referred to in the preceding paragraph will be respected.109 
Canada was granted authority to impose "economic countermeasures" against 
Brazil, but has declined to do so. Instead, on January 10, 2001, Canada "matched" ' 
Brazilian financing terms on a sale to Air Wisconsin to secure a contract for seventy-
five jets. On March 12, 2001, this financing was challenged by Brazil through the 
commencement of a panel review of the Canadian financing on the basis that it was 
a form of retaliation that had not been either notified nor sanctioned by the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body. On July 9, 2001, Canada claimed that it had matched 
Brazilian financing terms to Northwest Airlines to secure a contract for up to 150 jets. 
At the time when Brazil commenced the complaint in respect of the Air 
Wisconsin contract, Canada brought a further proceeding challenging the manner 
in which Brazil changed its PROEX program to bring it into compliance with the 
WTO SCM Agreement. 110 It was found that the revised program was compliant with 
Section 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement, "as such".lll This section prohibits subsidies 
that constitute a financial contribution by a government which confers a benefit 
and which is contingent upon export performance.nz The panel reviewed the 
structure of the PROEX program in a "per se" manner that does not involve 
consideration of specific instances in which PROEX support is provided. 
Under this approach, panels have not found legislation as such to be 
inconsistent with GATT/WTO obligations, unless that legislation mandated, 
or required, the executive branch to take action which was not in 
conformity with a Contracting Party's/Member's obligations under the 
GATT 1994/WTO Agreement. m 
The panel in PROEX Ill concentrated on two substantive provisions within the 
revised program, the first requiring that interest rate equalization be established on 
108. Panel Report, op cit. Supra, Note 6, para 1.2 
109. Article 22.6 Panel Report, op cit., Supra, Note 6 para 4.1-4.2, at 27 
110. The dispute was commenced on January 22nd, 2001. Brazil- Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, Second Recourse by 
Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS46/RW2, July 26th, 2001, 
111. Ibid. at para 5.206-8, pg 51. Paragraph 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement provides: 
Except as provided in the Agreement on Agriculture, the following subsidies, within the meaning of Article 1, shilll be 
prohibited: 
(a) subsidies contingent, in law 'or in fact, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon export perform~ 
ance including those illustrated in Annex I. 
112. Ibid., para 5.19, at 13 
113. Ibid., para 5.09, at pg 11 
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a case-by-case basis at levels that may be below the Commercial Interest Reference 
Rates ("CIRR") published monthly according to the OECD. The CIRR is established 
by the OECD Arrangement as the "acceptable" interest rate that members may offer 
without risk of retaliation or criticism. The second provision is that the eligibility 
request be analyzed with reference to "the financing terms practised in the 
international market."' 14 The panel found that these provisions are in compliance 
with Article 3.1(a) because "Brazil maintains the discretion to limit the provision of 
PROEX Ill interest rate equalization payments to circumstances where a benefit is 
not conferred in respect of regional aircraft.'' 115 
The panel also found that the PROEX Ill program complied with the "safe 
harbour" exception to Article 3.1(a), in circumstances where Brazil complied with 
the OECD Arrangement.' 16 It provides rules for the calculation of country-specific 
interest rates as well as the design of other terms and conditions of sale and 
establishes the most generous terms that can be offered. The WTO SCM Agreement 
accepts the OECD Arrangement as a "safe harbour" and that compliance with its 
terms by either members such as Canada or non-members such as Brazil will be 
deemed complia'nt with the WTO SCM Agreement, notwithstanding the fact that the 
subsidies in question would otherwise be considered WTO-illegal export subsidies. 
Brazil was found in compliance with the OECD Arrangement because PROEX Ill 
provided the measure of discretion necessary to allow Brazil to select interest rates 
and terms and conditions of sale that are consistent with it.117 
Throughout the decision, the panel stresses that its decision is limited to a "per 
se" analysis as to whether the structure of the program mandated non-compliance 
with Article 3.1(a) or the OECD Arrangement. The finding of compliance was made 
notwithstanding the anecdotal evidence that Canada submitted indicating that 
Brazilian officials intended to operate the program in a way such that it would not 
be compliant. 118 Canada also alleged that in two recent cases, Brazil had offered 
interest rate support, through Embraer, on terms that did not satisfy the provisions 
of the OECD Arrangement. The panel accepted Brazil's statement that it had not 
issued any letters of commitment concerning regional aircraft undt:r the PROEX 
program and Canada failed to provide any evidence to the contrary. 119 At the end of 
its decision, the panel once again returned to the limitation placed on its decision 
that PROEX Ill was compliant with Article 3.1(a) and the OECD Arrangement: 
Our conclusion that the PROEX Ill program, as such, is not inconsistent 
with the SCM Agreement is based on the view that it is legally possible for 
Brazil to operate the PROEX Ill program in such a way that it will: 
(a) not result in a benefit being conferred on producers of regional aircraft 
and, hence, not constitute a subsidy within the meaning of Article 1.1 of 
the SCM Agreement; or 
114. Ibid., paras 2.4-5, at pg 2-3 
115. Ibid., para 5.55-6, at pg 21 
116. Ibid., para 5.67, at pg 23, ("OECD Arrangem ent" ) 
117. Ibid., paras 5.206-8. 
118. Ibid., para 5.189, at 48. "Canada refers to a number of press reports and reported statements by Brazilian officials. 
According to one such statement, attributed to the then-Foreign Minister of Brazil, Brazil will not respect the 10-year 
maximum term for interest rate equa1isation." 
119. Ibid., para 5.190, at 49. Canada had provided the panel with sworn declarations of people who claimed to know the 
terms offered by Embraer in the relevant sales campaigns involving regional aircraft. 
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(b) result in a benefit being conferred on producers of regional aircraft, but 
conform to the requirements of the safe haven of the second paragraph of 
item (k) in which case it would not constitute a prohibited export subsidy 
within the meaning of Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement. 
We wish to be clear, however that it does not necessarily follow from our 
conclusion that future application of the PROEX Ill program will, likewise 
be consistent with the SCM Agreement. It should be mentioned in this 
regard that Canada is free to challenge such future application in accordance 
with the provisions of the DSU if it considers it not to be in conformity 
with the SCM Agreement. 120 
If the PRO EX program is compliant per se, each offer of government financing 
support must be reviewed on a case by case basis. Pursuant to the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism, the illegality of a specific application of the program· will 
not be determined until well after the subsidy has been bestowed. 
Notwithstanding that the PROEX programme is now compliant per se, Brazil 
has not fully complied with the directions of the WTO panel. Brazil has yet to ' 
withdraw the PROEX subsidies that had been extended in contracts executed prior 
to November 18th, 1999, in respect of aircraft not yet delivered.'21 The fact that the 
withdrawal of these subsidies may place Brazil in breach of contract is considered 
irrelevant by the WTO panel: 
Nor are we convinced that a different interpretation is required because 
Brazil asserts that it has a contractual obligation to issue PROEX bonds 
pursuant to commitments already entered into, and that it would be liable 
to damages for breach of contract if it failed to do so. Assuming that Brazil 
is correct in this regard, the implication of this view would be that 
Members could contract to grant prohibited subsidies for years into the 
future and be insulated from any meaningful remedy under the WTO 
dispute settlement system. Nor is this a purely hypothetical situation. If 
Canada's figures are correct - and Brazil has not disputed their overall 
accuracy - Brazil has outstanding commitments to issue NTN-1 bonds 
pursuant to PROEX as it existed before modification in respect of nearly 
900 regional aircraft that have yet to be exported. Letters of commitment 
in respect of some 300 regional aircraft were issued after the Panel Report 
in the original dispute was circulated to Members on 14 April 1999. By 
Brazil's reasoning it should be allowed to continue issuing bonds upon the 
exportation of these aircraft for years to come.'22 
These outstanding commitments provided the basis for the calculation giving 
rise to the authorization of countermeasures in the amount of $2.065 billion that 
was then allocated over a five year period at a level of $344.2 million per year.'23 
(b) Brazil's Challenge of Canadian Support Programs 
After Canada commenced the initial complaint, Brazil responded with its own 
120. Ibid., para 6.2·3, at 63-4 
121. Brazil-Export Financing Programme for Aircraft-Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the D SU, WT/DS46/RW, May 9th, 
2000, C' Brazil Export Financing, First Recourse") 
122. Ibid., at para 6. 16, at 9 
123. Brazil Article 22.6 Panel Report , op cit. supra, note 88, at para 3.19, 3.66, 4.10 
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challenge of Canadian government programs, commencing its complaint on March 
lOth, 1997.'24 The WTO panel found the Federal"Canada Account" financing'25 and 
the Technology Partnerships Program'26 to be prohibited export subsidies and the 
finding was affirmed on appeal and adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body on 
August 20th, 1999.127 The 1996/7 Business plan for the Technology Partnership 
program stated that in the aerospace sector, it will "directly support the near 
market R&D projects with high export potential."'28 After the panel report was 
affirmed, the Minister for International Trade developed a policy guideline and 
undertook "not to authorize any transaction under the Canada Account unless it 
complied with the OECD Arrangement."'29 Canada also undertook to change the 
Technology Partnerships Program to ensure it complied. 130 On subsequent review, 
the WTO panel determined that Canada had brought the Technology Partnerships 
into compliance but that the Canada Account was still not compliant, as the new: 
policy guideline was not sufficiently restrictive. '3 ' The restrictions the panel 
required to be implemented included that the net interest rates be at or above the 
relevant CIRR, and that "no derogations would be made, either at Canada's 
initiative or via matching." 132 
The Canada-Export Credits panel report released on January 28, 2002, 133 found 
that the "Canada account" financing provided to Air Wisconsin by the Export 
Development Corporation, was a prohibited export subsidy.'34 It was determined 
that the support constituted a "financial contribution" that conferred a "benefit", 13s 
that was "contingent upon export performance." 136 Canada defended the financial 
support on the basis that it was protected by the "safe haven" provided by the 
OECD Arrangement137 which allows the "matching" of an offer of financial support. 
This "arrangement" is a gentlemen's agreement that has no enforcement provision 
other than allowing parties, on notice to the other members, to match the interest 
rate terms and conditions offered either by members or non-members. '38 The panel 
rejected Canada's "safe haven" argument in a manner consistent with earlier panel 
reports. '39 The Panel noted that the determination depended on what was being 
matched, with certain "permitted exceptions" from the OECD Arrangement being 
124. Canada-Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/R, 1999, at I 
125. "The Canada Account operates under the mandate of the EDC, and, per EDC's 1995 annual report, is used to "support 
export transactions which the federal government deems to be in the national interest but which, for reasons of size 
or risk, [the EDC] cannot support through regular export credits." Canada-Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian 
Aircraft, Recourse by Brazil to Article 2 1.5 o(the DSU, WT/DS70/RW, May 9th, 2000, para 5.53, at 17 
126. The Tech nology Partnerships program was introduced in 1996 as "an effective, market-driven tool to stimulate the 
development and commercia.lization of technologies ... [that] share[s] risk with private sector, participants, gain royal-
ties from successful projects and reinvest these repayments to help support new initiatives." Science and Technology (or 
the New Century A Federal Strategy. Canadian Ministry of Supply and Services, March 11, 1996, at 13 
127. Ibid. , at para 1.1, at I ("Brazil Recourse to Article 21.5"), affirmed on appeal, WT/DS70/AB/RW, AB-2000-4, July 21st, 2000 
128. Brazil Recourse to Article 21.5, Ibid., at para 5.20, at 10 
129. Ibid., para 1.4, at I 
130. Ibid., para 1.6, at 2 
131. Ibid., para 5.1 47, at 40 
132. Ibid. 
133. Canada-Export Credits, WTO Panel Report, op cit., supra, note IS 
134. Ibid., at para 7.182, at 46. The panel found that the support constituted a "financial contribution" (para 7. 141), 
135. The finding of benefit was made in part because "Min ister Tobin stated that Canada is providing Air Wisconsin with 'a 
better rate than one would normally get on a commercial lending basis.", Ibid., at para 7. 143 
136. Ibid., at para 7.182, at 38 due in part to the Canada Accoun t's mandate which is ' to support and develop Canada's 
export trade and Canadian capadty to engage in that trade .. " 
137. Brazil - Export Financing Programme (or Aircraft, Second Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS46/RW/2, 
July 26th, 2001, para 5.94, at 28 ("PROEX lll") 
138. Canada-Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian A ircraft, Recourse by Brazil to Article 2 1.5 oftlte DSU, WT/DS70/RW, May 
9th, 2000, at para 5.82, at 24 
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eligible for matching while "derogations" could not be matched.140 The Panel noted 
that non-members to the Arrangement - such as Brazil - would not have access to 
information regarding the terms and conditions offered or matched by members 
and so the non-members would be placed at a systematic disadvantage. 14' The 
PROEX III panel had indicated that the rationale for the disciplining aspect of the 
matching provision within the Arrangement, is not applicable to the WTO SCM 
Agreement. "The SCM Agreement, is a binding instrument, and it is enforceable 
through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism." 142 The Canada-Export Credits 
panel report that was just released also commented on the nature of the WTO 
dispute settlement process: 
Canada also submits that although the SCM Agreement disciplines trade 
distorting subsidies, the prospective nature of the dispute settlement 
remedies means that - in the absence of matching - illegal subsidies will 
have a perpetual advantage... In any event, even if the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanisms does only provide for prospective remedies, we 
note that it does so in respect of all cases, and not only those involving 
prohibited export subsidies. Article 23.1 of the DSU provides that Members 
shall resolve all disputes through the multilateral dispute system to the 
exclusion of unilateral self-help. Thus, to the extent that the WTO dispute 
settlement system only provides for prospective remedies, that is clearly 
the result of a policy choice by the WTO Membership. Given this policy 
choice, and given the fact that Article 23.1 of the DSU applies to all 
disputes including those involving (alleged) prohibited export subsidies, 
we see no reason why the (allegedly) prospective nature of WTO dispute 
settlement remedies should impact upon our interpretation of the second 
paragraph of item (k). 
Canada has resorted to a self-help remedy by unilaterally matching what it 
considered to be a Brazilian offer of prohibited export subsidies. By doing so, 
Canada' no longer enjoys a moral high ground before the WTO in this dispute and 
the resort to a self-help remedy may well be seen as a more egregious breach of its 
international obligations than the continuance. of the PROEX program by Brazil. 
The WTO Dispute Settlement mechanism is designed to prevent such unilateral 
action, requiring parties to resort to the WTO to determine the level of retaliation 
to be imposed or to seek approval of the measures to be suspended.143 This provision 
was established specifically to prevent the United States from unilateral trade action 
through its Section 301 trade remedy. 
While the Air Wisconsin subsidies were the main issue in the Canada-Export 
Credits panel report, a number of other claims were made by Brazil. These claims 
139. In PRO EX Ill, Canada, the United States and the European Union argued that utilization of the matching provisions 
should be accorded "safe haven" status under the WTO SCM Agreement. PROEX liT, op cit. supra, note 119, para 5.110 
at 32-3 
140. A 11perntitted exception" is 11an action itself foreseen and permitted within limits by the Arrangement, while a 
derogation is 11an action itself not permitted under any circumstances by the Arrangement." Canada-Ex.port Credits, 
op cit, supra, Note 15, at 7.164. PROEX Ill, op cit. supra, note 119, para 5.109, at 32 
141. Members of the OECD Arrangement are required to disclose the terms of the financing that they are offering to the 
other members. Canada-Export Credits, op cit., supra, Note 15 at 7. 164; PROEX Ill, op cit., supra, Note 119, at 5.109 at 32. 
142. /bid., para 5.115 at 34 
143. WTO DSM Agreement, Article 23.2 of the said agreement provides that: 
In such cases, Members shall: ... 
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Section 22 of the Understanding to determine the level of suspension of concessions 
or other obligations and obtain DS authorization in accordance with those procedures before suspending concessions 
or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement 
the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time. 
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included the allegation that the EDC Corporate Account and Investissement 
Quebec constituted prohibited export subsidies "as such". 144 The panel rejected the 
allegation that these programs were prohibited "as such," on the basis that Brazil 
had failed to identify any provision demonstrating that the programmes mandate 
the extension of prohibited 'Subsidies.145 Brazil also challenged twelve specific 
transactions in which EDC financing was provided. In each case, the panel 
compared the financial terms offered to the evidence of commercial terms 
otherwise available. The panel upheld Brazil's claims that four transactions involved 
prohibited export subsidies, 146 rejecting the balance of the allegations. 14' The Canada 
-Export Credits panel determined that Canada is required to withdraw the subsidies 
within 90 days, 148 subject to Canada's right of appeal. 
(c) Observations that should be made by the participants on February 8th 
It is clear from the history of the dispute that both Canada and Brazil intend to 
continue offering financial support to their respective national champions. 
Politically, they have little alternative given the symbolic importance of Bombardier 
and Embraer and their importance in supporting clusters of high technology 
industries. Both nations are required to withdraw prohibited export subsidies and 
this appears to require the withdrawal of financial assistance expected to be 
provided pursuant to contracts that have already been signed. The amounts 
involved are equally balanced, with Brazil required to withdraw $2.065 billion in 
subsidies and Canada required to withdraw as much as $1.7 billion. 149 It is also 
apparent that any complaint will have to be made against specific transactions and 
not the programs per se. The outcome will depend on whether the particular 
support is compliant with the OECD Arrangement, which establishes specific rules150 
intended to place "limitations on the terms and conditions of export credits that 
benefit from official support."151 It should be in the interest of both nations to limit 
a debilitating competition of national treasuries that can only benefit the customer 
airlines. 
144. Canada-Export Credits, op. cit., supra, note 15, para 8.1 at 92. 
145. Ibid., Canada Account, at 7.77; EDC Services, 7.110; lnvetissement Quebec at 7.126. 
146. Ibid. , at 8.1: 
"(f) uphold Brazil's claim that the EDC Canada Account financing to Air Nostrum constitutes a prohibited export 
subsidy contrary to Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement; 
(g) uphold Brazil's claim that the EDC Corporate Account financing to Comair in July 1996, August 1997 and 
February 1999 constitutes a prohibited export subsidy contrary to Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement". 
147.lbid., at 8.1: 
"(h) reject Brazil's claim that the EDC Corporate Account financing to ASA, ACA, Kendell Air Nostrum and Comair in 
December 1996, March 1997 and March 1998 constitutes a prohibited export subsidy contrary to Article 3.1(a) of the 
SCM Agreement; 
(i) reject Brazil's claim that IQ equity guarantees to ACA, Air Littoral, Midway, Mesa Air group, Air Nostrum and 
Air Wisconsin constitute prohibited export subsidies contrary to Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement; and 
(j) reject Brazil's claim that IQ loan guarantees to Mesa Air Group and Air Wisconsin constitute prohibited export sub-
sidies contrary to Article 3. 1(a) of the SCM Agreement." 
148. Ibid., at para 8.4 
149. Pettigrew may allow Brazil's Plane Subsidies, Financial Post, January 29th, 2002, FP4. This figure does not include any 
calculation of subsidies that were extended to Northwest Airlines in July 2001. 
150. Some of these rules include: Art 15- Minimum Interest Rates; Art 16- Construction of ClRRs; Art. 17- Application 
of CIRRs; Art 18- Cosmetic Interest Rates; and Article 19- Official Support for Cosmetic Interest Rates; Art 22: minimum 
interest rates with respect to all new aircraft except large aircraft, along with spare engines spare parts, maintenance 
and service contracts with respect to those aircraft, and Art 28(b) covers minimum interest rates with respect to used 
aircraft. Canada -Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, Recourse by Brazil to Article 21.5 of the DSU, 
WT/0570/RW, May 9th, 2000, at 5.83, at 24. 
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The history of this dispute and the number of specific transactions reviewed 
indicates that it is appropriate to consider an adjudicatory model to determine 
compliance with the OECD Arrangement. Canada has already suggested in both 
disputes that the WTO panels establish verification procedures in respect of future 
arrangements to bring any subsidies into compliance with the WTO SCM 
Agreement. The suggestion was rejected by the panel. 
Canada asks only that the Panel endorse the establishment of such 
verification procedures, and is not proposing an ongoing role for the Panel 
should a verification process be established. Brazil does not, in principle, 
oppose the establishment of such verification procedures, but considers 
that they are not compatible with the spirit, if not the letter, of Article 19 
of the DSU. Brazil belies that such procedures are better agreed to by the 
parties in the course of bilateral consultations. 
We note that by virtue of Article 19.1 of the DSU, the Panel "may suggest 
ways in which the Member concerned could implement the recommenda-
tions." In our view, Article 19.1 envisions suggestions regarding what could 
be done to a measure to bring it into <;:onformity ... It does not address the 
issue of surveillance of those steps. For that reason, we decline to make the 
suggestion requested by Canada. 152 
The Panel hastened to add that "this does not mean that the Panel in any way 
discourages agreements between WTO Members that may facilitate transparency 
with regard to the implementation of WTO obligations."153 Any mechanism to 
establish verification procedures or to implement them on an on-going basis through 
an adjudicatory process must be established by the parties through negotiation. 
IV. THE AlTERNATIVES TO SETTLE OR CONTINUE THE DISPUTE 
It is unclear the degree to which both parties have the political will to resolve 
their disputes particularly if this requires the negotiation and adherence to new 
rules in addition to those included in the OECD Arrangement. Canada claims that it 
simply wants Brazil to adhere to the OECD Arrangement. ' 54 Brazil has taken the 
position before the WTO panel that verification procedures should be negotiated by 
the parties and Embraer officials have recently complained about a lack of 
disclosure by Canada of the details of its support programs. 155 These positions would 
appear to provide an agenda for resolution, and there appears to be at least three 
possible ·outcomes that could result from the negotiations that will begin on 
February 8, in New York: 
151. Canada- Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, Recourse by Brazil to Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS70/RW, 
May 9th, 2000, at 5.82, at 24. In short, it is to set a limit on the 11most generous repayment terms and conditions that 
may be supported," and thus to restrict debilitating subsidy competitions. 
152. Ibid., at para 6.1, at 43 
153. Ibid. , Footnote 135 at 43 
154. The Minister for International Trade identified these terms as the basis for a resolution of the case in a press release 
issued at the time the PRO EX Ill decision was released including: limitations on the rate of interest, such that it is no 
lower than the Commerciallnterest Reference Rate (CIRR); restrictions on the duration such that any financing does 
not exceed 10 years or 85 percent of the value of the transaction; and that the interest rate should include a risk 
premium commensurate with the credit worthiness of a particular airline. Canada Win Fifth WTO RulingJn Aircraft 
Dispute, bulletins@dfait-maeci.gc.ca, "Trade News Release" itnews@listserv.dfait~maeci .gc.ca 
155. 11 0ttawa can't be trusted in jet talks: Embraer executive", Financial Post, jan 24 2002, at FPS 
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(a) a policy of forbearance by which Canada and Brazil refrain from retaliation 
and implement an institutional solution that adjudicates allegations of 
improper subsidization on an expedited basis; 
(b) Canada and Brazil enter into an unrestricted bidding war for each new 
contract; or 
(c) Canada and Brazil impose retaliatory, punitive tariffs on one another. 
(a) FORBEARANCE & AN EXPEDITED ARBITRAL MECHANISM 
Generally, retaliation has been ineffective in achieving compliance with WTO 
panel reports requiring the withdrawal of the impugned measure, particularly in 
circumstances where entrenched political interests support non-compliance. 
Retaliation is even less effective when the two protagonists involved have a limited . 
amount of bilateral trade. It is one thing for the United States to engage in threats 
of retaliation; it is quite another when Canada is issuing threats in the context of a 
relatively modest level of bilateral trade. Retaliation can be more symbolic in nature 
than a serious penalty intended to cause the respondent to modify its behaviour. 
The application of punitive tariffs might satisfy domestic trade interests calling for 
some form of retaliation, even though they will have little impact in terms of 
forcing a change to the respondent's trade policy. 
An effective resolution of the dispute would be to forbear from retaliating in 
favour of the introduction of an arbitral mechanism that could determine the 
consistency of the financing terms being offered with the provisions of the OECD 
Arrangement, before the awarding of the contract competition. The question arises 
whether there would be sufficient time to choose an arbitral tribunal and for it to 
issue a determination before the end of the contract competition. Canada claims 
that it learned of the terms being offered by Brazil to Air Wisconsin in October, 
2000/ 56 decided to "match" the offer in January, 2001, and the panel report states 
that the support was "offered" on May 10, 2001.157 This provides a period of eight 
months in which an arbitration could be completed. An expedited procedure will 
have to be developed including: the selection of arbitrators from a standing list; 
production of documents and interrogatories (probably written); and a limited oral 
hearing. 
Care will have to be taken in the rules regarding production of documents, due 
to the time available and the complaints that Embraer officials have made with 
respect to disclosure regarding Canadian programs. It is unlikely that either nation 
will allow the arbitral panel to order production of documents that might be 
subject to cabinet or other government privilege. The failure to produce documents 
- whether subject to a claimed privilege or otherwise - may be ' dealt with by 
allowing the panel the discretion to draw an adverse inference in appropriate 
circumstances. It will also be important to establish protective orders for confidential 
and commercially-sensitive business information. There is substantial experience 
dealing with these issues in the form of the Administrative Protective Orders that 
can be obtained in trade cases, such as in the Softwood Lumber IV case now before 
the United States' Department of Commerce and International Trade Commission. 
156. Canada-Export Credits, op cit. , supra, note 15, at para 7.155, at 38 
157. Ibid., at para 7.137 at 35 
87 
With respect to substantive issues, the evidence required for the determination 
of whether the specific financing terms constitute a prohibited export subsidy, 
should be available. The WTO places the burden of proof initially on the 
complainant which must establish a prima facie case of inconsistency.'58 The 
complainant, therefore, should'be required to establish that a financial contribution 
has been offered that is contingent upon export performance and contravenes the 
OECD Arrangement. The onus of proof might then shift to the respondent to 
demonstrate that the offer of financial terms is no more favourable than those that 
are commercially available. This should impose no hardship on the respondent, 
who will be encouraged to carefully analyze what terms are commercially available 
at the time the offer is prepared, and to have that information readily available 
should a challenge be made. 
The parties will likely have to develop this arbitration mechanism independent 
of the World Trade Organization, as the WTO panels declined Canada's invitation 
to establish verification procedures, let alone to play an ongoing supervisory role. 
The question arises whether the parties should utilize one of the existing arbitral 
conventions and the procedural rules established thereunder or to develop a 
completely unique and separate mechanism crafted specifically for this dispute. 
Canada has agreed in NAITA and other trade agreements 159 that each party should 
promote private commercial arbitration through the adoption of uthe 1958 United 
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
(uNew York Convention") or the 1975 Inter-American Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration" (ulnter-American Convention"). Canada has signed the 
New York Convention while Brazil has signed the Inter-American Convention. 
While the parties should agree that the decision is binding upon them, the 
need to adopt an existing Convention will depend in large part on the method of 
enforcement. If the arbitral panel will have the power to issue an injunction 
preventing the offering of the financial terms in question, the adoption of an existing 
convention will be helpful due to the rules included therein regarding the adoption 
and enforcement of arbitral decisions.' 60 It is unlikely that the parties will agree to 
enforcement through the domestic courts and so there is no reason why an 
independent procedure cannot be crafted, based on the existing conventions as 
procedural models. '6 ' 
It is possible that the parties will agree only that the result would be enforceable 
through the WTO Dispute Settlement mechanism relying on moral suasion. While 
this would be disappointing, it would still represent an improvement, as the 
158. Canada-Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, Recourse by Brazil to Article 21.5 of the DSU, Wf/DS70RW, May 
9th, 2000, at para 5.13-14, at 7 
159. NAITA (Article 2022), the Canada-Chile FTA (Article N-21), and the Canada-Costa Rica FTA (Article Xlll.21) provide that 
each Party should "encourage and facilitate the use of arbitration and other means of alternative dispute resolution for 
the settlement of international commercial disputes between private parties in the free trade area." Each Party can do 
so if it is a member of :'the 1958 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
or the 1975 Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration." 
160. The Inter-American Convention O.A.l~S. No. 42, 14 I.L.M. 336 (1975). Article 4 provides that an arbitral decision may be 
ordered in the same manner as that of decisions handed down by national or foreign ordinary courts. Article 5(1) and 
5(2) provide that enforcement may be refused only if: (a) parties were subject to some incapacity; (b), responding party 
had no notice of the arbitration procedure or the appointment of the arbitrator; (c), decision concerns a dispute not 
envisaged in the agreement; (d) the correct procedure wasn't followed. 
161. Article 5(2) provides that enforcement may be denied by a domestic court if (a), the subject of the arbitration cannot 
be settled by arbitration under the law of that State; or, (b), recognition or enforcement would be contrary to public 
policy. It is possible that limits may exist on the degree to which Brazilian courts can limit Brazilian government 
action in terms of issuing support for its industries. As a result, the adoption of the Inter-American Convention in the 
circumstances of this dispute would be pointless. 
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decision may well help Brazil and Canada answer the domestic constituencies 
supporting the extension of prohibited export subsidies. Although clearly imperfect, 
the advantage of a policy of forbearance and, if necessary, reliance on moral 
suasion, is that it capitalizes on what appears to be the effective element that has 
resulted in compliance - the pressure applied by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
itself. 
The WTO DSM Agreement represents a supstantial improvement over the GATT 
1947, with the introduction of the appellate body as well as automatic adoption 
of panel reports. An attempt has also been made to make enforcement more 
automatic. 162 With respect to remedies, the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
states that its first objective is to "secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned 
if these are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any covered 
agreement."'63 The "last resort" in terms of remedies "is the possibility of suspending 
the application of concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements 
on a discriminatory basis vis-a-vis the other Member, subject to authorization by 
the [Panel] of such measures."164 As a result, approval is required and it must be 
consistent with the WTO-covered agreements, and this requirement is imposed 
even if the parties negotiate a mutually acceptable settlement of the dispute. 
The question arises as to the effectiveness of these provisions in achieving com-
pliance in circumstances where a WTO Panel or Appellate Body report has been 
adopted confirming a violation. Table III165 provides a summary of the panel 
proceedings that have been commenced since the inception of the WTO in 1995, 
as recorded in the dispute settlement section of its annual reports, Appendix Ill. It 
indicates the following results: 
NUMBER OF 
PROCEEDINGS 
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TABLE THREE: 
WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SUMMARY 
PANEL APPELLATE ARTICLE 21.5 
REPORTS REPORTS ARBITRATION 
47 30 10 
ARTICLE 22.6 
ARBITRATION 
6 
As indicated above, an Article 21.5 arbitration involves a determination 
whether the proposed measures are consistent with a covered agreement, while an 
Article 22.6 arbitration involves a determination as to the level of suspension 
proposed. With fifty panel reports and thirty appellate body reports issued, only ten 
have reached the first stage of the arbitral process established for the imposition of 
162. Following a panel determination that a measure is inconsistent with obligations under a WTO-covered agreement, the 
respondent is required to report to a Dispute Settlement Body meeting held within 30 days after the adoption of the 
panel or appellate report as to its intentions with respect to the implementation of the panel recommendations and 
rulings. WTO Understanding on Dispute Settlement, Article 21.3. The respondent will be given a 11 reasonable time" to 
implement changes the duration of which will be determined through binding arbitration within 90 days if the parties 
cannot otherwise agree. Arbitration is also available under Article 21.5 should the parties disagree 11 35 to the existence 
or consistency with a covered agreement of measures taken to comply." 
163. WTO Understanding on Dispute Settlement, Article 3.7. 
164. Ibid. Article 22.6 provides that the WTO Dispute Settlement Body shall authorize the requested suspension within 
thirty days of the expiry of the "reasonable period of time unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the request." 
Arbitration is available if the respondent objects to the level of suspension proposed and it will be completed by the 
original panel within sixty days. The arbitrator's authority is limited to the question whether the level of such suspension 
is equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment or whether the principles and procedures have been applied. 
The arbitrator 11Shall not examine the nature of the concessions or other obligations to be suspended." No right of 
appeal is allowed. Article 21.6. 
165. This analysis is current to September 1, 2002. It is currently being updated and will be available shortly. 
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retaliation.166 Only six cases have reached the stage of an Article 22.6 arbitration and 
the status of these cases is summarized in the following table: 
TABLE FOUR: ARTICLE 22.6 PANEL ANALYSIS 
Case Complainant Date of Amount Current Status 
22.6 Report Authorized 
E.U United States April 9/99 $191.4 Mill 100% tariffs since 
Bananas167 u.s. 1999 on $190 mill U.S. 
Trade dispute resolved 
by Agreement dated 
April 13th, 2001!68 
Retaliation to be I 
suspended if a licensing 
system was introduced· 
by July 1st, 2001. 
100,000 additional tons 
of "C" quota transferred 
to Caribbean nations 
effectively to the 
benefit of U.S. banana 
producers. 
E.U. Meat169 United States July 1999 $116.8 Mill 100% tariffs since 
u.s. 1999 on $117 Mill E.U. 
So far not effective in 
forcing compliance to 
date. Negotiations 
continue with U.S. 
meat producers asking 
for expanded access to 
the EU beef market for 
12 years for hormone-
free beef, while EU 
offering a four to five 
year period. 170 
E.U. Meat171 Canada July 12/99 $11.3 Mill 100% tariffs since 
Cdn August 1st, 1999.172 
The products affected 
are all in the meat 
sector (beef and pork), 
except for cucumbers 
and gherkins. So far 
not effective in forcing 
compliance. 
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Case Complainant Date of Amount Current Status 
22.6 Report Authorized 
Australia- Canada July 1999, Commenced 
Salmon retaliation proceedings 
but it was suspended 
pending a compliance 
review. 173 
Brazil/ Canada Aug 28/00 $344.2 Mill No implementation. 
Aircraftl 74 Cdn De facto retaliation of 
matching PROEX 
export subsidies. 
Canada- New Zealand, A 22.6 panel appointed 
Milk17S u.s. March 1st, 2001, 
pending a compliance 
review. Retaliation 
suspended during 
interim period. The 
earliest that retaliation 
could be commenced 
is early 2002.176 
Retaliation has been imposed in three cases (EU-Bananas, EU/US-Meat, EU/Can-Meat), 
quantified in Brazil-Aircraft and is a serious possibility in the Canada-Milk case. The 
Australia-Salmon case has been included but its current status is uncertain and 
appears to be held in abeyance. It is unclear what role retaliation played in the 
resolution of the E.U.-Bananas dispute. Punitive tariffs were imposed for a period of 
two years before a settlement agreement was negotiated. It is difficult to determine 
whether the tariffs applied significant pressure that helped result in the settlement 
agreement. However, it is notable that the duration of the tariffs was quite lengthy, 
· suggesting that the tariffs were not the most important factor. 177 
166. Some of these panel reports may be subject to appellate review and have simply not reached the point where an 
Article 21.5 arbitration can be commenced. 
167. E.U.- Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (Wf/DS 27), April 9th, 1999 
168. Text: U.S.-EU Banana Agreement April 13, 2001 Inside US Trade, http://www.insidetrade.com. Agreement that by }an 1, 
20061 a 11tariff only" regime will be introduced. 
169. EU- Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, (yVT/DS26/ ARB 12, July 1999 
170. EU REJECTS US BEEF TNDUSTRY CALL FOR 12-YEAR EXPANDED QUOTA, June 22, 2001 , Inside US Trade, 
www.insidetrade.com 
171. EU- Measures concerning Meat and Meat Products (yVT/ DS 48) 12}uly 1999 
172. Canada Retaliates Against the EU, DFAIT News Release, July 29, 1999, No 174 
http: / /198.103.104 .118/minpub/publication.asp ?FileSpec=/Min_?ub _Does/ I 02518.h tm 
173. EU Approaches U.S. About Low-Key Handling Of FSC Dispute, Inside U.S. Trade, September 15, 2000 
17 4. Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Wf /DS 46) 
175. Canada -Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products 
176. DFAJT Summary of WTO Cases to which Canada is a Party, 
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/dairy_update-may01-e.asp 
177. A recent joint declaration of the E.U. and the U.S. suggests that retaliation may not have been as important as the 
pressure applied by the on-going surveillance of the WfO DSU mechanism. Text Excerpt from the Declaration of the 
U.S. -E.U. Summit I Goteborg, Sweden, June 15, 2001, Inside U.S. Trade, www.insidetrade.com 
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The measure of retaliation taken by the United States in the E.U-Meat dispute 
and retaliation has proved ineffective in achieving compliance. This appears to be 
a more intractable dispute, due to the collision of a WTO determination with 
European agricultural interests. It suggests that a political decision has been made 
within the European Community that the cost of retaliation is more palatable than 
effecting immediate and unacceptable changes to its agricultural program. The cost 
of retaliation provides the time necessary to work out an acceptable compromise. 
The effectiveness of retaliation, however, may well prove itself in a separate 
case, United States - Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations". 178 The dispute 
involves tax advantages given to American corporations under the Internal Revenue 
Code relating to extraterritorial income through special purpose corporations. Such 
treatment was earlier ruled to contravene the WTO SCM Agreement as a prohibited 
export subsidy and that changes to the program did not bring it into compliance. 179 
The appeal of the continuing non-compliance decision was released on January 14, 
2002, upholding the panel determination. The European Union is seeking 
authorization to impose retaliatory tariffs of $4 billion U.S .. The United States will 
challenge the level of retaliation and the panel should be appointed by March 28. 
As a result, the European Union may be in a position to impose retaliation by late 
summer.'80 It has been reported earlier that the United States Congress is reluctant 
to make substantive changes to the program notwithstanding the threat of 
retaliation. 181 This dispute may well become a litmus test of the effectiveness of the 
remedy of retaliation, simply due to the amounts at issue when balanced against a 
Congressional reluctance to effect changes. Of course, if the prospect of retaliation 
does provide an incentive leading the United States' Congress to make the required 
changes, it may say more about the effectiveness of retaliation in the context of an 
immense bilateral trade relationship, than it does in circumstances where the 
amount of bilateral trade is extremely limited. 
The result confirms that arbitration has been used relatively rarely to achieve 
compliance. The major factor is more likely related to the international opprobrium 
associated with continued non-compliance with a WTO panel/appellate report 
determination that the respondent is in" breach of its obligations. Where retaliation 
has been imposed, the result has been ambivalent in achieving the result desired, 
with the elapse of time in the E.U.-Bananas case suggesting that retaliation during 
the course of negotiations may have been seen simply as the cost of doing business. 
Any continuing pressure on the respondent to comply would appear to arise from 
the periodic review by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. 
In the circumstances of the Aircraft from Brazil/Canada dispute, we suggest that 
the parties should agree to forbear from retaliation. The parties should agree to 
ignore the prohibited export subsidies that. both nations have been directed to 
remove. The introduction of a binding and enforceable expedited arbitral 
mechanism, could determine whether a particular offer of government financing is 
consistent with the WTO SCM Agreement and the OECD Arrangement. The result 
should be binding upon the parties and enforceable. The adoption of an arbitral 
178. United States - Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations", WT/DS108/ RW 20, August 2001, Recourse to Article 21.5 
of the DSU by the European Communities. http:/www.wto.org/disputes. 
179. Ibid., at para 1.1 
180. U.S. Lawyers Praise Reasoning of WTO Tax Ruling But Impact Unclear, Inside U.S. Trade, January 18, 2002 
181. Zoe/lick signals FSC Solution may be Tied to WTO Round Launch, Inside U.S. Trade, July 27, 2001, 1-2 
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procedure would still be an improvement even if the determination resulting 
therefrom can only be enforced by agreement that the determination will be 
adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body in the ordinary course and subject 
to WTO surveillance. 
(b) AN UNRESTRICTED SUBSIDIES COMPETITION 
The second possible outcome after negotiations break down, is that both 
parties engage in an unrestricted subsidies with scant regard for the OECD 
Arrangement. The parties in effect engage in a "war of the treasuries" with little 
intention to comply with the outstanding panel directions to remove 
existing/future subsidies. A "subsidies war" represents a transfer of wealth from the 
"winner" of the contract to the airline customer. 
Support for the adoption of this strategy may be found in "game theory". A 
strategy of matching subsidies is an iterative prisoner's dilemma, which provides an 
opportunity to condition the other party to enter into cooperative strategies. Each 
new contract competition is an iteration of this "two-party" game. It has the 
potential to place the greatest degree of pressure on Brazil/ Canada, because it places 
Embraer/Bombardier exports at risk, and thus challenges the key constituency 
within Brazil/Canada supporting non-compliance. 
The structure of an export subsidy competition requires the development of a 
payoff matrix such that two nations have various rewards depending on whether 
they cooperate or defect in an attempt to achieve a superior payoff. "Each country 
has access to an interventionist policy that is in its national interests but reduces 
the welfare of the other country. Cooperating means refraining from using the 
policy; · defecting means adopting the policy."182 This structure is the classic 
"prisoner's dilemma", in which cooperation is the best mutual outcome but 
non-communication or suspicion leads both nations to engage in non-cooperative 
strategies to avoid the worst-case scenario. The WTO SCM Agreement and the OECD 
Arrangement can be seen as attempts to limit such competitions and to achieve 
the superior outcome by prohibiting export subsidies except in limited 
circumstances. 183 However, this competition is not a true prisoner's dilemma: 
A major problem with the theory of the prisoner's dilemma ... is that it's 
restricted to the case of once and for all strategy choices. In reality, a 
decision to use subsidies ... is not irrevocable and will usually be reviewed 
at regular intervals. In effect, the prisoner's dilemma game is repeated 
182. An example of a payoff matrix is as follows: 
Country B 
Cooperate Defect 
Country A 400, 400 SO, SOO 
soo, so 100, 100 
If both nations cooperate, they each obtain a payoff of 400 units. If one defects while the other cooperates, the former 
increases its reward to SOO if the other nation continues to cooperate and reduces its payoff by 3SO to SO units. If both 
defect, each reduces its payoff by 300 to 100 units. )ames A. Brander, Rationales for Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy, 
published in Paul R. Krugman, Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, 199S, 23 at 37. Alan 0. Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats in International Commercial Relations: The 
Limited Case for Section 301, 23 Law & Policy in International Business, 263, 272-S (1991-2) 
183. Canada-Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, Recourse by Brazil to Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS70/RW, May 
9th, 2000,at para S.82, at 24 
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indefinitely. Repetitions of the decisions make the game much more 
complicated in that relatively complex strategies become possible. 184 
Experiments have suggested that one should cooperate if the rival cooperates 
and quickly punish non-cooperative behaviour, in order to condition the rival to 
cooperate. 185 
The challenge in justifying the export subsidy competition in practice as a 
prisoner's dilemma, is the need to develop a meaningful payoff matrix. This 
involves a complex evaluation of the expected political and economic impact of 
sanctions in both countries. 186 The analysis in these circumstances becomes highly 
case-specific and involves a broad range of questions relating to the relative 
economic and political costs imposed by sender (Canada/Brazil) and receiver 
(Brazil/ Canada). The political costs are the most difficult to model because .of the 
degree of subjectivity and dynamism involved. How robust is support for matching 
subsidies if the underlying theory upon which it relies is relatively fragile? 
Game theory is too simplistic for modeling the impact that retaliation may 
have in this dispute due in part to its adoption of various simplifying assumptions. 
Graham T. Allison187 highlights these assumptions in developing the "rational 
actor" model that is often used as a paradigm to explain government strategy in 
international disputes. Allison indicates that this model underlies both game theory 
and neoclassical economics. 
Classical 'economic man' and the rational man of modern statistical 
decision theory and game theory make optimal choices in narrowly 
constrained, neatly defined situations. In these situations rationality refers 
to an essentially Hobbesian notion of consistent value-maximizing 
reckoning or adaptation within specified constraints. In economics, to 
choose rationally is to elect the most efficient alternative, that is, the 
alternative that maximizes output for a given input or minimizes input for 
a given output. 188 
184. Ibid., at 39 The competition between Embraer and Bombardier may have an additional degree of complication. The 
competition described above appears to involve each competitor having one chance to select its strategy without an 
opportunity to change its selection before the outcome is determined. It is quite possible that market (/intelligence" 
might allow one party to learn what subsidy package the other party has chosen and to adjust its strategy before the 
outcome is determined. The question then arises whether the other party has a similar opportunity to respond or the 
inclination to do so. 
185. Ibid., at 41. One well-known experiment was conducted by Robert Axelrod of the University of Michigan. He invited 
game theorists from several countries to submit strategies for an iterative prisoner's dilemma. The wining strategy was 
submitted by U ofT's Anatol Rapaport that was a "tit for tat" strategy and was the simplest solution that had been 
submitted. Ibid., at 40 
186. The economic impact of the retaliation will depend on the size of the economies involved, the degree of bilateral 
trade between the two nations and the composition of this trade and its relative importance. The higher the ratio of 
the share of the complainant's GNP that is accounted for by the respondent's exports, the higher the odds of a 
successful outcome. The balance of trade is also important as the greater the trade surplus enjoyed by the respondent 
nation in bilateral trade with the complainant nation, the greater the influence that the complainant should have. 
The impact will depend on the ability of the industries targeted to adjust to the punitive tariffs, or to find alternative 
markets for those goods should a denial of access to the complainant's market occur. Ibid., 270-1. This is illustrated in 
part by the "gravity model" of trade that predicts that the amount of trade between two countries will be positively 
related to the product of their outputs (a measure of size or mass), and negatively related to the distance between 
them. This model has been utilized to explain trade patterns since the 1960s, as well as to evaluate the effectiveness 
of sanctions. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Kimberly Ann Elliott, Tess Cyrus, Elizabeth Winston, U.S. Economic Impact on Trade, 
fobs and Wages, Institute for International Economics, 1997, http:w.iee.com/CATALOG/WP/1997/SANCflON/SANCf-
NWP.HTM 
187. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1971, Little, Brown and Company, Boston 
188. Ibid., at 29 
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In this model, government decision-making takes place in a "black box" that 
hides any internal organizational or political processes that are involved. 
Government action is viewed as the choice of an action with full knowledge of the 
options available, made on the basis of the alternative that maximizes the nation's 
strategic goals. The model assumes "comprehensive rationality" involving "powers 
of prescience and capacities for computation resembling those we usually attribute 
to God." '89 Influencing government action is simply a question of manipulating the 
costs or benefits of a particular alternative to make it the rational choice. 
A more complex "organizational process" model postulates that there are 
numerous actors within government such that "its acts are not those of a unitary, 
rational, perfectly informed entrepreneur but of art organization."'90 Each decision 
is contributed to by several organizations in a manner that fractionalizes and 
distributes power. Government leaders coordinate the exercise of this power and 
can substantially disturb, but not control, the outcome.19 1 Each organization has its 
own fixed set of standard operating procedures that take over when the organization 
is engaged. 192 These procedures limit the range of effective choice open to 
government leaders when confronted with a problem, thus representing constraints 
on government action. '93 Instead of "comprehensive rationality", the model 
assumes "bounded rationality" that recognizes the physical and psychological 
limits of a government's ability to understand its alternatives and to make the 
optimal decision. 194 
Allison presents a third model that recognizes the political processes included 
in government decision-making instead of its organizational aspects. Each central 
player is involved in a bargaining process that defines the constraints with which 
the decision must be made. 
In this [political] process, sometimes one group committed to a course of 
action triumphs over other groups fighting for other alternatives. Equally 
often, however, different groups pulling in different directions produce a 
result, or better a resultant - a mixture of conflicting preferences and 
unequal power of various individuals - distinct from what any person or 
group intended.' 9' 
Decision-making power is shared because participants have independent power 
bases, with different political actors in the ascendancy at different points in time, 
dependent on a host of opaque factors. Regular channels - both formal and 
informal - structure the bargaining process. Government action is seen as an 
agglomeration or collage of relatively independent decisions and actions in a 
variety of bargaining processes, with the outcome representing a combination of 
the preferences and relative influence of central players or .subsets of players. 196 
189. Ibid., at 71 
190. Ibid., at 37, 74 
191. Ibid., at 67 
192. Ibid., at 68 
193. /bid,. at 79 
194. Ibid. , at 71 
195. Ibid., at 145 
196. Ibid., at 164 
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Allison does not select among these three models, but indicates that each 
represents a paradigm that illustrates various factors that must be understood to 
explain government actors in a particular international dispute. What may appear 
at first to be an illogical response based on a stark evaluation of the implications of 
the alternatives, may be quite rational given the organization and political aspects 
of the decision in question. A combination of the three models provides an insight 
that suggests that the adoption of game theory alone to determine whether 
Canada/Brazil should retaliate, oversimplifies the analysis that is necessary, given 
the complex organizational issues and political processes within Brazil/ Canada. It is 
a mistake to assum~ that the government is a single rational actor that is strictly 
motivated by economic incentives. Predicting the effect that retaliation will have 
must take into account the multi-faceted nature of government decision-making 
practices that inject a significant measure of uncertainty into the response. 
A brief review of the nature of Brazilian democratic institutions give an inkling 
of the complexities of the political actors, groups and processes that will determine 
the response should Canada decide to retaliate. Brazil's return to democracy may 
still be fragile and in need of encouragement and support. By the end of military 
rule in 1985, Brazil was described as a divided Leviathan, with the executive 
playing the major role in the state, but its effect weakened by competition between 
powerful state agencies with overlapping authority. The state agencies often 
established "innumerable links to business groups, both through associational and 
personalistic channels, or 'bureaucratic rings. 111 ' 9 ' Clientelistic politicians were 
reported to have penetrated the public agencies, having cronies appointed to 
important administrative positions through patronage. "This clientelistic 
interference made the politically appointed public officials indebted to and 
dependent upon non-state actors and thus weakened the bureaucratic hierarchy 
and undermined the internal cohesion of the state apparatus."198 
In the post-1985 period, Brazil's return to democracy was under significant 
pressure from this entrenched system of patronage. Brazil's new constitution, 
adopted in 1988, settled on a presidential system, in which decision-making power 
was concentrated in the hands of the president. Executive power was augmented by 
a relatively weak Congress that was hamstrung by factionalism. 199 Clientelistic 
conflicts came to pervade the entire state apparatus, such that politicians negotiated 
the division of the "spoils", to ameliorate the buildup in tensions between rival 
groups. zclO This formative period of Brazilian return to democracy was marked by a 
"considerable waste of resources", causing a dramatic increase in expenditures. It 
contributed in no small way to Brazil's slide into a deep fiscal crisis in the late 1980s 
"marked especially by skyrocketing inflation rates of 981 percent in 1988 and 1,973 
percent in 1989."201 
The election of President Collor in late 1989, marked a new point of departure 
in an attempt to limit clientelism but perversely, increased presidential corruption 
to unprecedented levels. The Collor Administration did not consult after the 
197. Kurt Weyland, The Brazilian State in the New Democracy, published in Democratic Brazil, Actors, Institutions and Processes, 
Peter R. Kingstone and Timothy]. Power, eds., 2000, at 38 
198. Ibid. 
199. Ibid. at 39. Congressional weakness was such that seventy·five percent of the legislative agenda emanated from the 
executive branch. 
200. Ibid. , at 40 
201. Ibid. , at 40·2 
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election with the most powerful business associations when instituting a 
stabilization plan in March 1990! 02 The Administration cut many bureaucratic rings 
and ignored existing interest groups. This caused rent-seekers within the business 
community to establish influence with the Administration in other ways, allowing 
Collor's former campaign manager to allegedly increase "the going rate of bribes to 
40-50 percent of the value of public works contracts."203 This led to Collor's 
impeachment in 1992, when the failure of his stabilization plan weakened his 
position and permitted clientelistic politicians and interest groups to appropriate 
public funding in exchange for quelling their growing opposition to the 
Administration policies. 
The interim Franco Administration from 1992-4, lasting the balance of Collor's 
presidency, was hamstrung by the lack of a political mandate. His attempts to 
strengthen the state were frustrated by powerful political interests even though the 
Brazilian Constitution automatically came up for review due to a sunset review 
provision.204 His Administration is remarkable largely for the appointment of 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso as the Finance Minister, who implemented the Piano 
Real (Real Program) that drastically reduced inflation without the attendant 
constriction in GDP that occurred during the early 1990s.205 Cardoso was elected 
President on the strength of the success of the Piano Real, and took office in January 
1995. A new era was ushered in, seeking reform by negotiation with interest groups, 
instead of attempting to bypass them: 
Whereas Collor confronted - and antagonized - clientelistic politiCians, 
rent-seeking interest groups, and powerful state governors, Cardoso has 
sought to bargain with them. Given the interest of these "veto players" in 
maintaining many aspects of the status quo, the progress of Cardoso's 
reform initiatives, especially in the area of state building, has been very 
slow and uneven. Although the Brazilian state is gradually regaining 
strength, for instance, through an increase in tax revenues, it is unlikely to 
achieve a high degree of autonomy from clientelistic politicians and 
business groups, who continue to have a strong influence on substantial 
parts of the public bureaucracy.206 
Not surprisingly, business groups continue to have a significant influence on 
government policy. Their support for the stabilization programs is essential and has 
been achieved by providing payoffs, such as selective protection from foreign 
competition or the bailout of bankrupt firms, particularly in the banking sector. The 
Cardoso Administration is reported to have doled out considerable patronage to 
achieve support. These payoffs are reported to have accelerated with Cardoso's 
successful campaign to obtain a constitutional amendment permitting him to 
achieve re-election to a second term.207 
In addition to tarnishing the "modern," clean image of the Cardoso 
government, all those favours have also created heavy pressure on the 
public budget. For instance, federal personnel expenditures rose by a 
202. Ibid., at 45 
203. Ibid. , at 45 
204. Ibid., at 46-7 
205. Ibid., at 49 
206. Ibid., at 49 
207. Ibid.; at 53 
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whopping 22 percent in 1995, and total spending increases have exceeded 
the substantial rise in revenues produced by the temporary tax reform and 
the economic recovery beginning in 1991. The fiscal crisis has therefore 
not eased much. 208 
Cardoso's presidency must be understood in terms of his relationship with key 
business elites within Brazil, whose support for continued stabilization programs is 
essential. It should not be seen as a coincidence that the PROEX program was 
introduced in 1991, and financial contributions increased through the late 1990s 
with Embraer's share increasing to 39-45% of total PROEX expenditures during 
1998.209 This occurred at a time when Collar, Franco and Cardoso were courting 
support from the business elites. The support of these elites is courted by Cardoso, 
due to the nature of Brazilian democracy but also the continuation of the 
stabilization programs that have been buffeted by such economic shocks as ·the 
Asian Crisis in 1997 and the Russian suspension of payments in 1998. Embraer 
support is also drawn from its importance as a symbol to the success of the 
Administration's neo-liberal trade agenda involving the opening of Brazilian 
borders to trade. 
From the standpoint of the organizational and political models, it is significant 
that the PROEX program, and the bias evident in the program supporting Embraer, 
occur at the time that Collar and Cardoso are "buying" support for Administration 
stabilization programs. It suggests that the Bozano, Simosen Group, and Brazil's two 
largest pension funds, Sistel and Previ/10 that own a majority interest in Embraer, 
wield significant influence within the Cardoso Administration. 
An important question arises as to the implications of Allison's framework for 
Canada's strategy of "matching" PROEX subsidies as a form of "tit for tat" 
retaliation. Allison's bureaucratic and political models suggest that governmental 
processes involve complex and highly individualistic bargaining games that are 
opaque in nature to outside observers and may produce outcomes that are difficult 
to predict even by the participants themselves. The loss of Brazilian sales may be 
expected to impact on the political constituency within Brazil that supports 
Embraer. However, "tit for tat" retaliation may have quite another effect. It may 
change the dynamic within Brazil that otherwise could have placed pressure on the 
Cardoso Administration to implement the WTO panel determination that PROEX 
III must comply in actual practice, even though it may be compliant on a "per se" 
basis. 
Brazil is attempting to integrate its industrial structure into a more open world 
economy, while attempting to maintain as much shielding as possible through 
Mercosur and other trade policies. It has always been sensitive to its role within 
world affairs, with a historical emphasis on being respected as a significant regional 
military power throughout the postwar era, at least until the restoration of 
democracy. Its support for the development of a domestic nuclear weapons capacity 
is one example of the importance attributed to a position in world affairs. It is now 
redefining its role to one of a regional power broker, supported by its dominance in 
Mercosur. It finds its expression in Brazil's insistence that the FTAA will not be an 
208. Ibid. at 53-4 
209. Trade Policy Review, Brazil 2000, op cit., Supra, Note 9at 93, para 68 
210. Ibid. , at 92, para 64-6 
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expanded NAFTA and its initiative of negotiating an E.U.-Mercosur Free Trade 
Agreement as a counterweight to the FTAA negotiations. Its interest in world affairs 
is also underscored by its lobbying for a permanent seat on the United Nations' 
Security Council, much to the chagrin of Argentina that believes that the seat 
should be rotated with her and other South American countries. Integration 
within the international community- and the respect thereof- can be expected to 
provide significant internal organizational and political pressure for Brazil to 
comply with the moral authority of a finding by an international tribunal. 
These factors within Brazil seeking deeper integration into the world financial 
community and trade environment would likely be in support of modifying the 
PRO EX Ill program to satisfy the panel determination. As one example, support will 
likely come from within the Finance Ministry that may be seeking international 
financial support for the continuing current account deficits that threaten the 
financial viability of current stabilization programs and the continuance of market 
liberalization. The Finance Ministry and central players of a similar persuasion 
would act as a counterbalance to the entrenched elite and business interests 
resisting amendment to the PROEX program. 
It appears that these factors had some success due to the changes incorporated 
into the PROEX Ill program that provided the basis for it to be determined "per se" 
compliant with the SCM Agreement. It is recognized that the changes made in the 
PROEX program by Brazil were on a 'no-costs' basis and may have been mere 
window-dressing. If Canada had not adopted a policy of matching what it perceived 
to be WTO-illegal subsidies, an opportunity would have been provided to 
determine the PROEX Ill program to be WTO-illegal in its application in a specific 
situation, a logical next step that was identified by the WTO PRO EX Ill Panel, if not 
endorsed by it. Such a determination would strengthen the factors within Brazil 
seeking compliance. 
The provision of extraordinary financial support by the Canadian government 
in 2001 to Air Wisconsin and Northwest Airlines, tends to relieve the pressure to 
comply by weakening the position of these factors within Brazil. The initiation of 
the panel review of Canadian support for the Air Wisconsin contract diverted 
scrutiny away from the nature of PROEX support, to what Brazilians see as 
high-handed conduct by Canada- a developed industrial nation- in adopting what 
she concedes is WTO-illegal support against the interests of Brazil, a developing 
nation facing the daunting challenge of upgrading its inefficient industrial 
structure. Instead of a WTO panel determination that would place additional 
pressure on Brazil to comply "in fact" and not only in the structure of the program, 
the Canada-Export Credits decision was released on January 28th finding that 
Canada is non-compliant and possibly vulnerable to retaliation. 
The insight provided by Allison now becomes relevant. Canada's policy in the 
form of "tit for tat" retaliation changes the mix of incentives and pressures on the 
factors within Brazil's Administration that will determine the way in which Brazil 
might bring its PROEX program into compliance. It may compromise the most 
important factor in achieving meaningful compliance, and that is the pressure 
brought to bear by the international community through the finding that Brazil has 
not complied with its international obligations. From this standpoint, the WTO 
SCM Agreement may be seen as relatively sophisticated in its reliance on 
international pressure to achieve compliance. 
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(c) RETALIATION 
The third alternative is for each nation to impose punitive tariffs of up to 100 
percent on imports from the other. Canada is in a position to impose such tariffs 
today and Brazil soon will be should the dispute not be settled. The imposition of 
duties must be seen as a strategy that is largely symbolic in nature, with little chance 
of proving effective in achieving compliance by either nation with the WTO 
determinations. Apart from the experience of the remedy thus far in the context of 
WTO jurisprudence, it is rendered further ineffective due to the relatively limited 
bilateral trade existing between Canada and Brazil. 
Retaliation is a strategy that is unlikely to apply any further pressure on Brazil 
to comply with the OECD Arrangement than would be achieved through a policy of 
forbearance. The failure of a policy of retaliation would be in part due to the fact 
that it is unlikely to build a constituency for change within Brazil. There is strong 
political support for continued government support for Embraer within Brazil, in 
light of its economic and symbolic importance as a successful high-technology 
exporter. The imposition of duties would have the result of excluding Brazilian 
imports from the Canadian marketplace. The economic impact of punitive duties 
will be dispersed across a number of low-technology sectors, including agricultural 
products. Instead of building pressures for change within Brazil, it would more 
likely have the effect of vilifying Canada once again. Canadian products could 
once again be the subject of boycotts. Canadian potash and sulphur would be 
convenient targets, to the extent that agricultural organizations would feel the 
effects of the punitive tariffs. This would have the effect of building a constituency 
within Brazil against trade with Canada, which has the potential to increase over 
time, the longer the retaliatory duties remain in place. 
The imposition of duties will likely be seen by Brazil as a cost of doing business, 
apparently as it was by the European Union in the E.U-Meat and E.U.-Bananas 
disputes. Brazil may attempt to fit its PRO EX support within the OECD Arrangement 
over time, but if it does, Brazil will do so as a result of pressure from the multilateral 
community, not as a result of the imposition of retaliation. In fact, the imposition 
of duties might indeed lessen pressure on Brazil to comply with the OECD 
Arrangement. The imposition of punitive tariffs might be seen as an acceptable quid 
pro quo by Brazil and certain sectors of the international community that believe 
that Brazil should be given some leeway as a developing nation attempting to 
create a high technology sector. The result is that the policy imposes marginal cost 
on the Brazilian economy, while doing little if anything to ameliorate the effects of 
the losses of further contract competitions. 
The weakness of this option as a strategy to effect change, is further undercut 
by the fact that once imposed, it would be difficult for Canada to eliminate the 
punitive tariffs, short of compliance by Brazil with the OECD Arrangement. Canada 
would stand to lose credibility in the circumstances as the impact on Canadian 
exports to Brazil would be realized over the long-term duration of the duties. As a 
result, this strategy is weak not only from the standpoint of effecting change 
within Brazil, but also with respect to establishing Canada's credibility within the 
multilateral community. 
Canada's apparent abandonment of a strategy imposing retaliatory tariffs on 
Brazil is justified in the circumstances, as it would likely apply little pressure on 
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Brazilian trade authorities to change its practices vis-a-vis Embraer. It would also 
harm Canadian trade interests. Retaliatory tariffs are impracticable in part due to 
the relatively limited level of bilateral trade which can be summarized as follows: 
TABLE FIVE:211 
BILATERAL TRADE ANALYSIS 
($ Cdn thousand) 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Imports from Brazil 706,313 861,190 889,024 1,340,709 1,489,252 
Exports to Brazil 1,290,158 1,272,637 1,208,460 987,754 984,482 
CDN Trade Balance +583,845 +411,447 +319,436 -352,955 -504,770 . 
Canada was authorized to apply countermeasures up to $344.2 million per year 
and indicated that its first choice would be to impose 100 percent tariffs. Imports 
are insufficient to generate the authorized amount of revenue, and tariffs of more 
than 200 per cent would be required to collect the "countermeasures" on a yearly 
basis. A review of the list of imports indicates that that cannot be assumed. Table 
Six below provides a summary of the principal imports from, and exports to, Brazil, 
which appear on the retaliation list. Iron products, agricultural products, textiles 
and low technology products, are fungible, and Brazil should be able to clear these 
products through other international markets, in the light of the relatively limited 
quantities sold into Canada. While the elasticity coefficients of these products have 
not been researched, there is no reason to believe that the markets are inelastic in 
nature. As a result, a punitive duty of 100 percent can be expected to shut off trade 
in the majority of products imported from Brazil. 
HS 
Code 
72 
20 
9 
17 
64 
47 
44 
8 
63 
62 
TABLE SIX: 
CANADA'S RETALIATION LIST, MAY 2000 
($ Cdn thousand) 
IMPORTS EXPORTS 
Product Amount HS Product 
Code 
Flat-rolled products of iron 192,585 48 Paper & paperboard 
Vegetables, fruit, nuts 115,210 31 Fertilizers, 
Coffee, tea, 87,762 88 Aircraft spacecraft and parts 
Refined Sugar 74,620 10 Cereals, milling, malt 
Footwear, 67,402 11 Starches, wheat, oil seeds 
Mechanical Wood Pulp 52,740 39 Plastics, leather, 
Wood products 52,287 7 Edible vegetables, etc. 
Edible Fruit, Nuts, citrus 34,340 47 Mechanical wood pulp 
Ceramic products 24,664 30 Pharmaceutical products 
Blankets, apparel & rugs 23,165 29 Organic chemicals 
Amount 
235,444 
212,483 
44,628 
37,407 
22,797 
21,700 
14,095 
12,205 
5,969 
5,542 
724,775 (48.7%) (62.7%) 612,270 
Sources: Same as for Table Five (note 194) 
211. Canada Gazette, Part I, May 13, 2000, Summary of Appendices I and 11, at 1454-64. 
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Cutting off trade with Brazil would likely have a negligible impact in terms of 
compelling Brazil to alter its financial support for Embraer, as Canadian-Brazilian 
bilateral trade is limited largely to agricultural or other products involving relatively 
low technological content. Eliminating steel imports from Brazil might provide 
some welcome relief from the standpoint of Canadian steel producers, who are 
under significant international competitive pressure. However, cutting off trade 
may have some unintended consequences, including retaliation by Brazilians 
against Canadian products, in a manner that is not necessarily coordinated by the 
Brazilian government. In January, 2002, Canadian-Brazilian trade relations were 
further strained, when Canada placed a ban on Brazilian beef due to concerns 
arising from the so-called "mad cow disease". 21 2 Reaction was immediate and out of 
proportion to the expected limited duration of the ban. Canada was shocked to find 
itself subject to vilification by the Brazilian public, with demonstrations in the 
streets and boycotts against Canadian goods. 
The treatment of Canadian potash213 provides a case study of the impact of the 
boycotts within Brazil. Canada is the world's leading producer and exporter of the 
main potash product potassium chloride. 214 It is used as a fertilizer and as a plant 
nutrient, either on its own, or mixed with phosphate and nitrogen.215 World 
production was approximately 42.3 million metric tons, in 2000.216 The Canadian 
industry employed approximately 3,400 workers, and generated $1.8 billion in 
sales, 217 with 9So/o of production concentrated in Saskatchewan, which enjoys a 
competitive advantage over its international competitors: , 
Saskatchewan's potash industry ranks as the world's most productive. Its 
productivity is more thanlO times that of the Russian industry and 3 times 
more than that of the European potash producers. The Saskatchewan potash 
industry accounts for 33o/o of world production and 33o/o of world capacity.218 
The majority of Canadian potash sales are made through Canpotex, a producer-
owned potash marketing company, the shareholders including Potash Corporation 
of Saskatchewan Inc. (Saskatoon), Agrium Inc. (Calgary), and IMC Global Inc. 
(Chicago). 219 Canpotex was incorporated in 1970 and has built an 
212. Canada became concerned about the possible infection of the Brazilian herd due to the importation of cattle from Europe. 
213. "The term 'potash' refers to a group of potassium-bearing minerals and chemicals. Potash includes potassium chloride 
(sylvite), potassium-magnesium chloride (carnallite), potassium sulphate, potassium-magnesium sulphate (langbeinite), 
and potassium nitrate." Canadian Minerals Yearbook, 1999, Potash, Michel Prud'homme, Minerals and Metals Sector, 
Natural Resources Canada. 
214. Prior to the break-up of the Soviet Union, Canada was the largest supplier of potash in the world. The former Soviet 
Union sells more potash than Canada does but at lower prices due in part to its poorer quality and selling methods. 
Canpotex Interviews, May 30th, 2001. 
215. Ibid. , at 41.2 
216. International Fertilizer Industry Association Figures (million metric tons): 
NB/Sask USA China Israel Jordan CIS England France Germany Spain Total 
0.8/14.3 1.3 0.5 2.9 0.5 13.5 1.0 0.5 5.6 0.9 42.3 
217. Ibid., at 41.1-3 
218. 11 Production occurred at eight underground mines and two solution mining operations in Saskatchewan and at one 
underground mine in New Brunswick. Another operation in New Brunswick only used its compaction units after its 
underground mine flooded in 1997." Ibid. 
219. Canpotex is a Canadian export association, established pursuant to Section 45(5) of the Competition Act. It does not run 
a foul of North American cartel laws in part because Canpotex does not sell into either Canada or the United States. The 
companies handle their own sales in those markets, competing aggressively with one another. Information has been 
sought on three occasions from the European Community. Canpotex interviews, May 30th, 2001. 2000 Annual Reports: 
Shareholder Production (000 tons, KC/) Location 
Agrium, 1,790 Vanscoy, Saskatchewan 
Potash Corp 7,149 Cory, Patience Lake, AUan, Lanigan, Rocanville, Sask. 
!MC Global 8,385 Belle Plaine, Colonsay, Esterhazy (2 mines), Sask 
Agrium !MC Global's interest in Canpotex is held by Canadian subsidiaries. 
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international reputation for service, product quality, and timeliness, thus allowing 
it to charge a price premium in an intensely competitive market. It has invested in 
a state-of-the-art shipment infrastructure, including facilities in Vancouver and 
Portland. It has also invested heavily in market development in such locations as 
China, to educate farmers as to correct fertilizing methods. Canpotex is a "flow 
through" company, which arranges distribution, sales and deducts its costs 
after sale. 220 
Brazil represents one of the most important international markets for potash, 
due to its large agricultural sector and the importance of its meat industry both 
domestically and in terms of export concentration. It represents ten percent of 
world consumption, while producing only 540,000 tons of potash in 1999.221 
FIGURE ONE: 
1999 WORLD POTASH CONSUMPTION222 
China, 14% 
European Union 
18% 
In 2000, Canpotex sold about 635,000 metric tons of potash to Brazil, 
representing 12 percent of total sales.223 Sales to Brazil have almost doubled over the 
past five years and this increase is due not only to growing consumption, but also 
to the fact that Canadian potash is capturing a larger market share. Canpotex has a 
better and more concentrated sales force, primarily located in Canada but with 
strong local representation. This successful combination has led to product 
differentiation and brand-awareness of Canadian potash at the farm gate, which 
represents a substantial achievement, 224 given the fungible ' nature of potash generally. 
Notwithstanding this brand-awareness, Canada faces significant competition within 
the Brazilian market: 
220. It buys from the three shareholder companies at the mine, load, transport and sell the potash. An interim price is 
established for the potash and a final adjustment is made after final sale. Canpotex interviews, May 30, 2001. 
221. Canadian Minerals Yearbook, op dt., supra, note 196,at 1 
222. Ibid. 
223. Total Brazil Sales I Total Canpotex Sales (All grades) 1998 1999 2000 
13% 9% 12% 
224. Canpotex interviews, May 30, 2001. 
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TABLE SEVEN: 
BRAZILIAN POTASH MARKET SHARES225 
Total1999 Total2000 
Supplier Country MT % MT % 
Dead Sea Works/Israel 448,620 14.20 755,541 17.89 
Kali Und Salz/Germany 660,443 20.90 742,098 15.58 
Ameropa CIS 659,165 20.86 651,166 15.42 
Canpotex Canada 440,340 13.94 635,924 15.06 
PCS Canada 476,798 15.09 626,697 14.84 
Mekatrade C.I.S. 345,346 10.93 514,661 12.19 
Balance 128,767 295,998 
Total 3,159,479 100.0 4,222,085 100.0 
The importance of Brazil in the potash market is also due to its location in the 
southern hemisphere. It provides an opportunity for Canpotex to complete the 
processing cycle for its shareholder corporations who fulfil their North American, 
Chinese and other northern hemisphere market requirements during the Winter 
and Spring. After a shutdown for holidays and maintenance, the companies then 
begin operations to fulfil the market requirements for the southern hemisphere 
including South Africa, Australia and New Zealand, but most importantly, Brazil. 
Any interruption in exports sales to Brazil, will have a disproportionate effect on the 
production cycles of potash mines within Saskatchewan, potentially leading to 
mine shutdowns and layoffs in ' this critically important market segment to the 
Western Canadian economy.226 
There are seven different grades of potash that are sold by Canpotex. Some 
grades are manufactured in a granular form that is good for mixing and bulk 
blending. From 1998-2000, 18-25% of Canpotex sales were accounted for by the 
granular grades, and 33-50% of these sales were to Brazilian customers. Granular 
sales accounted for 66%-84% of total sales to Brazil. Granular production is limited 
to certain mines within Saskatchewan and so the loss of the Brazilian market would 
have a disproportionate effect on these mines.227 
Canadian potash sales to Brazil are vulnerable to disruption, if retaliation leads 
to a sharp reduction in imports from Brazil to Canada. This was demonstrated by 
the cancellation of orders for 60,000 tons of potash ($8 to 9 million in revenue) that 
occurred in the January-February period. The cancellation reveals characteristics of 
the Brazilian market, and the manner in which Canadian exports may be affected 
by retaliation undertaken in the Embraer dispute. There had been no significant 
disruption in Canpotex's sales to Brazil as a result of any trade action, prior to the 
beef ban. Canpotex was aware of the Bombardier-Embraer trade dispute and 
considered that it would not represent a problem as long as it was kept focused on 
the aircraft industry. Buying patterns were unaffected and Canpotex did not receive 
any complaints about Canada, arising from the dispute. Once the beef ban was 
225. Potafertz, share data, 2000 vs. 1999 
226. Canpotex Interviews, May 30, 2001. 
227. Ibid. 
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imposed, however, Canpotex's Brazilian customers indicated that they were 
experiencing problems, because farmers were angry at the Canadian trade action. 
The meat industry has a significant symbolic importance in Brazil and the reaction 
was an emotional one, that spun out of control and it was not coordinated by the 
Brazilian government. It was a grassroots protest that was partially a result of 
the success that Canpotex had achieved in establishing brand awareness. The 
vulnerability of Canadian potash was reflected in Brazilian news reports: 
"I have been in contact with my suppliers of fertilizers and informed them 
that our plant will no longer use seasonings that contain Canadian potassium 
chloride." Jose Pessosa de Queiroz Bisneto, President f. Pessosa Group.228 
A similar pattern can be seen in the effect that the beef ban had on Canadian 
sulphur sales to Brazil. Sulphur is a key ingredient in fertilizer and Canada is a rich 
source of natural high quality sulphur. In 1999 and 2000, the Canadian sulphur 
industry was receiving reports from their sales agents in Brazil, that Brazilians were 
unhappy with the Canadian position in the Aircraft from Brazil dispute. This 
discontent flared into indignation when Canada imposed its ban on Brazilian beef. 
Brazilian longshoremen refused to unload Canadian products, including sulphur. 
The depth of feeling in Brazil was demonstrated by the fact that one of the major 
clients in Brazil - accounting for approximately one-third of sulphur purchases -
gave an interview to a newspaper indicating that he would no longer purchase 
Canadian sulphur. 
While the trade war remains in force, we (Ultrafertil) will substitute our 
Canadian sources of raw material for Polish, Middle Eastern, German or 
Russian sulphur... We have already concluded with one alternative 
source ... I support 100 percent the actions that the workers of the Port of 
Santos are carrying on; I believe that other businessmen should do the 
same and change their suppliers. 229 
The effect of the beef ban was to depress sulphur sales which, in the first six 
months of 2001, amounted to 544,000 tons, representing a reduction of 159,000 
tons, or 23 percent, versus the same period in 2000.230 Sulphur purchasers were 
diverted to California and the Middle East. A lingering effect of the reaction is that 
Brazilian purchasers have established longer term supply contracts with alternative 
sources. In 2000, Canada exported 1.126 million tons to Brazil, out of a total 
market consumption of 1.4 million tons. While it is unlikely that Brazil could 
eliminate Canadian sources of high-quality natural sulphdr, an important Canadian 
market could be disrupted with a significant decline in sales if the dispute was to 
flare up again. 231 
The effect of retaliation in the context of the PRO EX dispute can now be put in 
its proper context. Agricultural products are included among the imports that 
would be terminated if Canada was to impose a 100 percent punitive tariff as 
retaliation. There is reason to believe that the reaction within Brazil to this kind of 
retaliation would be similar to the reaction to the beef ban earlier in the year, in part 
due to the fact that beef products are included in the list of target products. 
228. "Embaixada canadensa ganha vaca brasileira," GM, February 8th, 01. The). Pessosa Group owns six sugar and alcohol 
plants in Brazil. 
229. Ultraffrtil suspende com~;>ra de productos quimicos canadenses, Decis3o da diretoria permanccera enquanto durar o veto a 
came brasileira 
230. North America Sulphur Service- August, 2001, at 6 
231. Based on interviews with Canadian sulphur industry officials, August 28, 2001. 
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A significant number of other agricultural products are included as well, and so the 
impact on the grassroots farming organizations should be the same. 
The result is that trade in both Canadian potash and sulphur would likely be 
side-swiped by the implementation of a punitive 100 percent tariff by Canada. The 
same emotional reaction can be predicted in response to Canadian retaliation in the 
PROEX action. The duration of the interruption in Canadian-Brazilian trade will 
likely be much longer in the circumstances of the imposition of retaliation. A 
disruption of rather short duration caused a loss of ten percent of potash sales to 
Brazil. Retaliation in the EU-Bananas232 and EU-Meat233 disputes, indicates that the 
imposition of retaliation in the PRO EX dispute might last indefinitely resulting in 
a significant reduction in Canadian exports, while alternative sources of supply 
strengthen their sales relationships with Brazilian customers. In the case of 
Canadian potash, this trade action would disrupt Canpotex sales to the southern 
hemisphere and cause problems with respect to production scheduling in 
Saskatchewan mining and processing operations. 
Turning to Allison's analysis, it must be recognized that the business groups 
and elites within Brazil are important factors in the determination by Brazil on how 
to comply with WTO determinations and respond to Canadian retaliation. They 
exercise their influence through the myriad contacts that they appear to have 
within the Brazilian government departments directly involved in the development 
of Brazilian economic strategy. An earlier trade dispute serves to illustrate the nature 
of the relationships between business, Congress and the executive withiri Brazil. 
The United States and Brazil were involved in a trade dispute that lasted almost 15 
years involving pharmaceutical patents.234 In the late 1980s, the United States was 
involved in a dispute with many developing nations, with the United States 
alleging that they provided inadequate intellectual property protection for the 
research and development expenses implicit in the marketing of new drugs. Brazil 
was seen as one of the leading opponents of this initiative.235 In the late 1980s, the 
United States targeted Brazil for retaliation through the Super 301 trade remedy and 
imposed punitive tariffs on Brazilian goods,Z36 that had unintended consequences, 
resulting in a counterproductive reaction by both the executive and the Congress.237 
The trade dispute died down in the early 1990s with promises of legislative action 
by President Collor and Cardoso but by 1994, the U.S. was again frustrated by 
Brazilian inaction and the U.S. threatened retaliation. 
The Brazilian Congress rejected U.S. threats. The president of the Senate, 
Humberto Lucerna, observed that "no one votes on this kind of matter 
under international pressure" and warned that the Senate might water 
down the proposed legislation.238 
232. EU-Bananas, op cit., Supra, Note 149 
233. EU-Meat, op cit., Supra, Note 149 
234. Thomas 0. Bayard, Kimberly Ann Elliott, Reciprocity and Retaliation in U.S. Trade Policy, Institute for International 
Economics, 1994, at 187. 
235.lbid. 
236. The United States imposed 100 percent tariffs on $39 million worth of Brazilian exports. The products targeted included 
$27 million in paper products, #11.9 million in nonbenzenoid drugs, and $100,000.00 in consumer electronics, "reportedly 
to pre-empt Brazilian exports in this sector.'' Ibid., at 19Z-8 
237. (/The U.S. announcement of retaliation may have provoked a counterproductive reaction in Brazil. President Samey report-
edly rescinded an order to Brazil's patent and trademark office to draft amendments to product pharmaceutical processes 
but not products. And the Brazilian Congress inserted provisions (later removed) in the draft constitution to prohibit even 
process patents." Ibid., at 198 
23S. lbid. at 199 
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Once again, retaliation did relatively little if anything to contribute to the 
resolution of this dispute. As Bayard and Elliott suggest, the lesson to be learned is 
that "it is exceedingly time consuming and difficult to achieve effective IPR protection 
in developing counties in which powerful groups oppose it. "239 It is notable that 
aspects of this intractable dispute continue to this day, with a recent iteration and 
threat of trade action being resolved in Spring 2001, with the announcement of a 
bilateral agreement that resulted in the United States dropping its complaint before 
the WTO. The settlement requires Brazil to notify the United States "if it plans to 
apply a provision of Brazilian law that would force U.S. patent holders either to 
start manufacturing in Brazil or license local manufacturers to manufacture the 
product."240 The U.S. and Brazil are required to consult in a special bilateral session 
to resolve the issue, although neither has waived their right to bring the dispute 
once again before a WTO tribunal.'•' The United States has determined in this 
dispute - after a long and protracted struggle involving threatened retaliation on 
two occasions - that negotiation is a better alternative. 
Embraer can be expected to have close connections with several federal 
ministries within Brazil, particularly Industry and Finance. These departments will 
be populated by officials with close connections with power elites supporting 
Embraer as an important national champion. They also exercise their political 
·power through the contacts they have within the Administration and their 
continuing support may be perceived as crucial to maintaining democratic 
institutions and the Administration's neo-liberal trade agenda. It is apparent that no 
countervailing group has emerged in Brazil to oppose the policies that offer 
financial support for Embraer. 
Should Canada retaliate by imposing punitive tariffs, the role of the elites 
within Brazil can be expected to be involved in fashioning a response. It is expected 
that a significant proportion of the processing, distribution and/or consumption of 
imported potash and sulphur within Brazil is by large scale agriculture interests. 
These interests will be closely connected to the Brazilian political elites. 
Consequently, their motivation and behaviour will likely be highly affected by 
political considerations, and not necessarily linked to strict economic rationality. In 
the case of Embraer, these elites will be highly vocal in their support for President 
Cardoso's policies to sustain Embraer as a national champion. Decisions about 
sourcing potash and sulphur may become closely connected with the political 
J priorities of the Cardoso Administration. 
As a result, it is not sensible to limit the analysis to a game theory analysis of 
costs and benefits based on economic incentives. The broader framework provided 
by Allison lends support to bottom line arguments that a policy of punitive tar~ffs 
against Brazilian exports is undesirable from a Canadian point of view. 
239. Ibid,. at 200 
240. U.S., Brazil End WTO Case On Patents, Split On Bilateral Process, June 29, 2001, www.insidetrade.com 
241. The reason given for American support for the accord is notable: 
"Informed sources said the U.S. backpedaling from the wro panel, which it had requested in February, reflected 
unwillingness on the part of U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick to give opponents of trade liberalization a red-hot 
issue that appeared to give credence to the idea of the wro interfering with poor countries' health policies." 
One significant issue that would be part of the dispute would be the access that developing countries should have to 
HIV/ AIDS related drugs. Ibid. 
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V. CONCLUSION: FORBEARANCE WITH AN 
EXPEDITED ARBITRAL MECHANISM THE SUPERIOR STRATEGY 
It is our conclusion that in the circumstances of the Aircraft from Brazil dispute, 
forbearance with the introduction of an expedited arbitral mechanism is Canada's 
best option. This is superior to matching subsidies or imposing retaliatory duties. 
The nature of the dispute is such that arbitration would be suitable to determine, 
on a timely basis, whether a government offer of financial support complies with 
the OECD Arrangement while a specific contract competition is still open. It would 
be ideal if the arbitral determination was binding upon the parties and enforceable 
in the domestic courts by adopting the New York or Inter-American Arbitral 
Conventions. However, it is unlikely that· the parties can agree to a binding 
mechanism and one that is enforceable in this manner. .It is possible that the 
determination will be binding only in the sense that it can be adopted as a WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body report and "enforceable" through the moral suasion of the 
multilateral community. 
A policy of matching subsidies is the most aggressive remedy that Canada can 
adopt and may well be an effective strategy from the standpoint of attempting to 
influence behaviour within Brazil. However, it carries a significant cost, in terms of 
damage to Canada's international reputation. It is a self-help remedy within a legal 
framework that frowns upon the utilization of such remedies, due to the experience 
with the American Section 301 mechanism. It is generally perceived that should the 
utilization of self-help remedies become pervasive, the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism will become discredited and weakened. The justification for utilizing 
such a self-help remedy becomes somewhat opaque as a result of the finding that 
the Canadian and Brazilian programs are compliant with the WTO SCM Agreement 
on at least an "as such" basis. There is no longer a "bright line" determination that 
financial support extended pursuant to these programs ipso facto are non-compliant 
in a manner justifying some form of retaliatory response within the context of the 
WTO. "Matching" a "subsidy" in such circumstances gives rise to a likelihood that 
the self-help remedy will be found non-compliant by a WTO panel in much the 
same way as the Canada-Export Credits determination. 
In the circumstances of the Air Wisconsin transaction, Canada determined that 
it was important to "buy" the contract by providing support that it must have 
known would be characterized as a prohibited export subsidy not consistent with 
the OECD Arrangement. The utilization of a self-help remedy by Canada in the 
circumstances has provided an opportunity for Brazil to deflect WTO attention 
away from itself and onto Canada. 
The least attractive of the three alternatives is the imposition of duties in a 
WTO-authorized form of retaliation. It carries with it at best a modest chance of 
successfully influencing Brazilian support for Embraer. It more likely will be seen as 
a cost of doing business within Brazil and a relatively modest one given the political 
and symbolic importance of Embraer. Experience with the implementation of 
retaliation suggests that it adds little, if anything, to the pressure applied to bring 
the program in question into compliance, by multilateral surveillance pursuant to 
the provisions of the WTO DSM. In the context of earlier trade irritants between 
Canada and Brazil, this form of retaliation also carries with it a significant risk that 
the dispute will escalate in an uncontrollable fashion due to an emotional, popular 
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reaction to the closing off of Brazilian exports. The case studies presented above, 
involving potash and sulphur, indicate that trade action by Canada may lead to a 
boycott of Canadian goods. As a result, the objective of building a constituency 
within Brazil to force compliance may backfire and indeed build a broad coalition 
with the objective of punishing Canadian trade interests. 
The parties should realize that the introduction of an arbitral mechanism is in 
their interest, especially if the competitive landscape of the regional jet market 
changes as a result of new market entrants. Throughout the dispute, the parties 
appear to have characterized the dispute as a two-party game. Embraer has already 
begun to forge links with Europe. Bombardier's market position is at risk due to a 
higher cost structure than either Brazil or Russia (hence the structure of the 
Boeing/Russian venture). Brazil similarly enjoys a lower cost structure, with a 
highly skilled engineering and industrial workforce and so may enjoy a better 
confluence of competitive factors. The possibility of new market entrants with 
"deep pockets" should support the introduction of an arbitral mechanism. The 
purpose of the WTO SCM Agreement and the OECD Arrangement is to limit such 
"competition of treasuries" and the adherence to such limits may provide 
welcomed relief, especially if the new entrants include the European Union and 
Hoeing with their deep pockets. 
The importance of the changing competitive landscape is caught in Michael 
Porter's theory of competitive advantage and the limited role that government 
should play in the development of business clusters! 42 Porter's theory indicates that 
competitive advantage is essentially a function of the quality of certain dynamic 
factors within the national economy. The primary agent of competitive advantage 
is the concept of a "business cluster", which is defined as "groups of industries 
connected by buyer-supplier relationships or strong interrelationships in terms of 
products and technology... involv[ing] end products, specialized inputs used in 
these products, specialized machinery employed in making them and associated 
services."243 Porter identifies the business conditions essential to the growth of 
business clusters in proposing his paradigm of a "diamond" of factors interacting 
on one another which is crucial to continual upgrading in an industry. The four 
main determinants are: factor conditions; demand conditions; related and supporting 
industries; and firm strategy, structure and rivalry. In addition to these determinants, 
the role of government and chance are also important determinants. Together these 
determinants form a system which dynamically produces competitive advantage: 
Each of the four determinants of competitiveness ... influences the capacity 
of a nation's industry to innovate and upgrade. Together they constitute a 
dynamic system that is more important than its parts. Over time, the 
determinants tend to be mutually reinforcing or mutually undermining.244 
The elements that promote competition will reinforce upgrading which may 
lead to sustainable competitive advantage. Those which do not reinforce competition 
are problematic. This leads to an analysis of the role of government: 
242. Michael E. Porter, Canada at the Crossroads, The Reality of a New Competitive Environment, The Monitor Company, 1991, at 22 
243. Ibid. 
244. Ibid., at 63 
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Government has a less decisive role than is implied in much of the current 
writing on competitiveness. Government policy toward the economy is 
often framed as a choice between laissez-faire and direct intervention in 
industry. This dichotomy is inaccurate. The role of government policy is 
best understood by looking at how it influences the diamond. Government 
at all levels can improve or impede national advantage through, for 
example, its investments in factor creation, through its role as a buyer or 
influencer of buyer needs, through its role in related and supporting 
industries, through its influence on the goals of individuals and firms, and 
through its competition policies. 
The proper role of government is to improve the quality of the inputs 
(factors) firms can draw upon, and define a competitive environment and 
rules of the game that promotes upgrading ... Its appropriate role is an · 
indirect, rather than direct, one. Government's proper role is as a catalyst 
and challenger. It is to encourage or even push, companies to raise their 
aspirations and move to higher levels of competitive performance, even 
though this process may be unpleasant and difficult. Government's job is 
to make firms feel wanted but uncomfortable and in need of improvement, 
not to forge cosy business-government "partnerships", relax pressures or 
industry, or to seek to eliminate risks. 245 
The singular focus by Canadian trade representatives on Brazil's PROEX 
program, might contribute to a lack of attention to more important competitive 
factors to the future of Bombardier's competitive advantage such as the change 
in the competitive landscape and the flexibility it might need in meeting this 
competition. 
245. Ibid. 
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PART Ill 
FIELD TRIP EXPERIENCES AND IMPRESSIONS 
111 
REFLECTIONS ON THE DISPARITY 
BETWEEN THE RICH AND THE POOR IN BRAZIL 
Vanessa Lishingman 
The field research trip to Brazil was the third component of the independent 
research project undertaken this year by seven students of Glendon College, York 
University. The fourth and final component of this in-depth study of a country or 
region of the world was the reflection upon the field research trip. 
I chose primarily to focus upon the disparity between the rich and the poor 
within Brazil, which I witnessed first-hand and which stirred up a melee of 
emotions that I am still unable to digest and comprehend. Whatever statistic or 
article you read in a magazine or a study about the inequality between the elite of 
Brazil and the poorest Brazilians in no way prepares you for what you see with your 
own eyes. I saw immense mansions, with incredibly large gates and security 
personnel, Brazilians walking in downtown Sao Paulo dressed very fashionably and 
expensively. On the flipside, I saw people picking through garbage, and sitting on 
the sidewalk eating this garbage for dinner; most of them were young adults or 
children. Witnessing this, I felt disbelief, disgust, horror, outrage, but most of all, 
shame. Here I was, with six other students, traipsing through Brazil because we had 
the opportunity to come to this dynamic country; we came here because we chose 
to come here. Not only that, we were able to visit six cities in Brazil. It was very 
difficult to reconcile the fact that I was there by choice, while many Brazilians 
continued to live well below the poverty line and therefore might never have the 
opportunity to visit another country. 
Whenever one reads anything about Brazil, the disparity between rich and poor 
is almost always a subject that is touched upon. Yes, there are gross disparities in 
other countries as well, but I think it appears particularly acute in Brazil because the 
country itself is so rich in natural resources, not to mention the fact that it is an 
economic powerhouse within Latin America. Poverty in Brazil is regional; the 
southern states are much better off in terms of quality of life than the northern 
states. What is interesting to note as well, is that Brazilians of African descent reside 
mostly in the northern states of Brazil, while many Brazilians of German and Italian 
origin reside in the south. Thus, one not only sees a polarity between north and 
south, but also between Brazilians of African origin and Brazilians of European 
descent. 
The city of Rio de Janeiro was where I felt the effects of income inequality were 
most visible and jarring. Against the stunning backdrop that Corcovado, Sugarloaf, 
stretches of white sandy beaches and immense hotels provide, people could be 
found sleeping on the street, begging with their children, visibly battered and 
beaten both in body and spirit. Every time I turned around, this vivid and painful 
contrast met me full-force, whether upon a return from the beach or the shopping 
mall. Again, the fact that I was there l:>y choice, and witnessing all of this but being 
separate from it, only re-affirmed my own realization and appreciation of how lucky 
I was, how lucky our group was, to be able to study and live in Canada and be privy 
to all the benefits that come with being Canadian, but also only more painfully 
aware that there are so many other people who don't and may never have the 
opportunities or lifestyle that Canada affords us. 
Coming to Brazil was an incredibly exhilarating experience in all senses of the 
word. It was also very humbling. As outsiders, essentially tourists to Brazil, we had 
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to be acutely aware that our presence within the country went beyond the essence 
of our little group; many people looked at our behavior as representative of Canada 
and Canadians. Therefore, I think it can be said, we consciously conducted 
ourselves in such a manner as to show our genuine appreciation for everything that 
everyone we met offered to us. Our gratefulness was not a phony act; we were 
amazed and surprised everyday at the kindness of the Brazilians we met. Virtual 
strangers opened their homes to us and showed us around their respective cities. 
Brazilians truly are a proud and patriotic people. I take this moment to say that 
coming to Brazil dispelled the stereotype that rich and middle-class Brazilians do 
not care and do not want to ameliorate the situation in their country. This is 
simply not true. So many Brazilians have said to us that it hurts them to see their 
people, especially the youth, suffer from poverty, violence and hopelessness. 
Brazilians do want to help bridge the gap between rich and poor, but wanting to 
help and actually finding a method to really ameliorate a dire situation are two 
completely different things. Oftentimes, and it is sad to say, the people that can 
help the most, that is, the middle-class and elite, are the very victims of crime and 
so the fear of being attacked while driving a car or walking the street only 
strengthens the human instinct for survival and self-preservation and diminishes 
the urge to reach out to those in distress. 
Demographically, Brazil is a country of young people. Consequently, it is the 
young Brazilians that are most affected by the country's problems. Our group was 
able to meet two very interesting organizations, Projeto Axe in Salvador and 
Communidade Solidaria in Brasilia, that are working towards helping young people 
re-integrate themselves back into society. Projeto Axe has a unique way of reaching 
out to street kids in Salvador. Employees of Axe first work towards gaining the trust 
of these young people, an incredibly difficult task given the fact that because of 
their experience of being homeless, many of these youth have attachment 
difficulties and various other emotional issues. The goal of Axe employees is to 
uncover what interests the youth have; whether it be sports, theatre, visual arts, 
dance, etc. Theirs is a more artistic approach; they try to encourage creativity as a 
way to boost a young person's self-confidence. It is the youth's decision to ask 
Projeto Axe workers for help in re-integrating into society; learning a trade, finding 
a permanent place to live, even returning home. Communidade Solidaria is a 
governmental organization operating out of Brasilia. It has a variety of functions, 
whether it is the promotion of Brazilian craft or helping youth learn marketable 
skills and trades and encouraging education. These are only two organizations 
among the thousands that are working within Brazil with a common goal of better 
quality of life. Suffice to say, there are many Brazilians involved in grassroots 
organizations intent on improving living conditions within their country. 
Although I witnessed many things that I found distressing, I don't regret for 
one second traveling to this beautiful and complex country. I believe that the field 
research trip was where I learned the most about Brazil, by experiencing it with all 
my senses. Yes, there is incredible poverty in this country, and it seems to get worse 
and worse everyday, but there are Brazilians that do care and who want to do 
something positive to help others; knowing and experiencing this was a consolation. 
It is because of this kindness that I have witnessed and also the determination, on 
the part of the organizations our group met, to ameliorate the social situation in 
Brazil that I would eagerly return one day to volunteer or work in one of these 
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organizations. I believe the field research trip is the most important component of 
the entire independent research project. What we read in books and saw in films 
only gave us a limited view of what life might be like in Brazil; having a chance to 
go to the actual country and immerse oneself in the culture was absolutely 
incredible, an assault on all the senses. What I take from this experience is the 
knowledge that I am more informed and enriched in terms of knowing this dynamic 
country, and all the more in awe and humbled by the strength of Brazilian people 
from all walks of life. 
114 
lE BRESIL : ENERGIE POSITIVE 
lE CAS DU 'PROJETO AxE' 
Maria Faija 
Notre excursion de pres de quatre semaines au c~ur du Bresil nous aura mene 
dans les quatre coins de ce pays et nous aura permis de survoler, meme si tres 
sommairement, la realite complexe d'un pays si metisse et tant contraste 
economiquement et culturellement. Vu du Canada ou d'ailleurs, le Bresil est 
souvent per~u comme le pays du football, du carnaval, de la samba et de la misere 
des favelas. Mais derriere ces cliches revelateurs d'une certaine realite bresilienne, se 
cache en fait une realite beaucoup plus complexe et contrastee qu'il n'y parait. 
Nous avons eu le privilege de c6toyer, ou plut6t, de fr6ler devrais-je dire, un 
univers et une vie quotidienne differents de la n6tre et cela que ce soit de Rio de 
Janeiro a Sao Paulo en passant par Salvador de Bahia, Brasilia, Manaus ou Porto· 
Alegre. Ce voyage, realise en plusieurs etapes, comporta des rencontres avec des 
representants de divers centres universitaires, des representants du gouvernement 
bresilien et canadien, des personnalites liees aux secteurs ectucatif, culture!, social et 
economique, des visites et une excursion en Amazonie. La richesse et la diversite de 
ces rencontres ont contribue a notre interet pour ce pays ou les contrastes et les 
differences jonglent continuellement. 
Nous avons tous ete touches par divers aspects de la societe bresilienne et, 
personnellement, j'ai tout particulierement ete attiree et concernee par la situation 
des enfants et surtout ceux de la rue que l'on nomme en portugais 'os meninos da 
rua'. Aussi, vous pouvez imaginer quel fut mon emerveillement que de rencontrer 
diverses organisations qui tentent a leur fa~on de changer les choses et surtout de 
constater qu'elles font preuve d'un dynamisme, d'une creativite, d'une volonte et 
d'une energie positive hors repere pour donner aux enfants l'espoir d'un monde 
meilleur. C'est pourquoi c'est cette experience, ou encore cette energie si 
enrichissante que je desire evoquer et que j'espere vous transmettre au travers de ce 
bref papier. Au cours de ces quelques semaines, comme mentionne precedemment, 
nous avons rencontres des organisations non-gouvernementales(ONGs) et des 
organisations gouvernementales. Certes, le Bresil compte, selon certains auteurs, 
pres de 110,000 ONGs; mais c'est surtout le travail de l'une d'entre elles en 
particulier, que j'aimerai presente brievement. Avant de rentrer dans les details de 
!'action de cette ONG qui se nomme Projeto AXE, il me semble important d'indiquer 
quelques chiffres et quelques donnees qui sont necessaires a la meilleure 
comprehension de l'a,mpleur et de l'envergure de la situation de ces 'meminos'. Au 
Bresil, selon les chiffres alarmant de !'UNICEF : 
• 25,000,000 children have no leisure, education, regular food, housing and 
adequate hygiene, and are subject to all kind of violence 
• 35,999 children aged under five die every year' 
• 3,500,000 children and youth aged between 7 and 17 are illiterate 
• 4,000,000 Brazilians under 14 (minimum age allowed by the Constitution) 
are working;; 
La societe bresilienne, avec l'appui du gouvernement, est engagee dans la lutte 
contre la marginalisation et !'exploitation de l'enfance. Aussi, nous pouvons mieux 
i Vincent David, Mondialisation des ONG http :eewww.liberation .comeomcecticoegerrn_ong.php3 (consulte le : 31/10/01) 
ii Abrinq Foundation for Children's Rights, A history of Action 1990-1997, Funda~ao ABRINQ pelos direitos da crian~a. pg 11. 
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comprendre !'importance des ONGs qui sont sensibles a cette question pour 
le moins si deroutante. Dans l'Etat de Bahia, des initiatives nettement reussies 
reviennent a des organisations non-gouvernementales telles que le Projeto AXE qui 
prend a cceur la defense et la protection des enfants et des adolescents. 
Un des temps fort de notre sejour au Bresil a done ete la visite de !'organisation 
Projeto AXE. Situee dans la premiere capitale a l'epoque de la colonisation, au sein 
meme du carrefour de plusieurs cultures, l'ONG Projeto AXE a pris racines dans la 
capitale bahranaise classee patrimoine culture! de l'humanite par l'UNESCO. Cette 
organisation souhaite contribuer a !'amelioration de la situation des personnes 
vivant dans un etat d'extreme pauvrete, et particulierement les plus vulnerables, a 
savoir les enfants et les jeunes. 
Creee en 1990, par un italien Cesare de Floria la Roca, cette ONG vit au cceur 
meme de la pauvrete. En effet, a Salvador de Bahia, plus d'un million de personnes, 
vivent dans des conditions d'extreme pauvrete et l'UNICEF estime que pres de 
270,000 enfants entre 10 et 14 ans travaillent plus de 40 heures par semaine en 
echange d'un salaire modique.iii Le programme propose par Projeto AXE prone la 
defense des droits des enfants et des adolescents en agissant au niveau ectucatif 
et social. Selon Ricardo Cappi, que nous avons rencontre le 16 avril 2002, la 
philosophie derriere ce projet, est de construire un 'projet de vie' qui permet aux 
enfants et aux jeunes de la rue de changer la perception qu'ils ont d'eux-memes et 
done de developper une meilleur estime d'eux-memes. Par ailleurs, il ajouta que 
l'objectif de AXE est de faire reflechir 'nois fazemos pensar'. En effet, ce programme 
encourage, souvent au travers de moyens artistiques comme la danse, la musique, 
etc, les enfants et les jeunes de la rue et tente done de stimuler leur desir pour le 
changement, afin de les aider a trouver une raison de vivre. La pedagogie qu'il 
propose s'inspire des modeles de Freud et de Paolo Friere. Cette pectagogie qui se 
cache derriere cette organisation est par consequent celle de la 'pectagogie du desir, 
du vouloir'. Tout comme leurs mentors, le Projeto AXE a pour philosophie la prise 
de conscience de soi, du monde. En effet, la reussite ou l'echec des apprentissages 
sont d'abord fonction du regard que chacun parte sur le monde et soi-meme. Un 
regard qui souvent reflete et determine les jugements, les opinions, les comportements 
de chacun et chacune. 
Ayant gagne une certaine renommee dans la capitale bahianaise, non 
seulement au niveau national mais egalement international 'os meninos da rua' 
font ctesormais le premier pas et participent d'eux-memes aux differents ateliers 
tenus par les ectucateurs de AXE. Il faut preciser que les educateurs qui sont 
selectionnees le sont sur des bases peu conventionnelles. En effet, ce sont les 
qualites humaines et non obligatoirement les diplomes qui sont requis. AXE 
recherche done avant tout, aupres de ces employes, une volonte de participation, 
un desir de militantisme. Cette approche, peu commune, est possible car les 
educateurs beneficient d'une formation. Au cours de celle-ci, ils apprennent que 
leur role n'est pas celui de gendarme mais plutot celui de quelqu'un qui est a 
l'ecoute, de quelqu'un qui respecte et qui tente d'ouvrir les yeux de ces enfants en 
les rendant conscients, par exemple, que la drogue les empeche de realiser les plus 
belles choses de la vie, et que leur avenir est directement lie a leur fac;:on de vivre et 
de s'integrer. Tous les quinze jours, les ectucateurs, les psychologues et les assistants 
iii UNICEF, Adottiamo urn progetto : Brasile bambini della notte, 
http :eewww.unicef.itMdottaprogettoeprojetbrasile.html (consulte le 10/05/02) 
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sociaux se reunissent pour partager leur experience et discuter de leurs idees et 
projets tout en exorcisant leurs craintes ou leurs traumatismes. Quant aux enfants 
ou aux jeunes qui souhaitent beneficier de ce projet, ils se doivent de respecter 
certaines regles strictes et precises afin d'etre accepter. En effet, il y a des conditions 
a remplir et les principales sont: le bannissement de la drogue et le retour a l'ecole. 
Depuis sa creation, le projet AXE a dirige les enfants et les adolescents vers un 
systeme educatif public, des ateliers de creativite et d'arts plastiques et le marche du 
travail. Par ailleurs, Projeto AXE suit juridiquement les actions de defense des droits 
des enfants et des adolescents et effectue un chiffrage et un reperage des enfants des 
rues de Salvador. De plus, AXE propose de traiter les problemes que connaissent les 
enfants en luttant contre !'exclusion et les inegalites et pour le droit fondamental a 
la vie, une vie dans la dignite. Ce programme symbolise la force et l'energie 
positive. En effet, AXE en langue indigene signifie l'energie positive qui permet a . 
tout etre humain de se realiser en tant que tel, en tant que soi. 
Ce projet est soutenu par les gouvernements au niveau federal, de l'Etat et 
de la commune, par l'UNICEF, l'OIT, la BID (Banque Inter-americaine de 
Developpement), l'Union Europeenne, l'USAID, le gouvernement italien et des 
organismes bresiliens et non bresiliens prives, comme Amnesty International par 
exemple. Mais, comme nous l'a mentionne Ricardo Cappi avec fierte, cet organisme 
est independant et ne se preoccupe en aucun cas de 1' aspect politique des situations 
auxquelles il peut faire face, il ne se fait pas influencer, en un mot : Projeto AXE 
n'est pas une marionnette politique que l'on peut manipule.t:. 
]'ai ete emerveillee par notre visite au c<eur de cette organisation et j'ai pu 
sentir l'Energie Positive qui s'est degagee tout au long de notre rencontre. Dans un 
environnement des plus difficiles, au c<eur d'une extreme pauvrete que symbolise 
la capitale de Bahia, des hommes et des femmes ont su relever le defi et reussir a 
toucher 'os meninos da rua' en les drainant vers un avenir plus 'positif'. La 
philosophie et l'approche pectagogique de Projeto AXE sont differentes de la norme 
et sont orientees vers une perspective et une education plus artistique, en tentant 
de solliciter chez ces· enfants defavorises un desir profond de s'en sortir. En. effet, 
l'art est l'essence meme de ce projet et en fait un projet unique. Les resultats, deja 
marquants, temoignent du succes de ce projet. En effet, Ricardo Cappi nous a 
preciser que certains des enfants, qui ont fait confiance a cette methode, se sont 
sortis de leur desespoir et, a leur tour, aident les enfants et les adolescents des rues 
car ils sont devenus des ectucateurs. Grace a l'ene'rgie collective qui emane de ce 
projet, grace a !'initiative de certains et a la croyance d'autres, ce projet a su porter 
les fruits de la. reussite. Ce voyage et toute cette a venture, la realisation de notre 
projet sur le Bresil, aura ete une experience inoubliable a bien des egards! 
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lA COOPERATION ENTRE LE PRIVE, 
LE PUBLIC ET LE COMMUNAUTAIRE AU BRESIL 
Guillaume Landry 
Le Bresil est un geant incontournable de notre continent. Troisieme plus grande 
democratie au monde et huitieme puissance industrielle du globe, la Republique 
lusophone n'incarne pourtant pas moins la fracture sociale du Nouvel Ordre 
mondial. Avec en parallele les bidonvilles, le crime et la pauvrete de ses megapoles, 
le Bresil joui depuis plusieurs decennies d'une croissance exemplaire sans pour 
autant la distribuer. Dans une societe ou l'ecart entre riches et pauvres est parmi les 
plus eleve au monde, la redistribution des ressources et la reduction de la pauvrete 
sont plus que jamais le point de mire des preoccupations sociales du pays. Les 
notions de democratisation et de decentralisation sont devenues recemment les 
porte-etendards de ce combat. La vision ainsi projetee est d'impliquer la communaute, 
de rapprocher les institutions de la population. Le partenariat entre les instances 
gouvernementales, le secteur prive et la societe civile demeure encore 
precaire au Bresil, mais il incarne une evolution de la dynamique entre ces acteurs 
et une possibilite de collaborer ensemble pour une meilleure societe. 
Les obstacles sont pourtant nombreux. La volonte politique ou l'ouverture 
d'esprit ne sont pas toujours au rendez-vous. De meme, le savoir-faire n'est pas 
globalement disponible. Le Bresil a su toutefois se faire connaitre dans le monde par 
ses initiatives en lien avec le budget participatif de Porto Alegre, le forum social 
annuel de la meme ville ou encore les programmes sociaux du Mouvement des 
Sans-terre. Sans pour autant faire la regie, ces instances sont des exemples probants 
de la capacite bresilienne a faire face a ses propres problemes. 
C'est dans ce contexte que la cooperation internationale cherche a faciliter 
cette impulsion. Denis Marcheterre, directeur executif de Pueblito Canada, une 
ONG canadienne qui travaille depuis plus de 15 ans au Bresil, affirme cependant : 
<< c'est le monde qui va changer le monde, et non la cooperation. >> Reputee pour ses 
innovations et la sophistication de ses solutions, la societe civile bresilienne a 
raison d'etre fiere et possede deja une experience substantielle en la matiere. En 
somme, il importe d'accompagner les Bresiliens dans leur processus de developpe-
ment en repondant a leur besoin a travers la societe civile qui travaille deja a palier 
aux injustices. Il est done necessaire de presenter nos erreurs comme nos succes 
dans nos propres experiences de dynamisation sociale, pour ensuite les laisser 
modeler nos solutions a leur realite et finalement nous inspirer nous-memes de leur 
experience. 
Le Bresil est une exception aux cotes de l' Afrique du Sud et du Nigeria pour 
avoir une agence nationale de developpement international oeuvrant sur son 
propre territoire avec l'aide d'agences etrangeres tout en operant uncertain nombre 
d'activites de developpement dans d'autres con trees. L' Agencia Brasileira de 
Coopera~ao (ABC), une branche du Ministere des affaires exterieures, personnifie 
justement cette dualite. En effet, il lui arrive d'entreprendre des projets de 
developpement dans des pays tels que le Mozambique ou l' Angola, generalement en 
partageant sa propre experience. D'un autre cote, cette organisation agit souvent 
comme intermectiaire entre les agences occidentales de developpement et les 
organismes de la societe civile pour organiser les projets. La realite bresilienne s'en 
trouve bien resumee; un volet du pays qui est suffisamment developpe pour 
exporter son aide, parallele a une autre facette fort sous-developpee, qui a de son 
cote bien besoin d'aide. 
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La cooperation internationale a done une place au Bresil, les besoins etant 
immenses. Pourtant, son action ne doit pas se limiter a ce role paternaliste de 
gestionnaire et de penseur. 11 . faut revoir notre maniere de concevoir nos 
interventions. L'image pompeuse de nos societes prosperes et progressistes qui 
aident par morale les depourvus illettres et innocents de ce monde est fondamental-
ement inadaptee. 11 faut dGrenavant comprendre nos interactions en tant que 
dialogue, un echange rendu possible par cet interet mutuel dans la dynamique de 
l'autre. Apprendre tout en partageant. Et force est de constater que le Bresil a bien 
des choses a nous apprendre. 
A titre d'exemple, une association regroupant divers secteurs economiques 
bresiliens, la GIFE, a cree un fond qui finance autant des initiatives sociales 
exterieures que des projets qui leur sont propres. Une organisation qui implique les 
entreprises dans leur communaute. Depuis, plusieurs firmes produisent un double · 
bilan a la fin de chaque annee : un bilan financier traditionnel et un bilan social 
faisant etat des realisations communautaires initiees sous les auspices des projets de 
l'entreprise. Cet exercice, gere par l'Instituto Brasileiro de Analises Sociair e 
Economicas (!BASE), a pour but de mettre a jour la responsabilisation sociale des 
entreprises et de consolider leur relation avec la societe et l'environnement. En plus 
d'etre un instrument de relations publiques extraordinaire, ces bilans sociaux 
motivent les compagnies a s'impliquer dans leur communaute et a tenir compte de 
leur milieu dans leurs activites et investissements. 
De meme, 1' Agenda social de Rio est un pro jet qui vise a faciliter la mise en 
relation des groupes communautaires avec les instances gouvernementales. Cet 
intermediaire permet done aux acteurs locaux de mieux connaitre les mecanismes 
mis a leur disposition dans l'appareil etatique pour le genre de projet qu'ils 
coordonnent tout en facilitant !'articulation des revendications de ces organismes 
aupres des preneurs de decision. 
L'Association bresilienne des fabriquants de jouets ABRINQ s'est pour sa part 
creee une niche dans le financement des activites pour la defense des droits de la 
personne et des enfants. Fort de cette reputation, I' Association a cree un prix 
national pour l'entreprise << amie des enfants >> . Une liste de criteres serieux et 
rigoureux, allant des services communautaires a la qualite des produits en passant 
par les conditions de travail et !'impact environnemental de la production sert a 
determiner le gagnant de ce prix hautement prestigieux. Il s'agit evidemment d'une 
immense promotion pour le gagnant qui se traduit en gain de marche considerable. 
Par ailleurs, nombreuses sont les entreprises qui prennent conscience des criteres de 
ce prix pour adapter la qualite de leurs produits et leur role dans la communaute. 
Une palme similaire est attribuee a la prefecture << amie des enfants >> , suivant elle 
aussi des criteres precis. De meme, la renommee de cette recompense pousse 
plusieurs agglomerations a revoir leur agenda et leurs services. 
Comunidade Solidaria est de son cote un programme federal instaure depuis 
!'entree au pouvoir il y a sept ans du President Fernando Cardoso pour mousser le 
partenariat entre la societe civile et le gouvernement. Bien que souvent taxee 
d'instrument politique par ses detracteurs, il demeure toutefois que la grande 
participation populaire a ses projets ainsi que !'extension de ses activites font etat 
d'un succes substantiel. Parmi ses initiatives se retrouvent des programmes 
d'entralnement professionnel, d 'alphabetisation, de formation sociale pour la 
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clientele universitaire, de commercialisation de l'artisanat traditionnel, de 
democratisation de !'Internet et de promotion du benevolat. Avant-gardiste, cet 
organisme illustre l'ouverture d'esprit et la collaboration possible entre le secteur 
public et la population. Ses resultats sont fort encourageants, comme la reduction 
de SO% du nombre d'analphabetes dans la region du nordeste ou encore le 
developpement economique des petites communautes traditionnelles de l'interieur 
du pays par la vente de leur artisanat. 
De meme, le milieu universitaire tente peu a peu de reactiver son role de 
service aupres de la societe en instiguant nombre de projets d'extension. Il s'agit 
d'espaces d'apprentissage pratique a travers des stages ainsi que des espaces de 
discussion a propos de sujets alternatifs en lien avec la composante defavorisee de 
la societe bresilienne. A titre d'exemple, un congres national alternatif des 
architectes s'est tenu recemment a Porto Alegre, reunissant des centaines 
d'etudiants et professeurs des quatre coins du pays pour organiser des echanges et 
structurer des projets a propos du developpement des communautes lie a\1 
Mouvement des Sans-terre. Les problematiques inherentes a la gestion de 
l'ecosysteme, a l'espace legal, a la limitation des ressources ainsi qu'a la dynamique 
politique ont ete abordees, se fusionnant dans un ensemble de documents 
constructifs elabore dans cet espace universitaire. 
La cooperation entre le prive, le public et le communautaire est une maniere 
pour le Bresil d'ameliorer la vie de sa societe. Le defi y est d'accroitre !'occurrence 
d'une telle dynamique et de transformer les programmes sociaux de maniere a 
prevenir les impacts negatifs de la mondialisation sur une grande partie de la 
population bresilienne. Les statistiques demontrent pourtant que la pauvrete et les 
inegalites se sont accrues ces dernieres annees. Ces initiatives doivent done etre 
considerees dans un contexte global ou l'offre est indubitablement inferieure aux 
besoins. 
Pueblito Canada travaille en collaboration avec l'ONG locale MLPC dans les 
centres de la petite enfance des bidonvilles de Belo Horizonte, troisieme ville du 
pays. La circulation des idees se poursuit, affirme Monsieur Marcheterre, et la 
transposition d'experiences bresiliennes via leur collaboration avec the . School of 
Early childhood development de l'Universite Ryerson de Toronto a donne lieu a des 
apprentissages fort pertineilts a l'echelle de notre societe. 
Les contradictions bresiliennes se suivent au fil d'un quotidien aussi 
flamboyant qu'inegal. Les defis sont enormes et les solutions continuent de se 
conjuguer au present. L'aide du Canada est bienvenue au Bresil. Reste a savoir si le 
Canada est suffisamment ouvert pour appliquer certaines experiences bresiliennes 
porteuses de succes a sa propre pauvrete. 
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ABRINQ AND ITS PROGRAMS TO FIGHT CHILD LABOUR AND ILLITERACY 
Jessica Dionne 
In many developing countries children are propelled into the labour force at a 
very young age. These children (anywhere between five to seventeen) tend to work 
under terrible conditions. In fact, UNICEF estimates that over two hundred and fifty 
million of the world's children work in hazardous conditions. Although child 
labour is prominent in Asia and Africa, many Latin American children must also 
work in order to survive. In Brazil alone, it is estimated that over 6.5 million 
children and adolescents work in order to survive. The purpose of this paper is not 
to discuss the horrors of child labour, but to examine the programs of a Brazilian 
organization called ABRINQ that has been taking steps towards reducing child 
labour and promoting educational projects for less fortunate children. 
Before identifying these programs it is important to briefly recall when and . 
how this organization was established. The ABRINQ Foundation for Children's 
Rights was founded in 1990, in the city of Sao Paulo, by business people who 
became aware of the terrible situation of many children in their country. ABRINQ 
is a non-profit organization that aims at promoting the basic rights of children as 
defined by the 1989 United Nations International Convention for Children's 
Rights, the Brazilian Constitution and Brazilian Statute for Children and 
Adolescents. This organization has been working very hard to mobilize the government 
and civil society in order to make children and adolescents a top priority. To do so, 
ABRINQ has promoted its organization and its programs in elementary schools, in 
cities, in various companies and in the media. 
One of ABRINQ's most noteworthy programs is the Child-Friendly Company 
Program that aims to "encourage private enterprises to fight against the 
exploitation of child labour and to invest in projects that can improve children's 
quality of life." To do so, members from the ABRINQ Foundation communicate 
with companies and invite them to support ABRINQ by eliminating child labour in 
their businesses. If the company agrees to stop employing children, it will obtain 
the right to stamp all its products with the ABRINQ logo. This agreement is not an 
official one but rather a pact of good will between ABRINQ and the company. 
Companies benefit from this pact because they become recognized by civil society 
as companies that are against child labour. Furthermore, because the media often 
publishes articles on ABRINQ and the companies that support this foundation, 
these companies receive good publicity. Of course, companies who sign the pact of 
good will and do not comply with its clauses can no longer use the ABRINQ logo 
on its products and will receive negative media coverage. The media thus becomes 
an important agent for positively or negatively influencing public opinion with 
respect to certain companies. This program is of great importance because it ensures 
that fewer children will be employed in factories. 
Another interesting ABRINQ project is the Child-Friendly Journalist Project. 
The objective of this project is to build a network of journalists nation-wide to work 
on the defence of children's rights. This is very important because it helps create 
social awareness with regards to child labour and children's rights. Although many 
Brazilians know that the situation of millions of the nation's children is appalling, 
few know how to help them. The Child-Friendly Journalist Project does not only 
sensitize the public, it also gives them information on how to help children 
through different organizations. 
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ABRINQ also has a program called the Child-Friendly Mayor Program that 
supports mayors across the country who make children a priority in their municipalities. 
This program is interesting because it makes children's welfare a political matter. By 
making children a priority, Brazilians will become aware of actions that they can 
take within their own communities to help children in their neighborhoods. This 
will in time make people more politicized and hopefully lead them to choose 
products that are not made by children, encourage them to volunteer or make a 
donation to organizations such as ABRINQ. Although the . welfare of Brazilian 
children is a national issue, it is often at the local and municipal levels that 
immediate action can take place. Think globally, but act locally. 
Fighting child labour is one of ABRINQ's top priorities, but this organization is 
also concerned with promoting better educational programs for children of lower 
income families. Many children in Brazil cannot afford to go to school or do not 
have sufficient access to educational material such as books and computers to 
. further their education. In fact, UNICEF has estimated that 1.8 million young 
Brazilians between the ages of 15 to 24 are illiterate. Thus, ABRINQ has created 
several programs to help decrease the illiteracy rate. 
The 'Believe It To See It Program' was created to "improve the quality of public 
schools by mobilizing the civil society and by giving contributions to the 
government for the establishment of its educational policies." This program is very 
important because it will allow more children to receive a better education. It is 
unacceptable for an industrialized country such as Brazil to have 1.9 million children 
between the ages of 7 to 14 years not attending school. With this program, ABRINQ 
is creating better facilities for children and hopefully this will keep more children 
in school. Obviously, part of the problem is that many children need to work in 
order for their family to survive. Poverty in Brazil is a major concern, and it affects 
many children and forces them to work at an early age and thus leave school. 
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The Children Education Program was created to promote the construction of 
day-care centres and pre-schools in order for young children to be surrounded by 
other children and become socialized. This program helps young children develop 
skills and especially keeps them away from the labour market. The more education 
they receive at a young age the better chance they will have to continue their 
education later. 
ABRINQ continues to develop many programs to decrease child labour and 
promote educational projects. The foundation's main goal is to make Brazil a better 
place for children. This organization has been working very hard to mobilize civil 
society and the media on the importance of making children's welfare a top priority. 
This task is not easy since Brazil is a vast country that is faced with many social 
problems. Thus, it is hard to control the employment of children in many areas of 
the country. In Sao Paulo, the largest city in Brazil, the issue of child labour has 
not been resolved, but ABRINQ has been working relentlessly to decrease the 
employment of children in this city and other states. 
Personally, I was very impressed by the creativity and level of organization of 
ABRINQ's programs and felt that this type of organization would be a good model 
for other Latin American countries to follow. At its inception, ABRINQ only 
employed one person. Now it employs over seventy people: an indication of its 
ability to make its voice heard. Child labour and child illiteracy are concerns in all 
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developing nations. The fight in Brazil continues and it appears that more and more 
Brazilians are becoming aware of these problems and are taking action in order to 
make Brazil a safer and better place for its children. 
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STYLES OF MODERN DIPLOMACY: 
A COMPARISON BETWEEN BRAZIL AND CANADA 
Marie-Claire Lemay 
The idea of this short essay came from personal experiences before and during 
our conference "Brazil: the Emergence of a World Power," and also during the 
subsequent field research trip to Brazil. While building up this project, I soon realized 
how the Brazilian and Canadian governments' responses varied significantly, and 
somehow reflected the different diplomatic styles adopted by those countries. For 
instance, after months of work on the conference, the Canadian Department of 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) still seemed to treat our initiative 
like a high school project, sending us basic tourist information about Brazil and 
reminding us not to leave our purse unattended on the beach. In the meanwhile, 
the Brazilian Embassy sent us specialized videos, magazines, and the ambassador 
was pleased to be present at the conference. In Brazil, the Canadian embassy 
organized a casual and outdoor BBQ with the personnel on the compound, while 
the Brazilian Foreign Office (Itamaraty) met us in business suits in a fully equipped 
conference room. This essay does not constitute a criticism of the DFAIT, but aims 
to point out some aspects in which it could learn from its Brazilian homologues. 
Canada and Brazil share many similarities, as the Brazilian ambassador to 
Canada, H.E. Henrique Valle, stated in 2001: 
Both are almost continental in size, their economies have roughly the same 
dimensions and their societies are multi-ethnical and diverse. They share 
common views as democratic societies and the conviction that the 
Hemisphere should be integrated on the basis of fundamental values such 
as democracy, human rights, protection of the environment, the fight 
against poverty and the pursuit of social justice.246 
To these points could be added the presence of aboriginal peoples, federalism, 
the planning and creation of a central national capital (Ottawa at the junction of 
Lower and Upper Canada in 1857; Brasilia between the Atlantic seaboard and the 
Amazon region in 1960), and a concentration of population on a stretch of land 
(the U.S. border in Canada and the Atlantic seaboard in Brazil). Yet, one major 
difference between the two countries remains the concept of national identity, 
which reflects on the national diplomatic style. In Canada, starting with the French 
and English legacies, the country has been flourishing under the banner of 
multiculturalism where the "mixing bowl" is the norm. In Brazil, constant interactions 
and racial mixture under the Catholic faith and the Portuguese language have 
created a real national culture and identity, thus a "melting pot."247 
Diplomacy is often simply defined as "the dialogue between states," while its 
agents, also called diplomats, insure the implementation at home and abroad of 
essential functions such as information, negotiation, promotion of cultural, 
economic and scientific interests, protection of nationals, and extension of public 
services."248 The execution of those tasks varies according to the country's foreign 
policy, the foreign country and the diplomatic style chosen. "The concept of 
diplomatic style is a useful means of thinking about the characteristic ways in 
which states and other actors approach and handle their external policy. [ ... ] 
246. VAllE, H.E. Henrique. "Brazil·Canada: Common goals in the Hemisphere," in Diplomat & International Canada. Ottawa: 
Diplomat & Canada, September·October 2001, pg. 16. 
247. EAKIN, Marshall C. Brazil: the Once and Future Country. New York: St. Martin's press, 1997, pg. 260. 
248. KIRSCHBAUM, Stanislav. Paix, securite et droits humains intemationaux ILST 3270, Glendon College, 2002. 
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Within diplomatic style are included negotiating behaviour, preference for open or 
secret diplomacy, the kinds of envoys used, diplomatic language, preferred 
institutions and types of treaty instruments such as memoranda or treaties of 
friendship. [ ... ] Personal diplomacy has increased in importance as a feature of 
modern international relations."249 
Within our project's framework, I could not help but notice how the Brazilians 
kept a professional standard in their approach, whether we were students or would 
have been government officials. They kept their business suits on, received us in a 
special room, offered us coffee and snacks, discussed with us with interest and 
answered all our questions in a polite and concise way, whether in Canada or Brazil. 
On the Canadian side, the approach was more casual and sometimes reflected the 
personality of the diplomats in question. In Canada, they seemed a bit bothered by 
our initiative and kept their contribution to a minimum, as if student projects were 
not high in their priority list. In Brazil, our Canadian diplomats seemed a bit 
surprised by the seriousness of our initiative and were more helpful. Nevertheless, 
the outdoor BBQ and improvised visit (although planned in advance) to the 
Consulate in Rio showed us how more relaxed is the Canad~an style, hence easier 
to relate to (as opposed to a more elitist approach). Yet, such casualness may also 
conceal an hierarchical conception and could, at times, be inappropriate or even 
offensive. Personally, as a student, I found the Brazilian approach more interesting 
because it made me feel important and taken seriously. 
The Canadian Foreign Service has long been associated with the United 
Kingdom. It is through a slow gradual process closely related to its constitutional 
evolution (and also some frustrations relating to British primacy) that it developed 
its own Foreign Office following World War 1.'50 The DFAIT, as it is called today, is 
still young, its most recent drastic change being _the opening of the entrance exams 
to women, in 1947. When recruiting, the Department is evaluating the following 
essential qualities: A good judgment, attention to detail, capacity to communicate, 
personal qualities, education (a Masters Degree was previously required, but now an 
Undergraduate Degree is sufficient), and preferably bilingualism in English and 
French.251 The entrance exams are held once a year in October, and of the 7,000 
candidates who wrote the exams in 2001, 80 to 100 will be offered positions . . 
Brazil's Foreign Service is closely linked to "the rising nationalism of the late 
1950s [which] pressured the government to seek a more important and independent 
position in the world affairs and, at the same time, to oppose U.S. 'imperialism.'"252 
From its inception, the Brazilian Foreign Service (Itamaraty) "recruited 
distinguished intellectuals from the fields of politics, literature, and philosophy to 
serve as Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers. Most notable was the Baron of Rio 
Branco (1902-1912), who increased the size of Brazil over 200,000 square miles by 
peacefully arbitrating a number of border disputes."253 The history of modern 
Brazilian diplomacy is closely connected to the establishment of the Instituto Rio 
Branco in 1945.254 This Institute is essentially a renowned academy for the 
development, specialization and professionalization of Ministry of Foreign Affairs offidals. 
249. BARSTON, RP. Modem Diplomacy. New York: Longman, 1997, pp. 130 and 106. 
250. CADIEUX, MarceL Le diplomate canadien: elt!mmts d'une difinition. Montreal: Fides, 1962, pp. 15-16. 
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"In countries with young histories, like Brazil, academic institutions of fifty years or 
more are already part of a tradition. This is especially true when, as in the case of 
the Instituto Rio Branco, norms and practices were brought together in this new 
academy which, since the days of the Empire, had been foreshadowing the ethical 
and professional bases upon which would be framed the criteria for the selection, 
training, and specialization of Brazilian diplomats."2ss When recruiting, the 
Instituto Rio Branco is searching for candidates "righteous in conduct, expert in 
French and English languages, knowledgeable of Mercantile and Maritime Law, and 
of the practices and customs of Business."2s6 The entrance exams are known to be 
very difficult and of the average 2,000 candidates every year, 20 are selected for 
training. 
This is perhaps what Canada truly lacks in its Ministry of Foreign Affairs: A lack 
of tradition and of institutionalization of its diplomatic service through a well-
established academy. A parallel could be made with West Point in the United States: 
Today West Point continues to operate as a training school for the modern 
army. [ ... ] Apart from the specific skills it teaches, West Point inculcates in 
its students a sense of the nation as a whole, past and present, public and 
private, at war and at peace. While the U.S. has used its military might to 
win its way in the world, Canada has had to live by the alliances it forms. 
What the soldier is to America, the diplomat is to Canada, yet we have 
nothing like West Point to train our future leaders.2s7 
Canada does not train its foreign officers efficiently, yet it could gain more in 
institutionalizing and perfecting its excellence in the diplomatic domain, where it 
enjoys a good reputation. While it might not be possible to build a brand new 
academy, the curriculum should stress the importance of etiquette and professionalism 
(which do not exclude casualness) and should be open to foreign diplomats as well, 
like the Instituto Rio Branco, since the contribution of outside participation (in 
terms of ideas, etc.) should not be underestimated. I was impressed by the 
Brazilians' great professionalism and their overall ability to make you feel important 
and comfortable albeit their seriousness. The Canadian treatment was more amicable 
and laidback, easier to relate to, yet lacking distinctiveness. Maybe distinctiveness 
is not such an issue after all, but as a future Foreign Service officer, I believe that the 
impression that you· make on the numerous people that you meet briefly, throughout 
your career, does reflect on the whole country you represent. 
255. Ibid., p. 4 
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lA DIVERSITE DE LA POPULATION BRESIUENNE 
Edith da Costa 
En l'an 2000, le Bresil avait une population d'approximativement 165 millions 
d'habitants. Cette population est une des plus diversifiee au monde et cela est 
certainement du au niveau tres eleve d'immigration dont ce geant de 1' Amerique 
latine fut l'objet. Visiter le Bresil donne !'impression de visiter plus d'un pays, non 
seulement a cause de son vaste territoire et de sa diversite geographique, mais aussi 
a cause de la population qui est assez differente d'une region a l'autre. Peu importe 
l'endroit ou l'on debarque en terre bresilienne, l'on per~oit un melange incroyable 
de personnes de differentes origines ethniques. 
Lors de notre voyage au Bresil, en avril 2002, mes com~gues et moi avons eu la 
chance de mieux saisir l'heterogeneite du peuple bresilien. Nous avons visiter en 
tout six villes : Sao Paulo, Salvador de Bahia, Brasilia, Manaus, Porta Alegre et Rio 
de Janeiro. Chacune de ces villes appartient a des regions distinctes dont les 
economies sont differentes les unes des autres et dont les roles au sein de l'Etat est 
propre a chacune d'entre elles. Ces differences sont dues a plusieurs facteurs, dont 
la population qui a influence le destin de ces villes. Pourtant, la fa~on dont chaque 
ville s'est metamorphosee a egalement un impact important dans la fa~on dans 
laquelle la population bresilienne s'est cteveloppee. 
Notre sejour au Bresil a debute dans la ville de Sao Paulo. Des notre arrivee, j'ai 
vite constate que cette grande metropole de 18 millions d'habitants est composee 
de groupes ethniques provenant de partout a travers le monde. Sao Paulo fut choisi 
par beaucoup d'immigrants dans l'espoir d'y trouver un avenir plus prometteur que 
celui offert par leur pays d'origine. La population japonaise notamment y est 
fortement representee et constitue la plus grande communaute japonaise hors 
Japan. Comme la plupart des megapoles au Canada ou aux Etats-Unis, Sao Paulo 
possede un melange culturel etonnant. 
Notre deuxieme arret fut dans la region du Nordeste, dans la ville de Salvador. 
A notre sortie de l'avion, une chaleur accablante nous accueille. En se promenant 
dans les rues de cette ville, on remarqua qu'une grande partie de la population etait 
noire. La ville de Salvador, etant situee sur la cote atlantique, a ete un important 
point de debarquement des esclaves en provenance des pays africains. Cette ville est 
d'une beaute incroyable et tres pittoresque et l'on peut y admirer encore aujourd'hui 
!'architecture coloniale portugaise. Aussi, a Salvador, la capoeira, art martial 
developpe par les esclaves, est un art traditionnel que les habitants apprennent a 
maitriser des leur jeune age. Pourtant, cette ville, tout comme la plupart des villes 
de cette region, fait face a une dure realite. La region du Nordeste est la plus pauvre 
au Bresil et la presence des favelas est tres forte. Meme si le Bresil est un pays 
multiculturel, certaines cultures ont mains acces a la richesse du pays que d'autres : 
la situation precaire de la population noire est un exemple de ce phenomene de 
discrimination. 
Nous nous sommes envoles ensuite vers Brasilia. Je constata rapidement que 
cette ville est unique en son genre et que je ne pouvais pas la comparer a aucune 
autre. En effet, la capitale du Bresil, qui fut construite il y a une cinquantaine 
d'annees seulement, est une ville dont !'architecture est tres avant-gardiste. Cette 
tres jeune ville fut situee au milieu du pays dans le but d'y instaurer la nouvelle 
capitale nationale. La population de cette vllle est constituee en fait de groupes 
heterogenes, qui sont venus d'un peu partout au Bresil pour y travailler. J'ai eu 
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!'impression, toute fois, que cette ville etait en grande partie formee de diplomates 
et de politiciens. 
Nous etions deja au milieu de notre etude de terrain au Bresil et voila que nous 
repartions vers Manaus cette fois-ci. Cette grande ville de l' Amazonie, qui me 
fascinait depuis longtemps, m'a fait decouvrir des paysages saisissants. Nous avons eu 
la chance de vivre une experience unique au milieu des << poumons de la planete. >> 
Les gens rencontres avaient des traits indigenes et nous avons meme visite une 
famille indigene vivant dans la foret. L' Amazonie fut veritablement une experience 
memorable. 
Quelques jours apres notre periple en foret amazonienne, nous repartons vers 
Porto Alegre, au Sud du Bresil. Cette ville a une forte compo.sante de population 
d'origine italienne et allemande. Il etait tres etrange pour moi de voir des Bresiliens 
aux cheveux blonds et aux yeux bleus. Meme en se promenant dans les rues de cette 
ville, reputee pour son vin et pour son churrasco, l'on pouvait sentir une presence 
europeenne ne serait-ce qu'en admirant !'architecture des batiments. 
Dernier arret, Rio de Janeiro. Comme Sao Paulo, cette ville offre un grand 
melange culture!. En effet, cette autre megapole bresilienne est un melange 
heterogene de gens venus s'etablir dans cette merveilleuse ville balneaire dans le but 
d'y trouver un avenir prospere. Rio de Janeiro offre elle aussi des paysages a couper 
le souffle, mais d'un autre cote cette ville est victime d'une pauvrete et une violence 
de plus en plus grandissantes. 
Le Bresil, dans son ensemble, est un pays riche au niveau culture! et cela est 
certainement du au fait que ce pays fut construit par des immigrants d'origine tres 
diversifiee. En visitant ce pays et en rencontrant plusieurs personnes, je n'ai pas pu 
m'empecher de comparer le Bresil avec le Canada, qui aussi est un pays compose 
d'immigrants en provenance de nombreuses parties du monde. En depit de 
similarites quanta l'origine de leur populations, force est de constater que les deux 
pays different surtout quant a la fa~on dont les immigrants se sont melanges. Au 
Bresil, il y a eu un phenomene de metissage unique en son genre. En effet, il y a eu 
beaucoup de mariages interculturels entre les indigenes, les noirs et les blancs. Ainsi, 
meme si dans chaque ville ou region du Bresil l'on peut apercevoir des formes 
culturelles specifiques, il reste que dans leur ensemble les Bresiliens sont un peuple 
extremement metisse. 
Au Canada, par contre, ce phenomene de melange culture! entre les differents 
groupes est beaucoup moins prononce. Au Canada, les groupes ethniques ont la 
tendance a se tenir ensemble, c'est-a-dire a habiter dans les memes quartiers d'une 
ville, parler entre eux la langue de leur pays d'origine, garder leur religion, etc. Ainsi, 
au Canada, les immigrants ne s'integrent pas si vite et facilement au reste de la 
population deja en place. Pourtant, ce phenomene aussi constitue une forme de 
richesse culturelle et le Canada est reconnue mondialement pour son multicultur-
alisme ethnique. 
Bref, dans le cas du Bresil, le multiculturalisme pourrait etre qualifie de 
multiculturalisme de melting-pot ou d'integration, c'est-a-dire que tout le monde se 
considere bresilien, tout le monde parle le portugais, aime le football et, en grande 
majorite, se sent catholique, etc. Meme si presque tous les Bresiliens ont des 
ancetres en provenance d'autres pays, ils se considerent tous, et avant tout, 
Bresiliens. Demander a un Bresilien qu'elle est son origine et il VOUS repondra 
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promptement qu'il est bresilien, sans faire allusion a une autre origine. Au Canada, 
ce phenomene est assez different. Les gens se disent Canadiens, mais d'origine 
italienne, irlandaise, japonaise, etc. Au Canada, on appele cela une mosai:que 
culturelle, ou chaque groupe garde une identite differente, mais, lorsqu'on place 
tous les groupes ensemble, cela aussi forme un tout. Ces deux formes de 
multiculturalisme pourraient toutefois cacher des differences significatives de 
perception nationale ou meme de projet national et il serait peut-etre tres 
interessant de les analyser plus en profondeur. 
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ANNEX I 
CONFERENCE AGENDA 
Opening Panel 
Chair: The Honourable Barbara ]. McDougall, P.C., C.F.A., L.L.D., O.C. 
Ms. McDougall is President and CEO of the Canadian Institute of International 
Affairs. 
Speaker: Mr. Amaral Gurgel, Amaral Gurgel Barristers and Solicitors - Honorary 
Consul of Brazil in Vancouver 
Presentation title: An overview of the Brazilian history and culture 
Presenteur: M. Bernard Andres, directeur, Centre d'etudes et de recherches sur le 
Bresil de l'UQAM (CERB) 
Titre: Presentation du Centre d'etudes et de recherches sur le Bresil de l'UQA.M 
(CERB) 
Speaker: Mrs. Sherry Nelligan, Gender Equality Incorporated 
Presentation title: Dreams and disparities - Gender equality in Brazil 
Speaker/Presenteur: M. Rejean Tessier, Directeur ad joint, direction de l' Amerique 
du Sud, Ministere des Affaries etrangeres et du Commerce International. 
Titre de la presentation: Relations Canada - Bresil: Vues d'Ottawa 
Speaker: His Excellency, the Ambassador Henrique Valle, Brazilian Embassy in 
Ottawa 
Presentation title: Brazil: present domestic realities and foreign policy goals 
Afternoon Panel 
Political. economic and development 
Chair: Mrs. Halina Ostrovski, President, Canada-Brazil Chamber of Commerce 
and National President, Canadian Council for the Americas (CCA) 
Speaker: Mr. Don Mackay, Executive Director, Canadian Foundation for the 
Americas (FOCAL) 
Presentation title: Canada- Brazil Relations 
Speaker: Dr. Albert Berry, Professor of Economics, University of Toronto and 
Research Director of the Program on Latin America and the Carribean at the 
U of T's Centre for International Studies 
Presentation title: Recent economic trends in Brazil 
Speaker: Mrs. Annette Hester, interim director of the Latin American Research 
Centre, University of Calgary, and Dr. Edmilson Moutinho dos Santos, Professor, 
University of Sao Paulo (USP) 
Presentation title: Politics, Presidential Elections and the Energy Crisis in Brazil 
Speaker: Dr. Jean Daudelin, The North-South Institute 
Presentation title: Brazil, Mercosur and the FTAA: The State of a Wild Game 
Speaker: Dr. Charles Gastle, Lawyer, Estey Centre for Law and Economics in 
International Trade 
Presentation title: The Aircraft from Brazil/Canada dispute 
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Social. cultural and environmental 
Chair: Dr. Elisabeth Abergel, Professor, Glendon College, York University 
Speaker: Dr. Rosana Barbosa Nunes, Professor, York and Brock Universities 
Presentation title: Immigration to Brazil and the formation of the Brazilian 
people 
Speaker: Professor Ted Hewitt, University of Western Ontario 
Presentation title: Urbanization: Brazilian innovations in response to social 
problems in Brazil. 
Speaker: Mr. Denis Marcheterre, Executive Director, Pueblito Canada 
Presentation title: Le role de la cooperation internationale au Bresil 
Speaker: Dr. Cecilia Rocha, Centre for Research on Latin America and the 
Carribean (CERLAC) 
Presentation title: Urban food security policy: The case of Belo Horizonte, Brazil 
Speaker/Presenteur: Dr. Yvon Maurice, Geological Survey of Canada/ 
Commission geologique du Canada 
Presentation title/titre: Two CIDA-sponsored projects to address environmental 
and social problems in Brazil/ Deux projets subventionnes par l'ACDI pour 
addresser les probli!mes environmentaux et sociaux du Bresil. 
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ANNEX Ill 
fiELD TRIP ITINERARY: MAIN PlACES AND INSTITUTIONS VISITED 
Tuesday April 9, 2002 
Departure from Toronto - Chicago 
__ Chicago- Sao Paulo 
Wednesday April 10 
Sao Paulo 
• Visit to ABRINQ- NGO working for children 
• Visit of SESC- community/cultural center 
Thursday April 11 
• Went to the city called Cubatao visit Carbocloro (Fabric of Chemicals) 
Friday, April 12 
Saturday, April 13 
Departure to Salvador da Bahia 
Meet with the Council of Canada in Salvador 
Dinner at Solar da Unhao where a show of capoeira was presented 
Sunday, April 14 
• Tour of the city 
• Visit with Canadian Sister Muriel who works in a favela 
Monday, April15 
• Visit to the University of Bahia, UNEB - ABECAN (Associar;ao Brasileira de 
Estudos Canadenses) 
Tuesday, April 16 
Visit of Centro Projeto Axe de Defesa e Proter;ao a Crianr;a e ao Adolescente -
NGO working with street children 
• Departure to Brasilia 
Wednesday, April 17 
• Meeting with Minister Luiz Fernando Ligiero, Head of the Office of Public 
Information and Affairs 
• Meeting with Mrs. Elke Urbanavicius Constanti, Deputy Coordinator of the 
Brazilian Cooperation Agency 
• Meeting with Minister ]oao Almino de Souza Filho, Director of the Rio Branco 
Institute 
• Meeting with Comunidade Solidaria Council 
Thursday, April 18 
• Meeting with Deputy Ricardo Berzoini- PT/SP 
• Visit to Canadian Embassy 
• University of Brasilia- meeting with Prof. Ricardo Caldas and International 
Relation students 
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Friday, ,April 19 
• University of Brasilia- Faculty of Education- meeting with Prof. Gilberto 
Lacerda, Undergraduate Coordinator 
• Tour of city 
• Departure to Manaus 
Saturday, April 20 
Arrival to Manaus -Two days expedition in a boat in the Amazon 
Sunday, April21 
Expedition in the Amazon 
Monday, April 22 
• Visit of the city 
Tuesday, April 23 
• Visit of the city 
• Departure to Porto Alegre. Prof. Rosana Barbosa Nunes joined the group and 
accompanied them to Porto Alegre and Rio de Janeiro 
Wednesday, April 24 
• Visit to the Universidade Federal do Rio Gran de do ·Sul - Visit to ABECAN 
• Tour of the city 
Thursday, April 25 
• Visit to the Universidade do Vale dos Sinos - Unisinos 
• Visit to Universidade de Caxias do Sul with Prof. Antonio Candido Calcagnoto 
• Visit of the City of Caxias do Sul 
• Informal presentation to students from the Universidade de Caxias do Sul/ 
Evening Course 
Friday, April 26 
Visit Porto Alegre 
• Meeting with Marketing Students at the Escola Superior de Propaganda e 
Marketing - ESPM 
Saturday, April27 
• Departure to Rio de Janeiro 
Sunday, April 28 
• Visit to Ipanema and Copacabana 
Monday, April 29 
• Visit to the Universidade Federal Fluminense - UFF 
• Visit to the Canadian Consulate 
Tuesday, April 30 
• Visit to the Centro Brasileiro de Rela<;:oes Internacionais - CEBRI (visit cancelled 
at the last minute) 
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Wednesday, May 1st 
• Free Day due to Brazil's Labour Day Holiday 
Thursday, May 2nd 
• Informal visit to Centro Brasileiro de Relac;oes Internacionais - CEBRI with 
Mr. Ademar Cruz 
Thursday, May 3rd 
• Return to Canada via Miami 
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A Project totally conceived and managed by 
the Independent Study Committee 
made up of the undergraduate students : 
Edith da Costa, ]essica Dionne, Maria Faija, Guillaume Landry, 
Marie-Claire Lemay, ]anice Leung, and Vanessa Lishingman 
International Studies Programme, 
Glendon College, York University 
Proceedings of the Conference held at Glendon College 
on February 23, 2002 
and Field Trip Experiences and Impressions 
(April 9th, 2002 to May 3rd, 2002) 
Papers assembled by the student Independent Study Committee 
and edited by Rosana Barbosa Nunes and Domenico Mazzeo 
Toronto. August 2002 
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